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ABSTRACT
The thesis is divided into four parts. Each part deals with one
aspect of ideological thought.
The first part attempts to define the area for study by indicating how
the terms ideology and ideological will be understood, and some reasons
for dissatisfaction with previous attempts to define the term. It
then considers the objection that any attempt to examine the concept
of ideology must itself be a rival ideological version of events. This
objection is examined by contrasting philosophy as an activity with
ideology and offering reasons for holding that they are a) different
activities b) philosophy does not underpin a particular ideological
model. Thus, it is possible to offer a disinterested study of our
subject.
The second part examines the relationship between history and ideology.
It attempts to show that history is an autonomous enterprise and that
it offers a special and particular understanding of the past. In
contrast, it is suggested that there are other ways of understanding
the past (of which ideology may be one) but that we can distinguish
between them and the historical understanding of the past by looking
at the appropriate context.
The third part looks at three particular ideologies - Marxism, Liberalism,
and Conservatism. It attempts to illustrate the part played by the
past in these ideologies and to thus make concrete the argument of part II
that ideologiets are interested in the past, but not in history. The
argument looks at the relationship between the past and the other
aspects of each ideology, for example, the view of human nature, of
political activity and of social change. It is suggested that the
important feature of the past for ideologists is the practical information
it can provide, rather than the knowledge it can generate at a
theoretical level. The vision of the past which Marxists, Liberals
and Conservatives have is determined by these other elements, such
that even if we wanted to, examining the Marxists view of the past,
as history, would be to distort it.
Having contrasted ideological understanding of the past with an 'academic'
understanding in the shape of history, part four looks at the relation¬
ship between ideology and religion. The purpose here is to see
whether understandings of the past which are not academic (they are
termed 'practical' here) are of the same type. The conclusion is that
there are as many differences between two 'practical' entities such as
ideology and religion, as there are between ideology and 'academic'
disciplines. Thus the 'shape' of ideology is thrown into relief from
two sides, that of 'academic disciplines' and that of 'practical activity'.
The fourth part continues by raising the question of disagreements
between ideologists and poses some questions about their capacity for
resolution. It is argued that disputes between ideologists are not
like disputes or arguments between scientists of philosophers, because
they lack appropriate criteria. A more illuminating parallel, it is
claimed, is with moral disagreements, where fundamental values rather
than 'facts' are at stake.
The thesis seeks, by looking at how ideologists understand the past, and
by relating that understanding to the other aspects of ideological thought
to try and make clear the status of ideologies in relation to other areas
of thought. It concludes that though ideologies do not offer us an
objective or theoretically illuminating understanding of events, they
should not be dismissed as a mere parasite on political activity. They
are closer to religion and to morality than to science, philosophy or
history, without being identical to them. Thus, to dismiss them as
if they were the poor relations of academic enquiry may be to
misunderstand them.
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The study of ideological thought does not present the potential
investigator with an obvious path to pursue. Indeed, it may well
be the case that the investigation of ideological thought can be
carried on profitably within several disciplines. For example,
it might be suggested that philosophers, historians and sociologists
all have an interest here. Philosophy might be conceived as being
interested in the concept of ideology, history in the chronological
development of the term, or in the development of particular ideo¬
logies, and sociology in explaining why various social groupings
hold certain ideological positions. It would clearly be an
enormous undertaking to assess the relative merits of each possible
approach, but this task is, fortunately, something that we do not
need to take up here. Rather, what we need to do is note the limits
of each type of investigation and select the appropriate discipline
for the kind of investigation we wish to pursue.
Because the concerns of this thesis are conceptual in character we
are committed to the methods and standards of philosophical inquiry.
It may be worthwhile, therefore, at the outset, to indicate something
of the manner in which philosophy is understood as an activity here.
This will help provide the background for a later part of the dis¬
cussion in this chapter on the distinction between ideology and
philosophy and it may, indirectly, help to show why philosophy does
not need to be supplemented here by the findings of history or
sociology. Philosophers do, of course, disagree about the nature
of their own subject and a particular view of philosophical inquiry
might not be expected to gain universal approval. The point,
however, is not to engage in the rather large task of defining a
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view of philosophy and defending it against all possible objections
but to delineate those features necessary for the rast of this
inquiry to proceed and, in particular, to put forward acceptable
reasons (based upon those features) for rejecting the charge that
we are merely offering an alternative ideological vision to those
under scrutiny.
Though most people would find it easy to agree that Plato, Aristotle,
Descartes, Hume, G E Moore and Wittgenstein were all philosophers
they might not find it so easy to agree on what the above were doing
when they did philosophy. In a well known paper on this very topic,!
Freidrich Waismann wrote how difficult it was to set out a series of
formal distinctions that would define philosophy and instead gave
examples of 'typical' philosophical arguments such as the reductio
ad absurdum or the location of an infinite regress. Though it can
be legitimately suggested that there is a lot more to philosophy than
arguments (in Waismann's sense), Waismann is surely correct to suggest
that the distinguishing marks of philosophy are to be found in its
methods rather than in its subject matter. The scientist, historian,
theologian and philosopher might all be said to attempt to understand
the world, but they do so in different ways. Some examples might
make this clearer. An historian might be interested in resolving
the question of whether or not the battle of Mons Grampius was fought
in Somerset or near Aberdeen, and the investigation of this question
would call for documents, archaeological evidence, clues in the liter-
""
F Waismann, How I see philosophy, ed. R Harre (London; Macmillan, 1968)
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ature or folklore of the time and so on. As more information becomes
available, one interpretation may appear to be more plausible than
others. The philosopher, on the other hand, is interested in a
different order of question - "Is the past knowable at all ?"
Sceptical doubt on this matter would not be resolved by the production
of more factual evidence, since a sceptic's doubts would cover all
evidence. Again, the physiologist might be interested in how certain
nerves transmit signals to the brain when heat is applied to the skin,
and whether or not such impulses can be measured by sophisticated
instruments. The philosopher is interested in the question, "Can
we ever hnow that another person is in pain ?" It is clear that the
philosopher does not require evidence in the sense that the historian
or scientist do, but needs to examine (in the examples above) our
concept of knowing. What, in other words, is involved in the claim
to know that an event happened in the past or that X has a toothache ?
In this sense, philosophy investigates the presuppositions of
judgements rather than their factual or empirical content.
This may give the impression that philosophical questions arise only
out of non-philosophical activities such as science or history. The
philosopher is seen as someone whose activities are parasitic upon
other forms of learning. It is true that philosophy is involved in
reminding us of the limits of, say, science or theology and in crit¬
icising attempts to push claims beyond their appropriate logical
limits, but it is equally important to note that the general questions
mentioned above may equally be said to arise from general epistemological
questions that have always been central to philosophical inquiry. In
this sense philosophy is not parasiiic upon other activities, it is
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an attempt to elucidate the nature of the world in a certain way (and
that investigation may involve looking at claims, or what is involved
in making claims, in history, science or theology). On this view,
philosophy would be concerned to look at the form rabher than the
content of ideological thoaght; or in other words, to examine the
kind of claims ideologists are making.
At this point someone might reasonably object that philosophy appears
to be concerned with the question of meaning to the exclusion of
questions of truth. We surely want to know more than the type of
claim the ideologist or religious believer is making, we want to know
if they are true: not, perhaps in the sense of factually true, but
in the sense of coherent or rational. After all, it might be said,
a great many absurd beliefs are entertained by large numbers of
people; surely it is failing in our duty as philosophers if we
neglect to criticise as well as elucidate these various beliefs and
doctrines, and surely it is carrying kindness too far to give them
equal epistemological status. Such an objection is, however, based
upon a misconception. To talk of truth is to talk of appropriate
and agreed criteria for settling a question. Thus two scientists
with opposing views would be bound by the results of a properly
conducted experiment, two theologians would be bound by a sacred text
and two historians would be bound by the production of appropriate
evidence. It is clear that within science, theology or history we
can speak of truth or falsity since there are accepted standards,
which can be appealed to. The difficulty comes when we try and ask
in general is science, or religion, true or false ? What is to be
the standard here ?
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It nay make matters clearer to go back for a moment to the question
of meaning. A religious claim, such as 'God made the world', may
look logically akin to a statement such as 'Chippendale made that
chair', but may in fact be of a different type altogether, since we
would not imagine that it could be verified by anything like the same
methods. Thus, a closer look at the meaning of a statement may help
us to avoid a category mistake in which we use the criteria of one
area to judge a matter that belongs to another. It would be as if
we judged how good cricketer X was by how many goals he scored. This
does not mean that all statements that purport to be religious are
automatically exempt from criticism of any sort. Some claims made
by believers do appear to be cast in the form that would subject them
to scientific criteria, and in that case they would have to meet
fchose standards. My point is that they need not be so, and although
this may preclude them from making claims of a certain sort, it also
gives them exemption fvom a certain sort of criticism as well.
Further, the standards of theology or science are not invented by
philosophers but arise out of, and are intelligible within, the
activities of religion or science itself.'*
This may seem like a mere appeal to accepted conventions. If
anything can be shown to have a social basis then it becomes exempt
from external criticism. This, however, is not my position, for I
am only arguing against the kind of inappropriate criticism which
systematically misunderstands the type of claims that are being made.
For a fuller discussion see P Winch,The idea of a social science;
and its relation to philosophy (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958)
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It may, however, be worth touching briefly on the issue of convention¬
alism. In the writings of some philosophers (The Protagorus for
example) this is taken to mean the acceptance of the majority view
("Man is the measure of all things"). There is a different sense in
which we can understand the term, namely that humans do not make
judgements in a void, they are made within a way of life in wkich
certain ways of thinking are familiar. Wittgenstein discusses this
issue and raises the objection "So you are saying that human agreement
decides what is true and what is false ?" to which he replies "It is
what human beings say that is true or false; and they agree in the
language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in a form
of life".^ This does not mean that people are free to make any kind
of judgements they like, or to 'invent' a form of life that pleases
them. It would be absurd, for example, to deny that the physical
world imposes certain constraints upon us, or to deny that conventions
can and do change (often quite radically) over time. My point is
that it is only because certain conventional standards are accepted
as taken for granted that any questions of truth and falsity can be
decided at all even if, over time, those conventions are abandaned
for 6&hers. This does not, as our objector might imagine, let
anyone off the hook, for the assessment of what is involved in a 'form
of life' does not exclude the possibility of criticising judgements,
either for failing to conform to those internal standards (for example,
a scientist produces an hypothesis that is unfalsifiable by evidence)
or for overstepping the logical limits of that activity (for example,
3
L Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1953), para 241.
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the psychologist x^ho wants to reduce all human behaviour to talk of
causes^). What it does exclude is the elevation of one way of looking
at the world over all others, unless we can show that all these other
various forms of thought and intellectual activities are really
attempts to do or say the sane thing as that wne way in a more or less
successful manner. Thus whilst one might not doubt that if the
Azande want to grow more crops per square yard they would be best
advised to use fertiliser and not sacrifice a chicken, what one can
doubt is whether the action of sacrificing a chicken before planting
crops must be understood as an attempt to achieve the same effect as
a liberal dose of John Innes potting compost.
The more general point that is being expressed here may thus be
elucidated in terms of understanding the relationship between nature
and convention. Becaase we inherit a sy3tem of thought and of
concepts, our view of nature is formed through them. We can only
express views from within a conceptual scheme and that scheme is
presupposed whilst we make judgements of a certain sort. This does
not mean that such conceptual schemes have nothing to do with nature,
for they are clearly modified in the light of experience and their
adqquacy in helping solve the problems they are addressing themselves
to. Thus science supercedes alchemy because it provides a superior
framework for understanding and manipulating physical processes. The
survival of 'forms of life' and their development or refinement over
time is, then, at least partly due to their ability to deal with "the
facts of nature" and to work in terms of what it is they are trying to
I am assuming here, for the sake of the argument, that such a view
is false.
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do.' They survive because they enable us to do, say, or express
something of importance. What I have been trying to suggest here
is that the task of elucidating the logic of vaiious activities does
not preclude the philosopher from being critical (cf Wittgenstein
and psychology) but that qua philosopher he or she can no more
change the rules of an activity such as science than the scientist can
change the laws of nature. Wittgenstein put the matter in the
following way:
Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use
of language. It can, in the end, only describe it.
For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves
everything as it is. ^
Later on he described philosbphy as a kind of therapy for various
disorders of the understanding. This view appears to be susceptible
to a knock down argument which demonstrates that philosophical
enlightenment is not like being cured of an illness; for in the
latter case we are restored to a former state of health, but in the
case of philosophical understanding we are not restored to a previous
state but have achieved greater clarity which has dispelled our
previous problems Philosophy has, in short, changed something. It
is not my aim to deny that philosophy would, in the case above, have
made a difference.- The question is "What kind of difference ?" For
example, to use an illustration mentioned earlier, if psychology is^
a barren science then the psychologist who comes to see this through
deeper philosophical understanding may legitimately claim that things
But we should note as E E Evans-Pritchard did, that the Zande grew
crops, and made objects perfectly adequately. Magic did not
conflict with this qctivity.
^
Wittgenstein, op cit, para 124
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are different and that it is impossible to continue as before.
This may be so, though it is important to note that what has changed
here is the psychologists understanding of that enterprise, rather
than the status of the enterprise itself. Philosophy has helped us
to see more clearly what was already there, and seeing that may make
it impossible to sustain certain claims. It aloes not, of course,
follow that such activities are therefore worthless, merely that
they are not what they seem or claim to be, and it may be possible
to continue with the activity under discussion in a different direction.
Thus, to take the case of ideologies, it may well be that they cannot
sustain claims to objectivity, and philosophy may show this. The
ideologist may, however, continue with his political activities having
accepted that they do not have the foundations he thought, or on the
other hand give them up because he considers them to be based upon
subjective assessment rather than objective knowledge. Philosophy
cannot guarantee either response, or say which one would be right here.
A second kknd of objection to the view of philosophy I have been out¬
lining is that it is insufficiently historical. It treats philosophical
debates as if they were all taking place now, and treats Descartes and
Aristotle as if they were members of an Oaford college. David Miller,
in the opening pages of his book 'Social Justice'' argues that such
terms as justice and fairness change in meaning over time and that we
cannot, therefore, assume that all the various philosophers who have
used the term are contributing in a more or less satisfactory or coherent
D Miller, Social Justice (OxfordJ Clarendon Press, 1979)
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way to the same debate. An extreme version of this thesis is put
forward by Quentin Skinner who argues that there simply are no
perennial problems in philosophy. On this view, before we can get
to grips with the arguments of Descartes or Aristotle we need to
engage in some preliminary historical research as a necessary supplement
to philosophy. In the context of the philosophical investigation of
ideological thought it might be argued that we need to start with a
preliminary historical inquiry into previous uses of the term.
It is certainly true that as an activity, philosophy has a history,
and also that certain terms have changed their meaning over time.
But these admissions need not lead to the conclusions that Miller and
Skinner advance. Though Aristotle was a Creek and Hegel a German,
their philosophical reflections were not intended to give an account
of Greek or German institutions or mores during a particular epoch.
Miller, who argues that 'linguistic' philosophy is parochial because
it only looks at 'our' notions of democracy or freedom, undermines his
own arguments a few pages further on, when he talks about the three or
four major models of society that will find defenders in each generation
or epoch.9 in this he is surely correct, for the argument over whether
sovereignty can only be exercised by virtue of a contract between a
ruler and people is one which can recur in a whole host of political
circumstances and over a number of years. In this sense, historical
examples which philosophers may advance are not there as factual
points but as reminders that what is actual is also logically possible.
It is worth noting that when philosophers such as Aristotle did discuss
* Q Skinner, Meaning and uiiderstanding in the History of Ideas, History
and Theory, Vol 8 (1969), 1-54
^
Miller, op cit, 12-13
the notion of duty or obedience they did so, not in terms of the polis
but in much more general terms, for example through the dilemma that
might face a captain at sea. Miller, by devoting part of his book
to looking at the claims of Hume and Kropotkin, seems to implicitly
accept that they are both contributions to the philosophical question
of justice, even though they are separated by many years and wrote in
different 'problem situations'. The test of the answers they give
cannot be that they have adequately described the political or moral
institutions of their time, but that the account they have given of
justice either gives, or fails to give an adequate exposition to
the conditions that would need to pertain if we were to be able to
speak of justice at all. That is, it must encompass all talk of
justice ana not just a particular use. Thus our criticisms are along
the lines that X's account is inconsistent, contradictory or fails to
give account of a viable alternative, not that the Athenian constit¬
ution has been misquoted.
Skinner, on the other hand, makes his claims in the course of more
general reflections on the nature of the history of ideas and on the
relationship between an adequate philosophical theory and good
intellectual history. Much of this need not concern us here. The
claiiii that is worth investigating from cur point of view is that there
are no perennial questions which the 'great books' of political
philosophy seek to answer. The persistence of the term justice, for
example, says nothing about the persistence of the question to which
it might have been used to answer.'^ Skinner has several sceptical
^
Skinner, op cit, 39
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arguments about traditional solutions to the question of how we come
to understand the works of great philosophers in the past, be it that
of poring over the text or of looking at the general historical context
in which such works were written. In the end he concludes that we not
only need to understand what was said but also to grasp what he terms
(following Professor Austin) the illocutory force.^ According to
Skinner understanding a text is equivalent to recovering a complex
intention on the part of the author, the social context being part of
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this linguistic enterprise. There are clear analogies with the
work of Collingwood here. He concludes by arguing that any statement
is the embodiment of a particular intention addressed to a particular
question, hence the lack of perennial problems.
In general one would want to agree with a lot of the negative conclusions
advanced by Skinner. In particular, he is quite correct to stress the
dangers of attempting to foist 'doctrines' on writers by adding up'
various scattered parts of their works and pretending that they are
contributions to a single problem. He is also correct to preach on
the dangers of looking 'behind' the works of various authors and
constructing the history of (literally) ideas that 'anticipate'
future developments or conflict with each other at some abstract level
("Evolution versus the Great Chain of Being", "science versus religion"
and so on). Indeed, one might go on here and suggest that Skinner does
not press some of his claims as far as he could, with interesting,
if negative, implications for that whole enterprise rThe History of
^





However, in terms of his discussion of philosophy and its history, there
is less to be said for Skinner's approach. Consider the question
"Can a good man be harmed ?" and the discussion of that question in
'The Gorgias' where we wre invited to look at the tyrant who triumphs
according to the standards of the world by lying, cheating, torturing
and killing to achieve power and the 'lover of good' (as Kierkegaard
might put it) who suffers the horrors of punishment for the sfcke of a
moral principle. Though there would be many points of difference
between Greek moral standards and our own (slavery, the position of
women and so on) this would not inhibit us from discussing the philo¬
sophical thesis at issue here (namely, does moral 'good' reside in
the nature of actions irrespective of the consequences, or is it only
contingently related to our actions and in that sense dependent upon
the consequences). It is difficult to see how Skinner could object
to the modern Utilitarian who seeks to show that the Socratic view of
morality is confused, or the modern philosopher x*ho wants to revive
and defend what Socrates says. To be sure, the circumstances of the
debate are different, and different things may hang on the outcome,
but it would still be difficult to uphold the view that the question
"Can a good man be harmed ?" is, in the Gcrgias, a particular question
for Athhnians of that era. The defender of the Socratic view is
after all, seeking to show that the Utilitarian has in a general sense
failed to grasp the distinction between moral good and practical gain.
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Thst is to say, though ideas may form part of the history of, say,
the Bolshevik rising or the Cuban revolution, they cannot be
'abstracted' from those events and linked together merely as ideas
and then put in chronological sequence.
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Skinner goes some way to admitting this when, towards the end of his
essay he concedes that there may be timeless questions, if not timeless
answers.^ There is some confusion in Skinner's thought here, for
it would seem to be a reasonable response that questions and ansxrers
are logically related, such that if the questions are the same, then so
may be the answers. What Skinner might have in mind is the fact that
some questions can allow for several (ecually) logically viable
answers (which may or may not be mutually exclusive). But this is a
different matter.
A more general criticism of Skinner's approach here is that he has
conflated two ways in which we can look at the past writings of philo¬
sophers. Just because a book was written 300 years gge does not mean
that we must look at it historically, any more than the fact that
Poussin lived 300 years ago means that our aesthetic judgement of his
paintings must be hsitorical. The point being made is that as an
historian of ideas Skinner may be interested in why Machiavelli wrote
the Prince', who was being attacked in it, where the ideas were
developed from and so on. And Skinner writes very eloquently on the
dangers and difficulties that are involved in this kind of reconstruction.
The context here is quite clearly that of the past understood
historically and involving questions such as who, why, what, and where ?
On the other hand, a philosopher may not be interested in that kind of
question at all. He or she may be interested purely in the validity
of a certain argument, or in seeing whether an argument of a certain
form helps solve a related difficulty (as Skinner himself uses Austin's
distinction) rather than understanding what Machiavelli intended to do.
Op cit, 52
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There is nothing wrong with either activity, they are merely different;
and problems in the interpretation of the former do not necessarily
make philosophy more difficult. Indeed, discovering Machiavelli's
intention would be an end in itself for the historian of ideas, but it
would not even be a starting point for philosophy, for philosophy is not
about reconstructing the arguments of other people, it is about ctiti-
cising arguments in the appropriate manner. The arguments can be based
upon the works of other, or imaginary, people. What matters is that
the criticisms are valid. I am suggesting that the works of Machia¬
velli are, for philosophers, not the repository of certain arguments
that need to be accurately reconstructed, but a stimulus to the
philosophical imagination. Thus it may be the case that Skinner (or
someone else) comes up with an interpretation of Machiavelli which
seems to shed light on a range of philosophical problems which vex us.
Surely the philosophical enlightenment that has been achieved would
still be there even if subsequent research were to show that Skinner's
interpretation was completely aricorrect ? In short, good philosophy
is not dependent upon good history.
I will return to the nature of philosophy as an activity at a later
stage when its relationship with ideology is being discussed at
greater length.
The second step which needs to be taken at this point is to consider
in more detail how we are to understand the nature of ideolggical
thought in this thesis. As we have already noted, one suggested
approach is to look back at the various uses of ideology and to list
them and outline them in a more or less comprehensive way. This is the
approach used by John Plamenatz in his book 'Ideology'and by Henry
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J Plamenatz, Ideology (London: Macmillan, 1971).
Drucker in 'The Political Uses of Ideology'.Both Plamenfitz and
Drucker point out the origin of the term in the works of Destutt de
Tracy, the way in which Napoleon gave the term a derogatory meaning
and How Marx used the term in a pejorative sense to account for what
he saw as certain features of bourgeois thought, Mannheim took up
Marx's use and applied it to Marxism itself. This would leave us in
a state of some confusion, since we could go on from here and list
many more uses of the term ideological which have entered into our
political vocabulary since Mannheim's day and still be little the
wider about the nature of the concept we are investigating. There
is, after all, more to jjliilosophy than compiling a dictionary.
Since Marx in particular has been responsible for much current usage
of the term, we need to examine his view of ideology: not as an
historical exercise, but to see if his account is indeed coherent.
If it is then the matter is solved. If, on the other hand, it is not,
then we need to sketch out an alternative that will make sense of the
term without suffering the twin dangers of vacuity or over-restriction.
In particular we need to make sure that our understanding of ideology
makes sense of the practice of politics.
Marx's views on ideology are scattered throughout his writings, and
we are always at risk of falling into the Skinnerian trap of 'prolepsis'
if we attempt to reconstruct a 'doctrine'. However, it is in order
to relate several features of Marx's view which can be discussed.
For Marx, unlike de Tracy, ideology is something to be contrasted
with 'science'. It has two main features. Firstly it is connected
^
H M Drucker, The PolitJ.cal_ Uses of Ideology (London; Macmillan, 1974)
with what Marx called 'false consciousness', whfcre the bourgeois or pro¬
letarian who is in the grip of ideology has a mistaken perception of how
the world 'really'iis. In this sense, the bourgeois notion of the state
is ideological and needs to be unmasked. A Marxist cannot have an ideology,
thus understood, since Marxist science has revealed how things 'really'
are. Secondly, ideology is something that justifies a particular class
position by producing an apologia for it. Thus, during various historical
epochs there will be different justifications for the ruling class of the
day (the Divine Right of Kings in 17th century). Such deception will not
be needed in the proletarian state, and again, in this sense the Marxist
claims not to have an ideology. There is a related sense in which an
ideology might be understood (as in Lenin) as underpinning a political
position, and in this sense the proletariat does havenan ideology - that of
scientific socialism. This broad view has recently been defended by
D*vid Miller in an article entitled "Ideology and false consciousness"*^.
The introduction of Miller here is not intended as that of a 'typical'
Marxist. Rather, he offers a view which is a fclear exposition of arguments
that are to be found, and referred to, in the works of Marxists. Thus,
though Marx may not have used the term of 'false consciousness', the coneept
is, I believe, quite applicable in this context as a feature of the Marxist
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view of ideology."' For esample, in the 'German Ideology', Marx wrote:
This conception of history depends on our ability to expomnd the
real process of production, starting out from the material pro¬
duction of life itself, and to comprehend the form of intercourse
connected with this and created by this mode of production (ie
Civil Society in its various stages) as the basis of all history;
and to show it in action as State, to explain all the different
theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion,
philosophy, ethics, etc, etc, and trace their origins and growth
from that basis: by which means, of course, the whole thing can
be depicted in its totality (and therefore too the reciprocal
17
D Miller, Ideology and False Consciousness, Political Studies XX, No 4,
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H Marx and F Engels, The German Ideology, Ed C J Arthur (London:
Lawrence and Wishart, 1970), 58-60
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actions of the various sides on one another) ...
In the whole coneeption of history up to the present
this real basis of history has either been totally
neglected or else considered as a minor matter
quite irrelevant to the course of history. History
must therefore always be written according to an
extraneious standard; the real production of life
seems to be primeval history, while the truly his¬
torical appears to be separated from ordinary life
as something extra-superterrestrial ... The
exponents of this conception of history have
consequently only been able to see in history the
political actions of princes and States, religious
and all sorts of theoretical struggles, and in
particular in each historical epoch have hadeto
share the illusion of that epoch. For instance,
if an epoch imagines itself to be actuated by
purely 'political' or 'religious' motives,
although 'religion' and 'politics' are only forms
of its true motives, the historian accepts this
opinion.
Ideology for Miller has three salient, related features - causal
origins, false consciousness and functional role. The key here is
the notion of false consciousness for, implicit in Miller's argument
is the assumption that if we can show certain views to be patently
and demonstrably false then it is quite legitimate, indeed forced
upon us, to ask about the origins of such specious nonsense and
exactly whose interests the. propagation of such falsehoods profits.
Thus Miller is quite aware of the distinction between why someone
holds a set of beliefs and their truth or falsity (there is no
reductionist thesis at work here) but holds that false beliefs demand
an explanation if someone ought to see that they are false but "till
holds onto them. Fefore discussing the more substantial issues at
stake here it is worth noting that Miller, though he sees himself as
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offering philosophical analysis of the concept of ideology, is quite
prepared to admit that this analysis may be shown to be ideological by
its own criteria though it is not clear whether he would regard this
as a damaging philosophical criticism.
I think that all three elements of Miller's thesis have difficulties.
As ha admits himself, there are notorious problems associated with the
base/superstructure model of society, and he admits the pertinence of
some of Plamenatz's criticisms on tlios point. lie argues, however,
that we can distinguish between ideas <tm the ecnnomic base and ideas
in the superstructure, the latter being caused (in a loose sense) by
the physical aspects of production. Thus
it is possible to look for a causal relationship
between the physical aspect of production and the
mental aspect, between, for example, the type of
agriculture with a society possesses and the
social relations within which this agriculture is
carried on.
^
Marx's claim is understood as being that the form of ideas and. beliefs
under a given mode of production is governed by the physical aspects
of that production and that if a tribe changes, say, from hunting to
farming, then their ideas and social structure will change as well.
It is, of course, true that we can. think of many instances where some¬
thing like this has happened. The history of the colonisation of
Africa and Latin America is full of stories of changes in economic
circumstances leading, to the decline in traditional values and ways of
life. It mirght equally be pointed out that there are counter examples
where changes in beliefs lead to changes in lifestyle, but the causal




Firstly, though Killer may claim that a causal thesis can be invoked
once ideas have been shown to be false, he does not see that this
brings together two seemingly incompatible categories. The point is
that causes and reasons do not so much compliment as exclude one
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another. If views are caused then they are what they are and we
cannot sensibly ask of them whether they are true or false. Me
ingght ask for the reasons why X holds a false belief, but that is a
different matter.
Thus, whilst bourgeois ideas may have origins, they are not caused in
kiiller's sense. Secondly, if we say that X acted according to, or
because of, certain beliefs (whether or not they are true) we are
asserting a logical connection and not a causal one. To act in
accordance with a belief is not to draw attention to a cause (the
belief) and its effect (the action) but to note that holding a belief
is a logical ppe-requisite of acting in that way. In other words, to
talk of the causation of ideas ist, in this context, misleading, since
belief and action do not follow on from each other, the possession of
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one is a condition for the intelligibility of the other.
It may be true that what Marx envisages here is the fact that in any
given society there will be a limited range of choices which is related
in some sense to the economic state of that society. But if that is
so, then it is difficult to see how Marxism itself manages to so
comprehensively break the limitations that ought to be imposed upon it.
The second part of Miller's arguroent is that the notion of 'false
A great deal of philosophical literature exists on this very
question, but it is not an issue that the background of which
can be gone into here.
21
See D J Manning (ed), The_Form^of Ideology (London: Allen &
Unwin, 198C), 9-10.
consciousness' is an essential element of ideological thought.
'False consciousness' is a notoriously slippery term, involving as
it does, not only the concept of being mistaken, hut being mistaken
in a special kind of way. For example, the scientists who were in
the grip of pre-Newtonian physics were mistaken (let us again assume
this for the sake of argument) but were not in the grip of 'false
consciousness'. Miller outlines several conditions that are
components of 'false consciousness' including theoretical rigour
and conceptual adequacy; but the problem here is how to distinguish
between 'false consciousness' and merely being mistaken. If religion
is a fraud, what has the believer done other than made a rather
disastrous and important miscalculation about non-existent future
benefits ? Such a view would, in any case, presuppose that it is
an obvious matter that religion or those political forms which are
non-Marxist are self-evidently false. It does not seem a plausible
thesis that Conservatism, Liberalism, and Nationalism are so self-
evidently false that anyone who adopts them should be immediately
suspected of suffering from 'false consciousness'. And again, we
would have to explain why Marxism is exempt. Secondly, hhis view
would seem to be based upon a fairly restricted notion of what
constitutes rational behaviour, in the sense that an action which does
not obviously promote either the material or spiritual benefit of the
actar can be dismissed a3 irrational and an aaample of 'false
consciousness'. There are two points to be made here. Firstly,
in the ca3e of certain types of action (for example, moral or ethical
decisions), what is of benefit is determined by the beliefs that we
have rather than determined by the opinions of an external observer.
Thus someone like Thomas More might willingly go to the scaifold and
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claim that this is not a waste, but a vindication, of his beliefs.
Secondly, we can think of counter examples to the Marxist thesis where
people engage in activities which may not be to their personal
advantage (those duties imposed by legal or moral ties, for example)
and are indeed unsuccessful or lead to disaster, but not irrational
since we can understand the logic of them. Thus the soldier who
dies for a cause that is lost (and he knows it to be lest) might be
behaving unreasonably (or even wrongly) but not irrationally, since
we can understand his action in terms Bucb as loss of honour, respect
for his dead compatriots and so on. The Spartans, for example,
despised the survivors of a defeated army.
What Miller may have in mind when he discusses 'false consciousness'
is something like the situation painted by D Z Phillips when discussing
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the closely related notion of 'self-deception ." Phillips gives
the example of a motner who maintains that her child is musically
gifted, when it is obvious to everyone else that the child has little
musical talent. When confronted by arguments to this effect, the
mother resorts to a series of qualifications and excuses, such as
the child has a sore throat, nerves and so on. It is certainly
plausible here to say we have something more than a mere mistake
about a matter of fact. But it must be noted that what we do nave
are a series of agreed standards to which the child fails to conform
- it cannot hold notes, read music, recognise tunes. It is not as
if the child was a painter where its pictures broke with an accepted
style, where the standard of judgement itself might be in dispute.
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The mother admits that these arguments count against her assertions
but resorts to excuses or qualifications to explain her child's short¬
comings. But the position with, say the Marxist critique of Liberalism
is more closely akin to the analogy of the new painting style rather
than the tone deaf child singer. That is to say, it is the standards
that are not agreed upon. In the case of the mother there is nothing
wrong with the standards but with her judgement, in the case of
Liberals and Marxists it is the very standards that are held to be
at fault.
Presumably it is the third element in Miller's argument that is intended
to supplement the thesis at thss stage. The scientist who holds to a
false theory is unexceptional (if unfortunate) but if we could show
that he gains in some material sense from the belief that his theory
is true and knows that the theory is suspect then there may well he
something worth investigating here. The image is that of the witch
doctor withholding information about western medicines in order to
preserve his position in the tribe, or the pedlar of quack medicines
in the wild west who trades on the ignorance of his customers.
Applied to single instances this viev is quite in order. We can
think of innumerable examples of opinions conveniently held for the
advancement of career, to make a profit and so on. What is not so
clear is whether or not we can hold this view to an entity such as
Liberalism or Roman Catholicism. To say that all Liberals, or even
the whole of the 'ruling class' holds the views that it does in order
to mislead the proletariat clearly rests on heroic assumptions that are
unsupported by any empirical evidence. Indeed, one of the clinching
arguments is that an empirical survey of such people would show them
denying this thesis ! The general point to be established is that the
notion of false or corrupt motivation (as in the man such as Cardinal
Wolsey, who only holds opinions in order to gain advancement with the
King, and who changes them to order) is parasitic upon the notion of
genuine motivation. In other words, if there were not examples of
genuine religious motivation we could not accuse Wolsey of corrupting
those standards. The thesis is, therefore, either susceptible to
decisive empirical refutation or buys exemption at the cost of uacuity
by destroying the contrast on which itsasense depends.
A further difficulty arises out of making sense of Miller's claims
about the function of entities such as Liberalism, as opposed to the
function of an element wit!tin them. It may seem to be merely playing
with words to protest that talk of the function of Liberalism implies
that Liberalism was designed or invented by someone (or a group of
people) in the way that the Nigerian parliament was 'designed' by
British civil servants. But this is plainly not the case. Liberals
may have purposes that they pursue in the political arena, but it no
more fellows from this that Liberalism has a purpose, than it follows
from the fact that footballers try to score goals that the purpose of
football is to score goals, or from the fact that because we pass laws
in parliament that the purpose of parliament is to pass laws !
It may be said here that not all functi.cns need to be understood in
terms of conscious design or intention. For example, certain actions
might have unintended consequences which lead them to function in a
certain way. The digestive system is not consciously operated by a
human, and was certainly not designed directly, yet it clearly has a
function in terms of the human body. Nothing I have said above is
intended to controvert this view, there are indeed unintended consequ¬
ences of actions and non-designed functions. My point, however, is to
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suggest that though the Marxist nay argue that the function of parlia¬
mentary democracy is to subvert the proletariatfby turning its attention
to the meaningless rituals of the form of power whilst distracting them
from, the reality of a class based society (even though there are not
evil conspirators in the wings who have designed it for that pvw-pose)j
there is no sense in vftich this opinion can be given an independent
expression outside Marxism and subject to conformation or rejection
by objective criteria, since all the evidence that the Marxist can
point to can also be used by a Liberal or Conservative to explain an
entirely different version of events.
Everything in the Marxist sense, may be said to have a function
because there can be unintended consequences which flow from it, But
it is difficult to see how we can move from the consequences _to
the function without running into a logical error. The Marxists,
proof that the function of parliament X3 to castrate the revolutionary
zeal of the proletariat i3 of the form "If the function of parliament
is to prevent revolutions there would be no revolutions. There are
no revolutions, therefore that is the function of parliament," ie
affirming the consequent.
If the above arguments are correct, then Miller has failed to distinguish
the 'ideology' of his opponents from Marxist 'science' and has,
therefore, given us no reason for accepting his analysis of the term
as being a profitable tool for the understanding of politics. This
was the substance of the criticisms of Marx offered by Mannheim in
'Ideology and Utopia'; Marxism is seen as a partial view of the world
and is, in its own terms, ideological. Mannheim offers the solution
based upon the conception of the sociology of knowledge and classless
(in this sense, disinterested) intellectual. It is not my intention
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to discuss his views here, since it may be argued that they are
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susceptible to the very arguments we have used against Marx.
Instead I want to look at a rather different view of ideology put
forward by Michael Oakeshott. Unlike those philosophers who see
the identification of contradiction at the heart of understanding
ideological thought, Oakeshott holds that the ideologist has
misconceived the nature of political activity and that is this
fact which has led to the spectacular disasters in the name of
reason, justice and liberty. Hie Liberal search for rational
principles to govern political activity has led to practical chaos.
It is, nowever, worth noting that part of the exercise is, as with
Marx, to distinguish between the ideological and one's own political
views. For Oakeshott, Conservatism is a disposition rather tnan
a settled doctrine or series of dogsas. It is the preference for
the known over the unknown and tne familiar over the unfamiliar,
allied to the belief that the mastery of politics is the result of
a combination of skills that arise from engagement in that practice.
This distinguishes the Conservative from his 'rationalist' opponent
who attempts to run society according to a jblan' which depends
upon abstract principles rather than concrete experience. Ideology
is, for Oakeshott, an attempt to abridge experience or a practice
by seating doxm guiding principles which serve as a 'crib' for the
politically inexperienced or unsophisticated. His analogy is of
tne difference between the master chef who has learnt the art of
cookery and whose projects and skill stem from his experience on the
one hand, and the kitchen boy with a cook book on the other. The
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kitchen boy does not lack technical information about ingredients, but
2A
the experience that cannot be taught except by doing.
Tvo comments need to be made here. Firstly, it is not clear how an
ideology can, in Oakeshott's sense, he an abridgement. An abridgement
is, presumably a shortened version of a practice and it must be in the
same logical form as that which it shortens. Thus a book cannot be
an abridgement of a practice, it stands apart from practice. An
ideological treatise is neither an abridgement of political activity,
nor of a particular ideology since there is more to Liberalism and
Marxism than the writings of Mill or Marx.
Secondly, though there may well be Conservatives of an Oakeshhttian
'type' who reflect unselfconsciously, this will not do as a description
of Conservatism. Indeed, it is important to see hare that Oakeshott's
views are as much a contribution to Conservatism as a cPimaat upon it.
There are certainly many Conservatives who would take a different view
of political activity (see for example Lord Hailsham's "The Conaerv-
ative Case')" , including views which might involve the Cake3hottian
charge of 'rationalism'. Thus whilst we can say that Oakeshott is
part of the Conservative tradition, his is not the only genuine form
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of Conservative thought. If we look at Noel O'Sullevan s view"
that Conservatism is the 'politics of imperfection' and a 'limited style
of politics' (which may even involve the view that politics is unimp¬
ortant) it is still true that this involves an engagement in politics
rather than an eleganc commentary on political activity. If
2A
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Conservatism can be said to have arisen as a self-conscious reaction
to the French Revolution then it competes with Liberalism and Socialism,
and as such differs from sexual or moral conservatism or attachment
to a favourite pair of slippers. It is not a series of subjective
personal attitudes and Conservatives do not see it as such:
Conservatives, no less than Liberals or Socialists have a view of
appropriate political institutions best suited to human nature.
II
So far we have ignored the positive identification of ideological
thought and its place in political activity. Any alternative account
to that offered by Marx or Oakeshott cannot presumably consist of
merely listing other part or present uses. Rather it would have to
establish other appropriate connections between those entities
identified as ideologies and offer grounds for distinguishing them
from, say, moral or religious arguments.
As we shall see, there are dangers to be avoided here, either in the
form of offering a stipulative definition or looking for a common
essence (both within a particular ideology and amongst ideologies in
general). What I wish to do here is to offer some preliminary
remarks upon the characteristics of those ideologies we will be seeking
to understand and to investigate. I do not, of course, claim that
this will neatly encompass enerything. For example, it might be
suggested with some justification that Anarchism is an ideology and
yet it is difficult to see what sense can be made of it in terms of
specifying its content with sufficient precision to bring it within
our framework. Again, it is plausible to argue that there are some
ideologies in the process of coming into being - such as Feminism -
and that they are difficult to classify along with long established
traditions of ideological thought such as Marxism, Conservatism and
Liberalism.
The first characteristic worth noting is that we are dealing with
something that is systematic in character. Systematic does not
necessarily mean that they are coherent, but points to the fact that
they are not a random set of opinions, nor are they about a special
part of political life. Any and every aspect of political life is
relevant and can be accommodated within an ideological framework.
Indeed it is precisely this universality (we can explain anything!)
that is seen as a reason for the superiority of an ideology over its
rivals. There are, we might say, no surprises for the ideologist.
This last claim needs to be approached with some caution. I do not
mean that ideologists are completely indifferent to the facts, or that
they are not sometimes (if only initially) confounded by events; for
example, some Marxists were surprised by the Russian Revolution.
What I mean here is that no event can fail to be interpreted within
the logical framework of an ideology. Thus Lenin was able to account
for events in Russia by revising Marxism, but not its categories of
reference.
Related to this systematic character is the fact that ideologies are
self-conscious reflections or responses to political circumstances.
The idea of an unconscious Marxist (in the Freudian, rather than the
medical sense) is a bad joke. It is this self-conscious aspect that
allows particular ideologies to develop as traditions of thought with
a sense of continuity, rather than as a series of ad hoc responses to
circumstances, and to develop a distinctive vocabulary of politics,
a tradition of thought, accepted authorities and so on that sets them
apart from opponents.
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Given the systematic and self-conscious nature of ideological thought
it is not surprising that Liberalism, Marxism and Conservatism (to
take the three examples we shall be most concerned with) are all
informed by a view of human nature and political activity which binds
adherents together and distinguishes them from opponents. Liberals,
for example, taed to see men as autonomous individuals, whereas
Socialists see men as, above all, producers. Though it may be
possible within a particular ideology to dispute about the correct
Liberal or Marxist version of human nature, there are limits to how
far this can go. It would not be open for a Liberal, qua Liberal
to conclude that man is alienated by the capitalist mode of production.
This is not to say that Liberals do not or should not use the term
alienation, but they use it, I would suggest, in a metaphorical sense
that is different from the more technical use the term has in Marxism.
In a similar way, the Liberal sees political activity as the engagement
of 'reason' in human affairs, whereas the Marxist would see politics
as the conflict between classes and above all about power.
It is worth making a distinction at this point between an ideology
such as Marxism and a particular political party such as the Bolsheviks
or International Marxist Group who are Marxist parties. Marxism ceeates
a framework within which genuine (for Marxists) political activity can
take place. It is about general beliefs (all history is the history
of class struggle) which might be used to justify particular proposals
(the liquidation of the Kulaks, execution of the royal family, etc.).
Marxist parties who disagree with each other all attempt to justify
their particular programmne by appeals to the theoretical works of
Marx and Lenin and to evidence which supports their case. Whether or
not agreement is possible is another matter, and it might be noted
here that Marxists of varying kinds have never found it that difficult
to justify a particular policy through reference to Marxist texts, or
to evidence. A related point is that the relationship between the
theorists of an ideology (such as Lenin or J S Mill) and the members
of a political party which bases itself on that ideology(i.s not one
of master and pupil. By that I mean that there is not a one way
traffic in which the theorists lay down correct solutions which members
then put into practice. P.ather4 there is often a complex interaction
between the two and in many cases political change precedes theoretical
revision rather than vice versa (eg Trotsky and Stalin). A consequence
for the view of ideological language that we have been discussing here
is to note that although the purpose of the language of Liberalism or
Marxism is, at any given time, to put a distance between that ideology
and its rivals, it is possible that this language will change over
time such that terms which were once exclusively the property of a
particular group are used by opponents. An example of this would be
the way in which modern Conservatism has taken over many of the terms
and features of eighteenth century and nineteenth century Liberalism.
Ideologies do, of course, change over time. Indeed it is quite vital
to their survival as relevant instruments for bringing about political
change that they adapt to new circumstances and account for them.
Thus Marxism has had to account for the fact of the Russian Revolution
through Lenin's 'discovery" of Imperialism. Whether or not they do
so is, to a great extent, a matter of historical contingency. For
example, the success of the Russian Revolution has enabled Marxism to
survive in a way that National Socialism could not survive the
collapse of the Third Reich. But things could easily have happened
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the other way around.
So far we have seen that ideologies are systematic, self conscious
attempts to understand political practice on the basis of certain
general principles which are held to illuminate those features of
practical life that might puzzle these wishing to engage in political
activity. It follows from this that the point of ideological activity
is not merely to understand the world, but to change it. Hence the
need for political parties which can generate concrete programmes for
transforming the imperfect world we live in, or protecting it from
the insane plans of rationalists. There is an obvious absurdity in
the Marxist who will not engage in revolutionary activity or the
Nationalist who will not work for independence. The ideologist offers
a description of how things are and a prescription of how things
should be if men are to live lives appropriate to their nature as
'unalienated men' or free born Scotsmen. This description is,
typically, advanced as something based upon an unbiased and objective
account. Ideologists see themselves as dealing in uncontrovertible
truths which can be supported by 'academic' research, unlike their
opponents who offer speculative metaphysics or barren rationalism.
Thus the ideologist claims to be in possession of general criteria
which are 'objective' and that a correct grasp of these principles is
necessary for successful engagement in political activity.
A further point worth making here is to look briefly at one aspect of
ideological language. An important feature as we have noted is the
way in which different ideologies not only offer different positions
(in terms of which party we should join or vote for) but also express
them in a distinctive language.
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Terms such as alienation, national self-determination, autonomy, sexism
and so nn do not merely describe the same events in a different way,
they make a difference to the event itself. Capitalism for the
Marxist is a different entity from capitalism for the Liberal, since
capitalism in the Marxist sense also carries with it such notions as
alienation, exploitation and so on, which the Liberal does not reject,
but does not even use. Thus although we may be wary of the explanatory
power of an ideological statement (such as 'The history of all, etc')
we can scareely deny the power of such sentiments to motivate the
ideologically committed and to justify political programmes. In
short, the mastery of the vocabulary of a particular ideology can
give us relevant tools in terms of affecting or preventing political
change. It was only because Lenin was able to convince the Russian
Conmiunifct Party that his policies were the correct interpretation of
Marxism that he achieved dominance in the Bolshevik Party and itswas
partly because Mrs Thatcher convinced Conservatives that her policies
were the correct way of carrying through Conservative principles that
she was able to become leader. My point is that Lenin could scarcely
have appealed to Mill for support and that Mrs Thatcher's mastery of
Marxist vocabulary would not have been appropriate in the contest
mentioned above.
Thus, whilst debates within a particular ideology may seem to be
unsatisfactory to those outside, they are not irrational or arbitrary.
This talk applies to the past as much as the present. In the
context of our general argument here we can note that fhr the ideologist
the past is a repository of practical wisdom wherein the righteousness
or follies of friends and opponents may be perceived. A repository,
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moreover, that is conceived of as being tio different in kind from
the present. Ideologists are not interested in the past for its
own sake, but for the lessons it teaches us.
One final point needs to be cleared up in these introductory remarks
on the characteristics of ideologies. It may be felt that if the
Marxist and Liberal do see 'Capitalism' as two different entities
then no communication and hence no argument (as opposed to challenge
or dispute) is possible between them. They live in different worlds.
There is some truth in this, and I shall argue later that one reason
ideological disputes founder is that there are no accepted criteria
between the two sides. However, the case should not be overstated.
Ideologies are not all embracing in the sense that Liberals and
Conservatives do share a common culture which provides the 'linguistic
stock' from which their notions are taken. For example, someone
like VTillian Godwin may have rejected the notion of 'the family' and
thus the concept 'father' may have had a different moral weight for
Godwin than for a defender of 'the family' in terms of how that
person should be treated. But though the divergence of view between
Godwin and his opponent parallels that between two ideologists, their
debate would only be comprehensible (as opposed to resolvable) if there
were certain common concepts at work. People can and do change
ideological persuasion, in some cases quite dramatically (eg Oswald
Mosely, Douglas Woodruff), and there may be a whole host of reasons
for this. An analogy would be with religious belief where, even
though religion is about everything, it does not preclude the possibi¬
lity of changing churches or even abandoning religion altogether.
There is nothing unusual in this, for we do not live in a world that
has hermetically sealed compartments, but where different areas
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of thought overlap and interpenetrate At a considerable extent. Marxism
and Liberalism are, after all, the products of the same culture in a
way that Liberalism and Voodoo are not. It is almost a condition of
them being rivals that we can see them in this way.
Ill
Though the section above has been an attempt to say something of the
overall framework within which the concept of ideological thought will
be discussed in this thesis, it is important to issue a brief warning
against two errors that can creep in to discussion of this sort.
One temptation I wish to avoid is that of merely seeking a stipulative
definition of ideology which will draw a neat boundary around the
concept. Such a move would not, I suggest, do justice to the term,
which is not a technical term for use in restricted theoretical
settings but one which is used a great deal in politics and one which
has, as I have argued above, its grey areas. Even if we accepted
the desirability of such an enterprise, its possibility would still
be in some doubt.
Suppose, for example, that we wanted a paradigm against which we could
test candidates for inclusion in the category 'ideological'. What
would we choose ? A particular one ? Then which one, and why
Marxism rather than Liberalism or Nationalism ? If we chose this
one, do we need to test it against another paradigm to make sure that
it has all the essential features of an ideology ? What would we
test that paradigm against ?
If we abandon this and select features from all ideologies to give a
composite picture, which features do we choose as being essential here ?
Do all ideologies have to have all these features (and in the same way,
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otherwise our formula will be oacuous), and if not, how are these
features essential ? How in fact would we go about selecting that
group from which we choose these features - from those practices we
call ideologies - but doesn't that beg the question ? If Liberalism
is part of the sample from which our definition is built up, could we
possibly find that it did not have enough features that are essential
to an ideology ? How strange it would be to exclude that which was
part of our original sample; rather like using Augustine, Aquinas
and Rahner to provide a definition of Roman Catholicism and then
using that definition to exclude Aquinas.
No ideology can be taken as a standard for all ideologies, they are too
diverse to fit such a jacket. Neither can we really hope to find a
common essence in them all for that either leads to vacuuity or to
illegitimately excluding something that common sense tells us ought
to be in. The position is analogous to a definition of Christianity
that would ensure Roman Catholicism and Pentecostal sects were included.
Hie general problems that attend any attempt to dind an 'essence' to
all ideologies elso apply to particular ideologies. In the final
chapter I shall be looking at the problem of arguments amongst
ideologists as to who are the true Liberals or Marxists, and who seek
to exclude their opponents, in greater detail. However, it can still
be noted here that there is simply no single set of arguments or core
of doctrine that all Liberals or Marxists adhere to. Here we ir*
very much at the mercy of the ideologies themselves. For example,
Engels was a Marxist and not a Conservative, not just because of his
theoretical stance, but because Marxists claim him as a source of
inspiration and so on, whilst Conservatives refuse to admit him as one
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of their own. There may, of course, be borderline cases such as
Sir Henry Maine, F Hayek, and Milton Feeidman or those who change
allegiance or are expelled for dissent; but none of this changes
the point I am making; indeed, it confirms the indeterminate nature
of ideological pigeon-holing.
If we look at three authors who are universally recognised as Liberals,
J S Mill, T H Green and Herbert Spencer, we can see that belonging
to the same ideology does not meant that they necessarily share common
arguments or even presuppositions. It is difficult to imagine a
moral doctrine further removed from the Utilitarianism of Mill than
T H Green's, and it is equally difficult to See the relationship between
both of them and Spencer's biological doctrines about human nature.
But, as I shall argue later on (again, in the final chapter) it would be
absurd to see any of them as the true Liberal, or to see Liberalism as
an amalgam of all three positions.
Even Marxism, where we are inclined to think that acceptance of common
authorities and common terms must lead to some uniformity, turns out
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to be a diverse ideology. If, as Henry Drucker suggests" these
debates, quarrels and constant splits remind us how much the disputants
have in common, they also serve to remind us how futile the search
for the essence of Marxism is.
To say that we cannot, in the sense indicated above, find a firm
foundation from which our enquiry can flow should not lead us into
making two antithetical errors. Firstly, it «faould not paralyse us
into thinking that nothing at all can be said. The lack of a
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stipulative definition, or even a sharp, precise boundary to a
concept does not mean that all attempts to use it must be riddled
with ambiguity and confusion. In the Blue Book Wittgenstein wrote:
1 want you to remember that words have those meanings
which we have given them; and we give them meanings
by explanations. I may have given a definition of a
word and used the word accordingly, or those who
thught me the use of the word may have given me the explanation.
Or else we might, by the explanation of a word, mean
the explanation which, on being asked, we are ready
to give. That is, if we are ready to give any
explanation; in most cases we aren't. Many words
in this sense don't have a strict meaning. But this
is not a defect. To think that it is would be like
saying that the light of my reading lamp is no real
light at all because there is no sharp boundary ...
There are words with several clearly defined meanings.
It is easy to tabulate these meanings. And there are
words of which one might say: They are used in a
thousand different ways which gradually merge into one
another. No wonder that we can't tabulate strict
rules for their use.
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None of this should be taken as endorsing the opposite error, namely
that of saying the term ideology can mean anything at all. For a
word that can mean anything means nothing. It could have no
possible application or use. There has to be something that is
non-ideological so that a contrast can be drawn with that which is
ideological. Difficult cases at the logical perimeters of a
concept do not mean that there is no difference between using that
work and another. Even if the edge to the beam of my reading lamp
is fuzzy, there is still a difference between dark and light.
When Wittgenstein wrote in the passage quoted "words have meanings
we have given them" he did not mean that language is something that
human beings have invented, or that they decide in general what
words mean. On the cont«ary, we are born into a society that already
28
L Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1958)
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has a language with a variety of concepts, and that this language
provides the background against which decisions or innovations are
taken. Once we have learned a certain amount of a language we can
adopt, 'stretch' and even introduce, terras on the basis of existing
usage. But this background must not be forgotten, and the difference
between it (and the possibilities it provides) and deciding how (in
some cases) to use a word, is akin to the difference bwtsreen learning
a foreign language and learning one's native tongue. If such a
background did not exist then communication would be impossible, for
everyone would have a private language, that is, not a language at
all. In this sen3e, ideology is one of those terras that we find in
use, a terra with a variety of uses. Sometimes it is used in a
fairly technical sense, as with Marx, at other times more generally,
as with Mannheim, and sometimes in a farily loo3e sense, as when
people talk about ideologies, meaning any setoof opinions. It is
already a terra that runs close to, or can be contrasted sharply with
other areas of human life such as religion or science. What we are
required to do is not to find the correct meaning or use, but to see
how all these uses are related and to guard againsttthe temptation
to say that since we characterise many different activities as
ideological then they all must be ideological in the same sense. And
this question is, of course, related to the way in which the term is
used in these different contexts.
I shall then, be looking at one way in which the terms ideology and
ideological are used, namely as referring to Marxism, Liberalism,
Conservatism, Nationalism and the like. I shall try and say some¬
thing about the characteristics of these ideologies and give grounds
for putting them in the sarae category. I shall al3o contrast them
with other areas of thought and activity and in certain cases try and
show that areas believed to be closely connected are not connected in
that way at all, despite superficial appearances to the contrary.
To say "But why call Liberalism ideological ?" might just raean "Why
don't you include Catholicism and the opinions of the Mother's Union ?"
or "Why call Liberalism an ideology when it is plainly true and based
upon undeniable facts about human nature ?" (that ifi it is like
scaince and not like its rivals which are based upon error and
confusion), and here all that can be done ie to try and show the
differences that there are between Liberalism and Catholicism etc, on
the one hand, and the reason why it isn't scientific or 'true' on the
other. In another sense the question is misconceived in the way that
asking "Why is a red object red ?" is misconceived if the answer "It
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just is red" fails to satisfy and end the questioning.
So far I have mentioned Marxism, Liberalism, Conservatism and
Nationalism as examples of political ideologies. They are not an
exclusive club that admit of no other members, I could for example
have included National Socialism, Socialism and Fascism. Some are
more prominent tnday than others; Marxism is often taken to be an
idea tehose time has come. On the other hand, some are in decline.
There are I suspect, very few Fascists outside of right wing groups in
Italy and the remnants of Franco's support in Spain.
In saying that I shall be comparing ideologies such as Marxism and
Liberalism it must be noted that I shall be, as it were, laying them
side by side so that they can be compared rather than attempting to
oc
cf S Cavall, Must we mean what we say (New York: Charles Sembrer's
Sons, 1969), 1-44. *-
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compress them into each other. In the end they must be left to speak
for themselves and shown in all their fullness. They are not, in
this sense, capable of further reduction without distorition. That
is, they do not break down into something more basic, either in terms
of social formation or personal psychology. If they still remain
opaque, unintelligible or merely seem pointless to us then they have
failed, but to pursue them beyond this point would be to Slter their
30
character and to distort and falsify them.
I hope that the above discussion has avoided a too narrow casting of
the net, and at the same time avoided opening the category 'ideology'
to everybody and everything. Mannheim, I think, tends to make too
much ideological and only raises the same problem at a later stage,
viz. how to distinguish w£tlin the category of ideology. An analogy
with the philosophy of mind might help here. Materialists assert that
everything is reducible, without remainder, to statements about physical
terms and therefore to the laws of science. Mental states, for
example, are reducible to facts about the brain. This position is
well known for difficulties that arise, but the only point I wish to
note here is that materialists are forced to re-introduce the distinction
they seek to abolish by admitting that thoughts and ideas are very
31 .
different forms of matter."' By the same tteken, to say that Marxism,
Liberalism, science and the opinions of the League Against Cruel Sports
are all ideological only means that we will have to differentiate
amongst them at a later stage. Thus, though a wider use of the term
ideology is legitimate for its own purposes, I tend to find it con-
30
cf How certain types of analysis do precisely this. Freud or
Frazer on religion, for example.
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fusing because it includes so much. The difference between it and the
use T am characterising can best be stated by saying that whilst I am
talking of Ideologies, writers such as Mannheim speak of Ideology. The
latter temm seems to resemble what Professor Walsh calls the pre-
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suppositions of a society or age.
A final point to be made here is that unlike Marx or Mannheim I am not
offering a theory about ideologies. I am not trying to explain them
in terms of social formation of social psychology. Indeed, there may
be nothing special to explain here. These remarks,are, I repeat,
philosophical and the relationships I am investigating are philosophical.
Attempts to understand ideologies in terms of social psychology may
raise philospphical clifficulties, but that is another matter.
IV
I shall cow consider the objection that philosophy is only offering a
rival ideological viewpoint about ideologies. This view is surprisingly
common. For example, Henry Drucker writes
I argue here that our several notions of ideology are
each of them appropriate to our own ideology. That
is, we disagree because we see ideology from an ideological
point of view. We see it as Conservatives, Liberals or
Marxists. There is enough agreement between the various
camps to assure us that we are talking about the same thing,
but little more than that.^
The last sentence seems to give away nearly everything that has been
claimed in the first part of the passage, for, in exactly what sense
is Liberalism as seen by a Marxist, the same as Marxism seen by a
Oft
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186-97.
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Drucker, op cit, xii.
Liberal ? If Drucker's first assertion is correct then all that
Liberals, Marxists and Conservatives are agreed upon is that their
opponents are a) ideologies b) wrong. It is not clear, however, that
'Liberalism-as-an-ideology' seen by Marxists as 'unscientific' is the
same as 'Marxism-as-an-ideology' seen by Liberals as non-scientific
and irrational and that both are the same as 'Liberalism-as-an-ideology'
and 'Marxism-as-an-ideology' seen by Conservatives as rationalism in
different guises.
But even leaving these difficulties aside, it still seems that Drucker
is saying that there cannot be a position on these matters that is non-
ideological. Indeed, he specifically rejects the opportunity to try
and formulate such a position, though his reason for doing so, "Who
would listen" strikes one as rather disappointing.
What is not in doubt rs the fact that in some cases political philo¬
sophers have written ideological works. Two works that might be
34
mentioned in this context are Oakeshott's "On Being Conservative"
35
and Popper's "The Open Society and its Enemies" ". It is easy to
agree with Alasdair Maclntyre that writers such as Bell, Lipset and
Shils fall precisely into this category. Indeed, when we find
Lipset writing that
"
... democracy is not only or even primarily a means
through which different groups can attain their ends
or seek the good society; it is the good society
itself in operation." ^
34
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It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he is as ideologically
uncritical of Liberalism as he is methodologically critical of its
opponents. But the fact that ideology and philosophy are often
conflated within the covers of the same book is clearly not the point
at issue here. What matters is whether or not we can find grammatical
differences between them. The fact that philosophers may be elected
to parliament says nothing about their competence, either as philo¬
sophers or politicians. The fact that ideology and philosophy can,
as it were, come together in a book or person does not mean that we
cannot distinguish conceptually between them, Just as the fact that
mass and extension are inseparable in a physical object does nfat mean
that we cannot distingish between them.
The identification of philosophy, especially philosophy as it is
currei^tly practiced in Britain and the USA, with ideology is a theme
that runs through Alsadair Tiaclntyre's book "Against the Self Images
37
of the Age". It is a view that is shared in some respects by the
authors of the earlier issues of the magazine 'Radical philosophy'.
In the first issue of that journal we find the editors asserting that
Contemporary British Philosophy is at a dead end. Its
academic practitioners have all but abandoned the attempt
to understand the world, let alone to change it. They
have rriade philosophy into a specialised, academic,
subject of little relevance to anyone outside a small
circle of professional philosophers ... As well as
exposing the poverty of so much that passes for philo¬
sophy, we shall aim to understand its causes. We
need to ask whether its barrenness is the inevitable
consequence of its linguistic and analytical methods,
as opposed to, for example, its application to trivial
'problems'. We shall ... investigate its ideological
role in the wider culture. „Q
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A C Maclntyre, Against the Self Images of the Age (London,
Duckworth, 1971). Hereafter referred to as ASIA.
Radical Philosophy, 1, Spring 1972), 1.
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Later on, attacking the defence of 'Oxford Philesophy' by Geoffrey and
Mary Warnock, they write:
They (the Warnocks) claim that Radical philosophy
seeks to make philosophy - an otherwise neutral
field - 'political'. lie, by contrast, assert
that the sort of philosophy the defend has functioned
politically, as ideology? we have no need to make
philosophy ideological, it is so already.^
The political role of philosophy is not restricted to questions within
moral or political philosophy.
On the contrary, the more abstract discussions of
epistemology, logic, etc., can be equally active
as ideology, even though their social effects are
less direct and less immediately apparent.^
Maclntyre's views are set out in the introduction to ASIA and are part
of a call for a "genuinely post-Marxist ideology of liberation".
Like the radical philosophers, Maclntjrre seeks to bring out the unity
of philosophy and ideology. He writes that:
The unity of this book resides in the aspiration
60 link philosophical criticism with ideological
commitment.^.
He claims that
The nature of contemporary academic philosophy in
the Anglo-Saxon world has contributed in a marked
way to the persistence amongst us of certain uncrit-
icised ideological concepts and values.^
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This illustrates the fact that
... philosophy may thus appear to guarantee one
way of looking at the world by seeming to demon¬
strate its necessity: and this is the key role
of inadequate philosophy in underpinning ideology.^
The upshot of this, both for llaclntyre and the Uddieal Philosophers
is that " ... a good deal of what I have characterised as ideology
not only overlaps with the proper concerns of philosophy, it is_
philosoply. 1,44
There are two separate, though related arguments here; firstly,
that philosophy and ideology are in certain respects identical (that
is they are the same activity) and secondly, that philosophy can
underpin an ideology, either by demonstrating its necessity or by
demonstrating the incoherence of its rivals. I think that both
views are mistaken. My own position can be stated by constructing
a parody of the earlier quotation from 'Radical Philosophy', ,!0n
the contrary, not only are the more abstract discussions of logic
and epistemclogy non-ideological, so are the seemingly practical
questions dealt with by morel or political philosophy."
We have already seen that the ideologist is concerned to try and
change things by guiding people to act in one way rather than another.
In saying something about this I wish to draw the reader's attention
to the fact that philosophy is understood here as being concerned
with thought of a certain kind, not people and their view of the world.
That is to say, there is a distinction between practical problems





that we face, and philosophical problems that we work at. * To say
that something is a philosophical argument, or to say that such and
such is a matter for philosophy rather than history or psychology,
is to draw attention to the form of that argument and to be able to
recognise what would count as a valid objection to, or modification
of, that position; as opposed to an irrelevant interjection such as
'But that's unscientific1' on the other. As we have already seen, we
distinguish between philosophy and history or science on the grounds
that they are different activities, not that they are the same activity
but with a different subject matter. There may be borderline cases,
but there is also broad agreement between philosophers about what
would be recognised as an objection and so on. Even major departures
in philosophical thought are built upon ground previously accepted by
the practitioners of the subject. Otherwise it would be difficult
to link those changes with that activity.
Thus, although Hegel was a German and Aristotle a Greek, there is,
strictly speaking, no such entity as German or Greek philosophy (if
Aristotle's philosophy were completely different from our own, how
could we characterise any of his arguments as philosophical ?).
Although there are many schools of philosophers, Stoics, Scholastics,
Positivists and so on, they are not doing more or less adequate
types of philosophy. Philosophical coherence as something that is
achieved within philosophy and not something that is true of philo¬
sophy, or types of philosophy, as a whole. Though the philosophers
who debated with Plato or Descartes are dead and gone, their positions
45
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can always be revived. It is, after all, a standard move in philo¬
sophy to take a position that appears to be discredited and to show
that the arguments are in fact, valid. The long history of the
'Ontological Argument' is a good example of this. It is difficult,
therefore, to see precisely the sense in which Maclntyre can talk of
something called 'Anglo-Saxon' philosophy and the Radical philosophers
can speak of 'Oxford Philosophy', as if they were nore or less adequate
types of philosophy, other than as rhetoric.
Now because it is an activity, philosophy cannot be seen as atemporal.
My point, however, is that the temporal nature of philosophy is not
akin to the temporal nature of ideological arguments. Philosophical
positions can be revided and refought in a way that ideological
conflicts cannot be recreated. Though both types of conflict must be
placed in an appropriate context, the context for understanding a
philosophical argument involves understanding the logical relations
between ideas, net the relationship of those ideas to contingent facts
outside of philosophy, such as the relationship between disputing
political parties. We can argue with Kant and Plato in a way that we
cannot dispute with Burke or Paine.
This point may become clearer if we look at the way in which a
philosopher and an historian might be interested in Aristotle. For
the historian, the character "Aristotle'' might be important in a
number of ways. He is important within a certain narrative, as is
the fact that he wrote the Nichomachean Ethics, the Politics, the
Prior and Fosterior Analytics and so on. If some of these works
were found to be forgeries, or had been written earlier or later than
had been previously thought, then the historian would be forced to
reconsider his conclusions in the light of the new evidence. But in
philosophy the person "Aristotle" never appears, except as a personi¬
fication (as for example in science). For philosophy "the person who
is the nuthor of the Politics" is irrelevant. What natters is the
coherence of the arguments put forward (and the arguments are not the
property of Aristotle or anyone else). If the xrorks mentioned were
shown to be written by another Greek, the Holy Spirit or a monkey \d.th
a typewriter, it would not have the slightest bearing within philosophy
the arguments woxild still be good or bad, valid or senseless; and it
is this aspect that is the subject matter of philosophy.
Though x/e invariably start philosophising on the basis of those
questions raised by the great philosophers of the past, once we start
to philosophise the}' must drop out of consideration, and do so before
the philosophy starts. This doesnnot mean that treat the great
philosophers of the past as mere question setters, or sterile repo¬
sitories of valid arguments to be selected and put together like some
kind of intellectual jigsaw. That vxould be the very antithesis of
philosophy. But it vouM be the antithesis of philosophy not because
he had been guilty of poor exegisis (though they may be of great
importance in another context) but because we saw philosophy as the
aseembling of 'correct' answers rather than a matter of questioning
received opinions in the appropriate manner. That is, the first
thing to realise in philosophy is that other philosophers cannot
answer philosophical problems, in the sense that I have to work
through those problems and become convinced of the truth of an
argument, even if that argument turns out to be one advanced in the
past by Plato or Hume. The philosopher cannot build on a foundation
of previously established 'valid' arguments without having tested them
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for himself. This attitude is, I believe, exemplified by the
Socratic injunction 'Think not of Socrates, think of the truth". The
point being made is that the philosopher must go wherever truth takes
her and theft the pursuit of this understanding is greater than any
human. Thus, we may consider the works of a philosopher in order to
gain a greater understanding of a certain argument that is advanced,
and in the course of this be brought to understand an argument and to
believe it to be true, whereas before we had only partly understood
its implications and because of this held it to be false. But if we
say "Walsh has made me understand X" the relationship between Walsh
and the understanding is still a contingent one, that is, the teacher
is the occasion for fc^eunderstending. Kierkegaard puts the matter
like this
From the standpoint of Socratic thought, wvery point
of departure in time, is eo ipso accidental, an
occasion, a vanishing moment. The teahher himself
is no more than this; and if he offers himself and
his instruction on any other basis, he does not give
but takes away, and is not even the other's friend,
much less his teacher.^
None of this whould be taken as denying the importance of exegesis, or
of the importance tf the history of philosophy. The point is that
the former cannot be a substitute for philosophical thought of our
own and the latter is histoj-y, not philosophy.
Once we start to do philosophy, ve step outside the confines of any
text. It is therefore irrelevant that 0 E Moore was unfair to
Berkely in his 'Refutation of Idealism'4' as Collingwood claims.^
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What matters is that Moore's arguments refute the arguments he is
attacking, not whether anyone holds those arguments or not. Moore's
exegisis (and 3ense of fair play) are subject to different criteria.
Put another way, the argument is not between Morre and Berkeley at
all, but about the validity of certain arguments.
It might be objected at this point that although historical or
exegetical argueesrx : are irrelevant to the validity of philosophical
arguments, they are necessary (or at least important) for the under¬
standing of any particular argument. In other words, my philosophical
remarks on ideological writings will need accurate exegesis based upon
historical research in order to bear the weight put upon them.
There is some force in this, but it must not be overstated. Firstly,
it can be said to miss the point we are trying to establish for in
philosophy we are not concerned with a particular person's arguments
as they were put forward in the past, but with any argument of a certain
kind. Secondly, though it may be true to say "If you really sant
to understand the arguments of Descartes or Plato you should really
learn French, Latin and Ancient Greek, for that is how those arguments
were originally expressed and any translation will lose some of the
subtlety of the thought" it does not follow that this involves any
history any more than a child learning German from a parent also
learns German history. What we would need to understand in Descartes
would be how the various concepts hold together in French or Latin, and
these concepts may hkve an origin in time, but that is a different
matter. I may, after all, use the term 'germ' correctly without
knowing anything of its origins. Thirdly, though historical toesearch
may throw up a new book by Hume which challenges previous inter¬
pretations of his views on, say, ethics, it is not clear that it is
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the activity of history which helps us to understand the new text.
Though a text may be of limited use on its own (Skinner's point about
'poring over the great books') looking at the relevant historical back¬
ground may not help us. It would certainly be of limited use, for
example, if Hume were using a new term or an old term in a new way.
Consider the analogy with someone who wishes to see what Wittgenstein
means by the term 'grammar' in the "Philosophical Investigations".
Someone might say, "Look at the way the term was generally used in the
mid 20th century" and the enquirer might then go away and read J L Austin
and others. But the conclusion reached would be that grammar was
something found in English text books and this would be completely
contrary to the way in which Wittgenstein was using the term as is
49
clear from fhe paragraphs in which he introduces the term.
Looking at the background would have given us the wrong answer since
Wittgenstein was using the term in an atypical way. The point is
that if what Hume means by a term isn't clear from the text then
historical research (as opposed to looking at other texts of Hume's)
would be of limited value.
Indeed, suppose a new work of Hume was discovered with the term
'fabulous' in it, but no clear indication of how it was intended. An
appeal to other works by Hume might help, but what is this background
we are falling back on, other than works and documents ? How do we
understand in the first place how Hume is using that term, so that we
can apply it to his later work, other than by interpreting its use
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L Wittgenstein, op cit, paras 7ff.
^
As C- E Moore in fact remarked "He was, I believe, using the term
in an atypical way". Quoted in J Passmore, One Hundred Years of
Philosophy (Penguin Books, 1968), 426.
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in that first work or document. In other words, the first work we
have is on the same logical footing as the later work, and is not in
any sense a more secure foundation for correctly interpreting the
second work than the second one would be if it had been discovered
first. But if the earlier work depends on precisely the same kind
of interpretation as the second, in what sense do we need it ?
None of this should be taken as denying that philosophy has a history
and that there is a role for exegisis. The point being established
is that a philosophical argument is not so much between people as
positions which can be discarded or revived over time. Ideological
arguments on the other hand are not like this. In order to see
what is involved in an ideological argument we not only need to
understand the terms in use, but also the particular circumstances
in which the argument takes place. This is because ideological
tracts such as Mill's 'On Liberty' or the 'Communist Manifesto5
of Marx and Engels are as much political acts as reflections on such
acts. I have already mentioned how Popper's 'Hie Open Society' is
deliberately set in the context of the battle against totalitarianism,
and the dispute on the French Revolution between Burke and Paine is
another good example. The point of writing the works is important.
In contrast, it is of not the slightest philosophical importance that
William James is being attacked in the 'Philosophical Investigations'
or that Descartes is Ryle's principle target in the 'Concept of
Mind'. Though Lenin may have attacked his Marxist rivals through a
book of philosophy when he wrote 'Materialism and Empiro-Criticism'
that aspect could not be part of philosophy. When Wittgenstein
dedicated the 'Philosophical Remarks' he expressed the wish that he
could, like Bach, dedicate it to the greater glory of God. But the
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dedication is not another line in the argument, ann mora than Bach's
is another line of music.
In an earlier passage T mentioned how Socrates, wen when faced with
death, refused to compromise the search for philosophical truth.
Moreover, he urged his pupils not to hold onto arguments because he,
Socrates, had held them when alive, but to always think girst of the
.... 52
truth. There are no authorities in philosophy."" It matters nought
that Aristotle held X or VJittgenstein held Y. Not only could a
philosophical argument riot be settled by shwwing that Hume held the
opposite view, such a move would be inappropriate in the context of a
philosophical discussion.
This is nfct true, however, of ideological arguments (and incidentally
of some religious and moral arguments). In an ideological argument
it may be appropriate to cite an .authority, be it Mill, Marx or a
tradition. In a religious argument between Christians of the same
denomination for example, it would be entirely appropriate to rest
one's case on the Bible as an authority. There may, of course, be
arguments over interpreting the Bible, but that is a different matter.
The authority of the Bible is a limiting concept in a religious
argument. In a similar way, if a Marxist can show another Marxist
that Marx did not hold a certain view, this can be enough to clinch
Again, I owe this example to Mr D H Raslid.
52
I mean here that there can be no appeal to authority, though it is
also true to say that there are no authorities in philosophy in the
way that there are authorities on Ftruscan pottery or 12th century legal
systems. Tnat is, there is not a body of knowledge that a philo¬
sopher can become an expert in: when T arv "Professor Walsh is an
authority on the philosophy of history I mean either that he is a
good philosopher and has worked in this area over a long period of
time, becoming aware of problems that snow a depth of philosophical
understanding, or that he knows a great deal about the writings of
other philosophers in this area (or both).
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matters. A lot of Lenin's writings are desismed to show that his
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onponents were 'unMarxist'. An example of this is a series of
articles under the title "Is Nature Dialectical ?" in 'Marxism Today'
where the authors are not only discussing the coherence of certain
arguments, but trying to decide whether they are 'Marxist' or not.
Clearly, if one of the disputants were to admit that his arguments
were 'unMarxist' then he would he forfeiting any claim to the allegiance
of fellot^ Marxists in advocating a certain course of action.
I do not say that the appeal to an authority is the only apnea! that
can be made, nor that it is always an overriding one. My claim is
that it must be taken into consideration by the disputing parties.
That is to say, it is part of the structure of the argument, not an
irrelevant interjection.
V
If the above arguments have succeeded in distinguishing between ideology
and philosophy as activities, then Maclntyre has conflated the two
when he argued that "some ideology ... is philosophy". We can now
turn to the second objection - the claim that philosophy car function
as ideology by underpinning a particular account of political life,
or demonstrating the incoherence of its rivals.
The argument is simply that philosophy can affect practical decisions
by showing that the grounds we were advancing for doing X were confused.
Examples of this apparent relationship are not hard to find. A
A fine example froi personal memory is of a debate between Trotskyite
and non-Trotskyite Marxists which ended when a member of the latter
group read a letter of Lenin's which started with the words "What a
swine that Trotsky is" .
R Gunn, Is Nature Dialectical ? Marxism JToday, Jan 1977? V°1 21, no 2, 45-5^
D Hoffman, Is Nature Dialectical ?. Marxism Today, Feb 1977> V°1 21,
no 1, 11-18.
religious believer, who holds that there is life after death nay, on
the production of certain sceptical argunents, give up that belief and
religion. It is important to note that this argument does not depend
upon the validity of the criticisms of religious belief, merely that
they are pertinent to the issue at hand.
But this in iteelf is not enough to establish the conclusions made by
Maclntyre and the Radical philosophers. The fact that philosophers
offer advice to their fellow citizens or persuade people to take a
course of action is at best a comment upon their persuasive powers.
What needs to be established is that there is a logical connection
between philosophy and political activity, or as the Radical philo¬
sophers plight put it.. Conservatism is a consequence of t)xford
philosophy'.
One argument against Maclntyre's position would be that he has failed
to make a distinction between the act of being persuaded assa result
of the philosopher's argument and the establishrmf.fc or the validity of
those arguments. The latter is a logical consequence. In short,
the fact that after a conversation with a philosopher, X abandons
religion only shows that he has been persuaded by the philosopher's
arguments. Wiat has not been shown is that X has been influenced by
philosophical understanding. This may be seen as a trivial point,
since most philosophers would accept that the only entailment from an
argument is another argument, and yet wish to say that people act on
the basis of arguments that they believe to be valid. My point is
that this shows that the relationship between argument and action is a
contingent one, and if that is the case, philosophy can only note
that fact. It is also worth noting that the possibility of acting
upon the advice of philosophers would always depend upon a society
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being aware of their deliberations, and it is perfectly possible to
imagine a society in which this was not so. One is reminded that when
0 E Moore received the OM from George VI he met his friends outside
Buckingham Palace and announced in shocked tones ''The King has never
heard of Wittgenstein "
The fact that philosophers may remain largely unknown in a society
does not, however, mean that there is no connection between them and
society in general. Maclntyre puts the point this way
Philosophy leaves everything as it is - except
concepts. And since to possess a concept involves
behaving or being able to behave in certain ways in
certain circumstances, to alter concepts, whether
by modifying existing concepts, or by making net?
concepts available, or by destroying eld ones, is
to alter behaviour
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This remark refers to the earlier quotation from Wittgenstein.I
hope it is not being unfair to Maclntyre to suggest that he sees
philosophy as 'refining' or 'sharpening up our concepts for everyday
use. It would be untrue to suggest tnat Wittgenstein's view of
philosophy 'forbids'- changes in language and is, therefore, a form
of social conservatism. Indeed, he specifically wrote
... a reform of ordinary language for particular
purposes, an improvement of our terminology designed
to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly
possible. But these are not the cases we have to
do with.-.-
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The point is that there are any number of ways of changing language,
but philosophy does not have that task. As we. noted earlier,
55
"AC Flaclntyre, A Short History of Ethics (London: Rout ledge, &
Kcgan Paul, 1967), 2-3.
ji>
See footnote 6 .
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L Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para 132.
philosophical clarification does nftt quite leave everything as it is,
in the sense that our understanding of what is already there is
deepened, but the ability of philosophical terminology to influence
non philosophical areas will depend, not on philosophical criteria,
but on those of the activity in question. There may be a distinction
worth making here between 'ordinary' language and some of the more
specialised fields such as the law, where, since the purpose of
examining legal concepts is to Hake them more explicit ami less
susceptible to ambiguity, the role of philosophical analysis may be
more influential, though no less contingent.
But Uifetrgenstein's point that philosophy is not, in general, about
tidying up or refining language was also made by the late Gilbert
Ryle in his paper 'Systematically misleading Expressions'."'^ It is
important, he argues, for the philosopher to see the difference
betxveen the expressions 'The present Queen of France is bald' and
"The present Queen of England is bald". The ^irst one is not
referential in the way that the second one is, and cannot therefore
be true or false in the same way that the second one can be. Both
F.yle and Wittgenstein base their attack on metaphysics on the grounds
that it is a systematic form of grammatical confusion. But, as Ryle
points out, the 'ordinary person' is not misled in any way by this
difference, any more than 'ordinary' talk about 'It's at the back of
my mind' or 'I really clew off the handle' misleads her into thinking
Chat we have mysterious parts called 'minds' or 'handles'. If the
ordinary person and his listener are clear enough about what they are
saying then they don't need the philosopher to help them (and the
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G Ryle, Systematically Misleading Expressions, Proceedings of
Aristotelian Society. Vol 32, 1931-32, 139-70.
philosopher mist at least know what they mean, or he wouldn't know
what he was analysing) and if they aren't using words intelligently,
then it is pointless to ask what they really mean (since they could
mean anything, or as Ryle puts it, to ask what they would mean i_f a
rational man was using them, is to prompt the reply "They would mean
what they would eean'). Now in the same way a political argument
right contain terms that would be misleading or insufficiently precise
in the context of philosophy. Someone might suggest that Trade
Unions are "above the law", and those with a philosophical turn of
mind might reply that no-one can be (in that sense) above or outside
the law since a society will have a series of legal relationships
which will define the relationships of its members to each other. We
are subject to the law by virtur of being citizens. But the politician
might reply here "You know what I mean" and in the context this is
true enough. Tee debate can continue without the intervention of
philosophy being important or necessary.
The point to be stressed here is that philosophy is not a series of
manoeuvres which can be inserted piecemeal into other activities.
Because someone points out that a politician has contradicted himself,
this does not mean that that person is engaged in philosophical thought
or is doing philosophy. The context for the argument is important
here, and I would suggest, if a philosopher were to take up the
question of legal relations in our example, his or her movement would
be away from the particular political debate to a more abstract set of
relationships. Thus, though the examination of a political question
may give rise to recognisably philosophical difficulties, the politician'
attempts to solve these questions do constitute an engagement in
philosophical thought.
I claimed earlier on bhat whilst practical problems are faced, philo¬
sophical problems are worked at. This can he seen more clearly if we
look at the differences between sceptical and practical doubt. To
use a common example, it nay be difficult in a fop to see whether the
object ahead is a scarecrow or a sleeping farmworker. As the fog
lifts, or I get nearer, it becomes clear that it is a scarecrow. The
doubt lifts along with the fog. But those philosophers who have
doubted the existence of physical objects would not be satisfied. They
doubt even when they -ire standing directly in foont of an object, in
perfect lgght. Barkely and Tlune were puzzled by the account that
could be given of reality, and its coherence or intelligibility. They
did not try to trail; through trails or carefully nrod a chair to see if
it existed before sitting down. Sceptical doubt is not caution on a
grand scale ! Hume, as is well known, did not take his doubts to
the backgammon board. We do not need philosophers to put our concepts
in order before we can engage in political debate, any more than we
need to refute scepticism about material objects before we can sit down
cr put our glass on a table. The American philosopher Robert Paul
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Wolfe introduces hi3 book 'In Defence of Anarchism' by saving that
it was the only position left to him because he could find no philo¬
sophical foundation for the authority of the state. As an intellectual
position this is odd, but defensible?- it would, however, be ouite
absurd to suggest that if arrested by a policeman for a traffic
violation Wolfe could reply "You can't arrest me officer, philosophers
haven't sorted out the question of authority yet" !
S9
R P Wolfe, In Defence of Anarchism, (New York, Harper Row, 1970).
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'ihe woiq 'yet' is not unimportant here. One of the characteristics of
a practical, or political decision is that it will not wait for ever,
'though I may try and ensure that I have the best available evidence
on which to base my decision, there comes a point when I have to do,
or not ao, X. i cannot say 'Just let me read Capital once more, and
ttien I will decide whether to join your attack on the Winter Palace1',
sua of course a whole host of factors that couia not be philosophical
would also enter, such as whether or not the attack was likely to
succeed. Though I might at a later date decide that the course of
action adopted was wrong v.I may even leave the bolshevik party and
join its opponents) there is a sense in which it was determinate at
that time. That is, I cannot make that decision agiin, and if one
were, incapable ot sustaining commitment to anything in practical life,
there would be an important sense in which action was impossible.
but the impetus in philosophy is to take precisely the opposite path.
1 ao not have to solve all the questions raised by thesis at any
particular time, even though it must be submitted by a certain date.
Indeed, I can entertain complete indecision between competing arguments
in a philosophical discussion, a path which would certainly make me
an ineffective politician. This is related to my earlier remarks
about the abstract nature of philosophical reasoning. As a politician
I need to concentrate on the resolution of this issue, as a philo¬
sopher I move towards the discussion of what tiiis kind of issue
involves in any given case. And, of course, it may well be that my
investigation shows me that there is no one correct answer.
Finally, if political philosophy is to be concerned with hfce mapping
of the framework within which those debates which are its subject matter
take placer in short if philosophical reflection on politics is to
encornssn all tall: o* politics, rathor than a political view, than
those conflicts ail inconsistencies will be part of the 'given' for
the philosopher and cannot he removed, for they help make politics
what it is. This is not a plea for irrationalism, or a suggestion
that anything can go, but to draw attention to the fact that there
is plenty of room ofthin politics fur many interpretations and kings
of arrangements for a society and that it would be odd to believe
that philosophy r.ou? -1 resolve then. In fast, the resolution of such
difficulties is just what we call politics, and political activity.
VI
In discussing the relationship between philosophy and ideology I have
tried to establish seme conclusions, the nature of which it is
important not to misunderstand. Firstly, I have argued that pfcilo™
sophy and ideology are di_stinct activities, ever if a good deal of
ideological argument can be found in philosophical works. I have
tried to show that turning towards the concerns of philosophy
involves a turning away from the concerns of ideology and vice versa.
Considerations that are of vital concern to ideological arguments,
such as the likely success in persuading the public, or defeating the
arguments of our opponents, the relationship of an ideological
argument to the tradition from which it springs, whether the party
will accept it and so on, are of no importance in a philosophical
discussion. Indeed, to accept an argument on any of those grounds
would mean that philosophical reflection had been abandoned. Socrates
charged the Sophists with caring more about success and persuasion
than truth. On a similar theme, I have suggested that - to use an
expression of Oakeshott's - philosophy is like a conversation that can
be picked up at any tine .nnd where no conclusion needs to be reached.
In contrast, immediate resolution is a feature of political debates,
lest the opportunity be lost.
Secondly I have tried to show that philosophy does not, in any strong
sense, underpin a particular ideology. People may, of course, be
influenced by philosophers or quote philosophers in support of
political demands, but that does not consititute an engagement in
philosophy. The relationship between politics and philosophy is a
contingent one, and philosophy can only note and explore the implica¬
tions of that. It may well be that philosophers are active and
interested in politics but it is a mistake to see their philosophical
activity and political aims as two sides of the same coin. My
suggestion has been that philosophical reflection on politics must
look at all possible aboounts of society, not chose qua philosopher
between competing views. That choice is politics. Turning towards
the practical implications of an argument (or vice versa) does not
mark the extension of philosophical reflection into politics proper,
but marks the turning away from philosophy by introducing elements
that are foreign to philosophical thought. The change of context is
vital here, for we cannot turn philosophy into politics merely be
inserting a form of words from one into the other. As J L Stocks
put it, the introduction of criteria that can be applied in a philo¬
sophical context into a political argument may be a prelude to
philosophy, but it is not philosophy itself.
If this is so, then it is possible to offer a philosophical account of
ideological thought, an account that is not an ideological rival.
^
J L Stocks, The Need for a Social Philosophy, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, Vol 36 (1936), 11-12.
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CHAPTER TWO
History is concerned with the past, but not all statements about the
past are historical. There is no obligation to treat an event, or
series of events, in the past historically. For example, the work
leading up to the construction of the first Atomic bomb and its
subsequent dropping on Japan can be treated as a scientific matter,
as a technological question, as a political problem, or in a moral
way, as well as from the standpoint of history. We may even treat
it, as C P Snow does in his novel 'The New Men', in a literary
fashion. And the idiom in which we make our statements about it
indicates the manner in which we understand it. This does not mean
that the various elements mentioned above might not be found
together in a particular narrative. It would be difficult to make
sense of the example above without considering the relationship
between the technological, political and moral aspects involved. Nor
does it mean that in constructing an account of the how, why, who and
where of that event, the historian will not be called upon to look
at moral, political or technological considerations. The debate on
whether or not to use a nuclear weapon would be unintelligible outside
of a particular^ moral climate (the issue of whether to use it on non-
combatants), without certain technological considerations (the fact
that large ecale civilian casualties would occur) and outside of
particular political considerations (the desire to avoid large
American losses in an invasion, or to warn the Soviet Union). But it
Particular in this context means a definite moral climate rather than
only that moral climate pertaining at the time.
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does mean that the point of the historians investigation is different
from that of a novelist, a scientist or even a moral philosopher. To
say this is to assert, in one form, the distinctive nature of historical
questions and explanations.
But assertion, however confident, is not enough here. To say that
historical inquiry is distinctive immediately gives rise to the question
of how this is so. Two common objections to this view can already be
stated. There are those who would hold as an epistemological
principle that all genuine explanations share the same form; a form
that is found, par excellence in science. History and science use the
same framework but for different ends. Professor Hempel's "The
2
function of general laws in history" is an example of this view.
On the other hand, there are those who would argue that history must
be permeated with evaluative notions (be they moral, political or
ideological) and in this sense history is not distinct from our
ordinary 'practical' talk of events. Again, though the terms used
by the historian are applied to the past rather than the present,
there is nothing that marks them out as belonging to a distinctive
logical framework.
It may appear that whilst the second objection has obvious relevance,
the first does not. Some ideologists have argued that history is
not the impartial inquiry it seems, but merely exposes the rival
ideological positions of various historians, whilst others have argued
that it is the impartial study of the past that confirms their own
view of events at the expense of their rivals. Though it is by no
2
See his Aspects of Scientific Explanation, (New York: Macmillan,
1965), 231-45.
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means clear that the resolution of these issues would general conclusions
3
conducive to either side, their relevance is obvious. The relation¬
ship between history and science (this is a rather crude way of putting
it) on the other hand, might be seen as interesting but by no means
central to the present thesis. What needs to be stated here is that
this discussion will provide a prelude to later remarks upon Marxist
views of history, where the possibility of a 'scientific' view of
history is raised. Furthermore, it would not do to give the impression
that the only alternative to the view that history is subjective and
evaluative (in a pejorative sense) is that it must seek the object¬
ivity of the natural sciences.
I
The question of the autonomy of history is a continuing source of
dispute amongst philosophers. The principle of autonomy has for
example been defended by those philosophers associated with the
English idealist tradition, in particular, Collingwood and Oakeshott.^
Though there are important differences to be found in the positive
account of history offered in their respective works, they are in
agreement that 'the historian is master in his own house'."* One
important feature of Idealist treatments of history is that they are
concerned with history in the context of a much wider question, viz.
the nature of experience as a whole. Crudely put, Collingwood and
Oakeshott are offering alternative 'maps' of experience, and the
3
In the sense that (1) leads to complete relativism in a pernicious
sense and (3) would not generate the political prescriptions
necessary for any group or party.
4
R G Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924).
M J Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes (Cambridge, CUP, 1933).
'
R G Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946),
155.
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coherence they seek to establish is not that of history, or indeed of
any particular activity, but that which offers a complete account of
'experience'. In Speculum Mentis for example, Collingwood not only
wants to distinguish between the various logical areas he discerns,
but to grade them as parts of a hierarchy. In contrast, Oakeshott
claims only to distinguish between the *saodes' that experience may
take
The notion of the distinctive nature of aarious types of explanation
(including historical explanation) is also associated with those
philosophers who have been influenced by Wittgenstein. They have
certainly rejected any attempt, in the sense understood by Idealists,
to construct an overall picture of 'experience' but have concentrated
on the argument that there is no all-embracing method of explanation
to be found. This conclusion is not the product of a priori reasoning
about 'experience' but the result of a patient investigation of what
people do when they engage in certain activities. These activities
reveal a number of 'language games' which are related (sometimes
closely - magic and religion, sometimes more distantly - magic and
science) but in which there is no paradigm of explanation to which all
other methods must be measured. Though these activities or language
games may, and do, overlap to a considerable extent. A claim which
arises out of this view is that human beings as agents, mre not part
of the natural world and, are, therefore, not the objects of scientific
investigation. To this extent they agree with Collingwood and
Oakeshott.^
6 - sit^ •
Cakeshott, op cit, 4.
'it is interesting to contemplate the similarity in :the conclusions
reached by Wittgenstein ami Oakeshott and the dissimilarity in their
arguments. For a variety of reasons I do not agree with those who
see Wittgenstein as "Idealism without the metaphysics".
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For Collingwood, history is about individual events, not about universal
connections. Moreover, the essential element in historical explana¬
tion is that of getting 'inside' the event by 'rethinking' the
thoughts of the agents concerned. History is, for Collingvood, the
history of Thought and in as much as we understand what Nelson did at
Trafalgar, we also understand why he did it. The inner rationale
which history seeks to uncover is quite different from the establishment
of correlations between related phenomena and as such, is an inappro¬
priate object for scientific study.
In Oakeshott, as we shall see in greater detail later on, the stress
is not on 'rethinking' Nelson's deliberations (or those of his
opponent) but on constructing an account which makes the joining of
battle, the course of the battle and the outcome of the battle,
intelligible in the circumstances described. The battle is placed
within an identifiable set of conditions and circumstances and the
complete description desired by the historian is one where all
lacunae have been eliminated. Again, this is nothing like a
scientific account, with its accent upon necessary and sufficient
causes. In particular, the Humean concept of cause is eschewed by
Oakeshott and in its place we find a conception more akin to events
following each other such that Y is a reasonable and intelligible
consequence of X. As we shall see later on, historical events (eg
plagues and earthquakes) may be caused in the Humean sense, but that
is not the point at issue here, since they are only referred to in
the context of making human actions or reactions intelligible.
Both Collingwood and Oakeshott accept, implicitly at least, the idea
of a non-universalisable context which makes an action what it is.
Idealism relies completely on the understanding of categories and
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claims that changes in the world are changes in thought, or revisions
in the terms by which we categorise our experience. This view rests
on the insight that without shared criteria of identification, social
norms, and, in particular, a shared language - all of which depend on
the existence of the social, not natural worLd - we can know nothing
and therefore say of nothing that it exists. Thus, the world is so
only in as much as there are categories with which we may sort out
and identify it. Different cultures (and epochs) may have different
categories and in as much as there is no overlap between them, the
inhabitants will live in different worlds. This view contrasts
with those associated with the Empiricist tradition, wh*»-e it is held
that at all times and on every occasion, a harsh objective world
imposes itself upon us.
In the case of those influenced by Wittgenstein, the context referred
to above is the social life of a community with its rules and conven-
8
tions. Wittgenstein, and more recently Peter Winch, have both
argued at length that language, conceptual schema and behavioural
patterns in a society are all complex kinds of rule following. Thus
to understand a society at all, we will have to give an account ahat
will be a more, or less, profound rendering of its rules and social
practices and an elaboration that is more, or less, sensitive to what
can and cannot be done in that society. By 'what can and cannot be
done' I refer to rules in a aonstituitive rather than a regulative
sense. In pre-Christian times we could not describe an activity as
'celebrating the Black Mass', and I could not claim, in modern Britain,
especially in L Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations and
P Winch, The Idea of a Social Science.
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to be a Roman citizen or as Chesterton noted, 'blaspheme against
Odin'. If this is so, then the claim is that historical explanations
are more like tracing internal connections between ideas, than the
discovery of external links between cor.gingently related phenomena.
Thus, there is a negative agreement that history cannot be reduced
to another method of inquiry, even if Wittgenstein or Winch would
probably baulk at the positive account of history offered by Idealist
philosophers. As Winch himself has noted, if contexts change and
if history is 'rethinking the thought' then it is difficult to see
in whit sense a modern youth can 'see' the knight's beloved in terms
of the notions of mediaeval chivalry, let alone see her as the knight
did.
This does not, as yet, tackle the issue of evaluation and objectivity
in history. Though an assertion of the distinctive nature of the
historical method is to say that it is not the same as any speculation
about the past, it does not follow that this excludes certain features
that might be an irreducible part of a natural lagguage such as
ascribing praise and blame. Both these issues will be returned to
shortly.
/.gainst the view I have been describing is ranged a group of philo¬
sophers, the best known being Hempel and Popper. For Hempel, an
explanatory argument consists of (i) a law or laws (ii) an initial
condition or set of conditions (iii) a deduction from (i) and (ii)
in the form of a statement reporting the event to be explained. In
the case of Popper, the position is not quite the same, as he holds




from the 'logic of the situation'. The main thrust of both arguments
is, I take it, that a rational-type argument of the Idealist kind does
not in itself explain why an event happened unless we already pre¬
suppose a law-like generalisation of the form "people in situation X
generally (or always) do y".^
A distinction worth emphasising at this stage is that those who reject
the autonomy of history can do so on at least two grounds. Fisstly
there are reductionists, who would claim that scientific arguments (or
the social sciences) can replace history and secondly those, of whom
Hempel and Popper are examples, who claim that arguments in history
and science use the same ingredients and exhibit the same logical
structure, but use them for different purposes. It is not the method
of inquiry that distinguishes history and science but the area of
investigation. To sum up, the issues that arise out ef the relation¬
ship between history and other activities are (i) can history be
reduced to some science (ii) is there a single form of explanation in
history and science (iii) does history arise sui generis (iv) must
history involve practical/political values ?
II
Having sketched in some of the arguments surrounding the topic of the
autonomy of history, I want to elaborate on a particular philosopher's
defence of that autonomy. The philosopher I have chosen is Michael
Oakeshott and my reason for doing so is that Oakeshott, although not
a 'mainstream' figure in English philosophy, has, I believe, elaborated
and developed this position with great clarity and had raised almost all
The views of both Popper and Hempel have changed from their initial
formulations, but it is not our concern to chart the caurse of these
changes here.
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the important issues that we need to consider. I intend, therefore,
to spend some time in discussing his views and possible objections
to them.
I am certainly not claiming that Oakeshott's views are typical, either
of historians or of philosophers. The fact that he fails to gain
even a footnote in John Passmore's "100 years of British Philosophy"
indicates how eccentric many hold his views to be.
Thus, two caveats need to be made here. Firstly, I am not primarily
(if at all) offering a defence of Oakeshott's views; rather I am
using his arguments to set the discussion in as clear a light as
possible. It may well be that my subsequent exegesis merely indicates
how far I have misunderstood those views bjit, as we have already seen,
what matters is that the arguments should be worth philosophical
discussion rather than that they are unambiguously attributable to
a particular author. Secondly, as I have aiteady noted, Oakeshott's
discussion of history is within the more general context of his views
on judgement and experience as a whole. I shall try and relate the
two in the course of this exposition in those areas where clarity would
otherwise be lost.
Oakeshott's views on the nature of history are largely contained in
Chapter 3 of 'Experience and its Modes' and in an essay entitled "The
Activity of Being an Historian"^. As I have already noted above,
Quentin Skinner has argued that it would be a gross methodological
error to try and force the two pieces written some 30 years apart, into
some sort of artificial unity - merely on the grounds that they share
the same atitihor - and say that they add up to something called
"Oakeshott's views on history". In fact, if we look at them, they do
In his Rationalism in Politics (London: Methuen, 1962), 137-167.
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share a great deal in the form of argument and emphasis. It ir worth
pointing out, however, that I think Professor Greenleaf goes too far
12
inhhis book 'Oakeshott's Philosophical Polities' when he asserts that
the later essay "added little to the earlier analysis of history ...
save a stress on the way in which the practical disposition inhibited
13
the appearance of a truly historical past". What strikes the
present writer about the later essay is the stress upon the emergence
of history and its development as an activity (as a game develops rules
from an unstructured beginning) rather than on the existence of logical
forms which are discovered by human beings but which are unchanging
and do not develop (or rather it is our knowledge of them which
develops).
It may be useful to start with the later discussion; for in "The
Activity of Being an Historian' Oakeshott considers the emergence of a
particular human practice and the nature of reflection about that
practice. There are, he claims, two directions that such reflections
may take; we can examine whether or not the practice under discussion
is 'a coherent manner of thinking about the world' and we can discuss
the possibility of it being superceded by a superior method of
understanding.
According to Oakeshott, the historian is distinguished by the kind of
questions he or she asks about the past, for there is neigher a single
past, nor a single present. By this he means that any present
experience can provoke a variety of responses within us. The demolition
of a row of old buildings may provoke a mere movement of self-preservation
12




(getting out of the way of the falling debris), or a more complicated
response in which we feel elated at the prospect of progress (a medical
school is to be built there), or depression over an act of vandalism
(the buildings were fine examples of Georgian architecture).
(Bakeshott maintains that there are three possible attitudes - the
contemplative, the practical and the scientific.
The contemplative attitude is that exhibited in the works of poets ar
novelists, and though it may be interesting from a philosophical view¬
point it is not, strictly speaking, relevant to our discussion. I
shall put it aside. The practical idiom is that in which we see the
world and its contents as related to ourselves. That is, we see
things as useful or useless, friendly or hostile, expensive or cheap.
Typical utterances within the practical idiom would include such
statements as "It's hot today", "You'll need to push it harder" or
simply "Don't do that !" In the practical idiom, the term cause
for example, is a sign that other events are likely to follow. The
ability to recognise events as causes in this sense gives us mastery
(or increased mastery) within the world by enabling us to predict
events and using them to our advantage or averting them.
The scientific world, on the other hand, is the world in as much as
it is independent of ourselves. The scientist arranges things, not
as they affect his or her fortunes, but as they are independent of
human agency. The notion of cause here is that of the necessary and
sufficient conditions of an hypothetical situation, not of a relation¬
ship that has proved useful in the past to observe. Thus, a practical
statement such as "It's hot today" is transposed into the scientific
idiom by being re-written as "At 12 noon the temperature on the roof
of the air ministry was 30°C". The scientific idiom can, in Oakeshott's
sense, be seen to be wider than the area covered by the natural
sciences; for to be fully within the remit of the natural sciences
statements tend for example, to be about rather than water. It
may be objected here that the distinction between science and practice
is unreal, since science is rooted in the human desire for mastery
of the natural world. Oakeshott is, however, making a legical, rather
than a factual point here.
The fact that a particular project may run together the two issues of
'discovering' scientific laws and the control over the environment that
may now be possible (think of the earlier example of the atomic bomb)
does not mean that there is no distinction between science and tech¬
nology. Strictly speaking, the scientist discovers laws and is not
interested in changing or circumventing them, even supposing this were
to be possible. Indeed, it simply does not follow that knowledge
through the discovery of scientific laws gives mastery, since we may
lack the technology to construct appropriate devices to use this
knowledge, and in some cases, such a device might be impossible to
build. For example, we know that the Sun is cooling down, but it is
tiof. thought to be the case that this is something we could prevent.
Furthermore, the fact that X can be done (wh&re X is something based
upon science) says nothing about questions of whether such mastery is
desirable or not. The point is that though scientific considerations
might play a part in the decision, there is still a distinction to be
drawn between the scientific evidence, how it is arrived at and so on,
and the practical issues of desirability, consequences and the rest.
After all, the fact that blood tests might play a part in determining
a paternity suit would not make the judges' deaision in such a case
a scientific one.
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The same three categories are also available to us when we come to look
at the past. An important point to note here is that, strictly
speaking, the historian does nfit study the past at all. What is studied,
according to Oakeshott is present evidence for past events. This is
so in as much as
A fixed and finished past, a past divorced from and
uninfluenced by the present, is a pafct divorced from
evidence (for evidence is always present) and is
consequently nothing and unknowable.^
This looks paradoxical, since there is a temptation to say the statement
"The battle of Hastings was fought in 1066" is about a battle fought
nearly a thousand years ago rather than about documents in an archive.
The point Oakeshott is trying to establish is, I beliirve, that the
past is not 'there' for the historian to escape into and rummage around
for evidence. It is not like a country that we can visit and then
write home about. And if there is only evidence for what happened
(and we cannot examine the event3 for ourselves) then the notion of
'what really happened' must be replaced, according to Oakeshott, by
the notion of 'what the evidence obliges us to believe'.This
is the only way in which the past can be anything other than an
impenetrable world bvpond the bounds of the present. In one way this
leaves Oakeshott open to the charge of scepticism since we can never
'really' know what happened in the past. Thcs vdiole way of putting
things carries with it the danger of apparent paradox.
In the first place, we are offered a past that is present, though
according to Oakeshott, not 'merely present'. In as much as history
is based upon inferences from present evidence it is a way of ordering
14
Oakeshott, on cit, 107
Op cit, 108.
our present experience (that of sub specie praeteritorum), not a way
of experiencing the past. This has echoes of Croce's dictum that all
history is contemporary history, if we take this to mean that history
is not a part of reality, but the whole of reality understood sub
specie praeteritorum. Thus history is in fact the historian's
world of present experience. It is evident from this that a certain
tension must arise between the understanding of the past which springs
from the historian's understanding of the present and the past as
understood by those who were agents at the time when past events were
present occurrences, that is to say, the understanding of what they
were doing which comes from those who lived in the past.
Oakeshott's account of the past is, in this sense, a constructionist
one. History is written by historians, not. those who lived in the.
17
past. In a paper on history and social science, he writes that
"History is not made by soldiers and statesmen ... any more than
etymology is made by insects"History must be understood from
within the framework of contemporary thought. But if this is so,
then what is to be made of the way in which people in the past con¬
ceived themselves as doing things ? Though the evidence for this
must be present, and something with which we are capable of being
familiar with (in the sense of comprehending its significance) in
terms of our present categories, it must be the case that the account
offered makes clear the understanding of people in the past and not
'r
Though Oakeshott does reject any equation of his views with those
of Croce, Experience and its Modes, 109.
'




our own. The evidence at the disposal of historians is that of the
understanding of events and actions by those whose actions and thoughts
they were. In leaving us records of what were present experiences,
thoughts and reflections, it is those in the past who make history and
not historians. The historian's account is logically limited by
what could coherently be asserted about the actions of conscious
individuals in the past, and this must (for Oakeshott) be what they
took themselves to be doing, since there would otherwise be no history
at all; for there can be no facts without judgements, and the
judgements must have been tho3e of those conscious individuals in
the past. None of this excludes the possibility of interpretation and
judgement by the historian of the present evidence, and it is in this
senee that history is the historian's ereation. My point, however, is
merely to note that there is an apparent tension, given Oakeshott's
characterisation of fact and judgement, between the parameters of sense
(and therefore of possible interpretations) being set by agents in the
past on one hand and the view that history must be understood within
the framework of contemporary thought on the other. Oakeshott does
talk of the historian 'translating' from the idiom of practice to that
of history, but the question is, of course, what is involved in this
19
translation and within whose framework it is to be understood.
There is also the tension between an agent's experience of an event
in a 'real' past and the historian's construction of that past.
To repeat, the past is, for Oakeshott, a way of understanding present
evidence and as such, can be viewed in the contemplative, scientific
and practical idioms that are available to our understanding of the
Translation dees after all carry with it the notion of moving from
like to like (eg English to French) where approximate content - je
ne sais quoi may well be untranslatable - can by conveyed through
a logically identical form; rather than moving from one form to
another. To 'translate' a religious notion into science might, it
could be argued, lose the point altogether.
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present. As before, I shall set aside the contemplative attitude,
which in this context would be that of the historical novelist. The
'practical' attitude to the past is, analogously with the attitude
to the present, that of seeing the past in terms of its usefulness.
People often talk of 'learning the lessons of history' and at a more
sophisticated level, this attitude is to be found in the way a
20
practising lawyer might look at a will or legal document. Oake-
shott characterises this attitude, in its more vulgar forms, as
reading the past backwards, in other words, how does the past affect
our present aims and enterprises. It is seen as the womb which has
given birth to our present world, and the information it contains is
seen as a fund of facts and the accumulated widdom of the ages, such
that we might look to for help in dealing with out present contingencies.
More than that, it is the arena in which we may judge past events as
if they affected us. For example, 'The summer of 1920 was the finest
in my aemory", or "King John was a bad king' are both 'practical'
judgements, as are, in different ways, statements such as "He died
21
too soon" or "The Pope's intervention changed the course of events".
The scientific attitude is more complex. We saw earlier that it
was used to distinguish the world of events which are independent of
us. That is to say, events are not useful or useless, they simply are
what they are. In this sense it is the opposite of the practical
attitude. However, it is important to see that the use of the term
scientific can cause confusion here, if we simply equate it with the





methods and practices of the natural sciences. Strictly speaking
there cannot be a scientific (in the sense of 'natural science')
attitude to the past, for:
The world as it appears in scientific theory is a
timeless world, a world, not of actual events,
but of hypothetical situations.^
In other words, the scientist is concerned, not with particular events,
but with events in as much as they are susceptible to generalisation,
quantification and assimilation under universal laws. Science is
concerned with the general, not the particular, or to put in in
Oakesliott's terminology, the world conceived sub speciae quantitatis.
The historian's attitude to the past is characterised for Oakeshott
by none of the attitudes above. If the scientist is concerned with
the general, timeless configurations of phenomena there is no room
for the particularity of history; if the contemplative or practical
person may invoke a response about the past, for the historian there
is nothing else - the past always appears in his/her work. And that
last remark is a grammatical remark, not an observation of fact.
Furthermore, and this is of crucial importance for Oakeshott, the
historical past is the past understood for itw own sake. In a
well known passage, Oakeshott contrasts what he calls 'the attitude
of the wopld' with what he considers to be the attitude of the
historian.
'The historian' adores the past; but the world
today has perhaps less place for those who love
the past than ever before. Indeed, it is deter¬
mined not to allow events to remove themselves




them alive by a process of artificial respiration
or (if need be) to recall them from the dead so that
they may deliver their messages. For it wishes
only to learn from the past and it constructs a
'living past' which repeats with spurious authority
the utterances put into its mouth. But to the
'historian' this is a piece or obscene necromancy:
the past he adores is dead. The world has neither
respect not love for what is dead, wishing only to
recall it to life again. It deals with the past as
with a man, expecting it to talk sense and have
something to say apposite to its plebian 'causes'
and engagements. But for the 1'historian' for whom
the past is dead and irreproachable, the past is
feminine. He loves it as a mistress of whom he
never tires and whome he never expects to talk
sense. Once it was religion which stood in the
way of the appearance of the 'historical' past:
now it is politics; but always it is this practical
disposition.0 ^
The historian then, is distinguished by the fact that the practical
disposition is absent from his work, and the historical disposition
is found only, though not always,,in the workn of historians.
It may be worth dwelling on the distinction betwp.en the historical
attitude on the one hand and those of science and practice on the
other, and looking at the arguments involved more closely. In
Oakeshott's terminology, the world of history is 'coherent' (which
means that it cannot be subsumed into another 'world') but defective
(which means that it is an 'arrest' of experience - it is not the.
perfect reflection of the world of which it speaks). Within the
world of history, any and all evidence is relevant, nothing is
excluded as non-contributory since events are important for what
they show us about the past, and the idea of excludinp something as




and importance. Again, this is a logical point about the way in
which historians must be bound by evidence and not a remark on those
areas of research that historians may have to rank in order of
importance in deciding what work to embark on next (say, sport in 19th
century France or the rise of Fascism in Europe). This does not mean
that the selection of a period or topic for study is completely
unrelated to history, for such a selection will spring from the
historians own interests and a care for those questions and problems
seen as important within the practice of history. And some historians
may choose topics for 'practical' reasons. But this distinguishes
history from practice, since practical goals would involve the
selection of data in quite a different way. Furthermore, it is also
true to say that engagement in the world of practice presupposes that
things can be changed, preferably to our advantage. If X is a king
then the intervention of the Pope will change the course of events
since it will require new strategies and so on to adapt to the new
set of circumstances. But in history (and I am not talking here of
the possibility of new evidence turning up to change our view of
things) the past is fixed. The Pope's intervention did not change
the course of events, it was the course of events. If the past,
whilst we have evidence for it, is unchangeable then we cannot say
that "William II died too sonn", he roust simply have died when he did.
The final group of practical statements that Oakeshoftt wants to
exclude from history proper, judgements such as "King John was a
bad king", are not quite so straightforward. There is clearly a
sense in which all the historian can do is relate the actions of the
king as we have evidence, but there is another sense in which it does
not seem inappropriate to assert that he failed in his aims to curb
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the Barons or murdered rivals and so on. Are such judgements bound
to be practical in the relevant sense ? The answer is, I think,
not necessarily, and it is something that I shall put aiide in order
to return to it later on.
The world of practice is, in this sense, not independent of ourselves.
To allude to the issue of moral judgements, the ethical ' I' is_ a
part of the moral world in the way that the scientific *1' is not part
of the phenomena it investigates, not does it appear in experiments.
But if history is a study of the world that is independent of the
historian, it does nof follow, says Oakeshott, that history is
called upon to imitate or emulate the »ebhoc.s of the natural sciences.
To do so would produce an ignoratio elenchi, for:
... these are abstract and separate worlds of ideas,
different and exclusive modifications of experience •••<>4
This is precisely where for Oakeshott, social sciences such as sociology
and anthropology come to grief, for they attempt to use historical
25
data to produce generalisations that are not historical . Scientific
generalisations are concerned to bring more and more phenomena under
a general description or law. Thus the superiority of Einstein's work
to that of Newton is in its ability to account for a wider range,
whilst still being true of everything covered by Newton's theory. The
historian, on the other hand, is interested in this thing or that
thing rather than any thing which can be identified, given sufficient
24
Experience and its modes, 165.
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As Wittgenstein remarked of Freud's methodology, method and problem
bypass each other. See Philosophical Investigations, page 232.
Strangely, Oakeshott has some sympathy for psychology, see On
Human Conduct (Oxford, OUP, 1974), Chapter i.
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criteria, as falling within the phenomenal world of which that law
speaks. The historian seeks not for similarities, he or she seeks
for dissimilarities between events and explains, not by recourse to
wider and wider generalisations, but by providing more detail of a
specific event.
To sum up, for Cakeshott the 'grammar' of science, an area which is
distinctive precisely because it refers to that frhich is empirical.
and general, is incompatible with the 'grammar' of history because of
the logical limits of the phenomena it investigates. That is to say,
there are some areas of human activity and appects of human behaviour
which are excluded from the area in which terms such as cause and
26
uniformity have sense. And, by the same token, there are phenomena
in the natural world that are excluded from the area in which the
giving of reasons (as opposed to the citing of causes) is appropriate.
This is a gap that cannot be bridged, least of all by using the
vocabulary of one to describe the contents of the other.
And as far as the distinction between the 'historical' and 'practical'
past is concerned, we might sum up by saying that the past understood
as history speaks only of itself. It cannot, logically speaking,
generate information that will he of use to those in the present: it
i6 fixed, finished and unpenttratable, as impossible as Gatsby's dream.
Ill
As we have noted, the first series of objections to Oakeshott's
characterisation of the independence of history comes from those
described (with varying degress of accuracy) as 'positivists'. Their
Some writers would contest this, suggesting reasons can be causes.
But they are not our concern here, cf Blue and Brown BooKs, 18.
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argument, roughly speaking, is that science provides a model fur all
genuine explanations; or rather, that there is <a paradigm for genuine
explanation of which science is the exemplar.
Any explanation must ape, however uncomfortably, the methods of the
natural sciences, even if the subject cannot, at present, reach the
precision of those sciences. On this view the structure of explanation
if subject neutral. In terms of historical explanation, this view is
usually expressed under the general category 'covering law theory" and
its original and mo3t notable exponent is Professor Heropel. Hempel
argues that there are two kinds of covering law - the universal and
the statistical/probable. As we saw, in the frrst case a valid
explanation is one iihich is produced from (i) a general law (ii) a
set of initial conditions. Thus the expansion of a volume of gas is
explained by recourde to (i) general laws about the behaviour of gases
(ii) the heating of a given volume of gas at constant pressure. In
the second type of case, according to Hetapel under conditions of a
more or less compleE kind F, an event, or result' G, will occur with
statistical probability - ie roughly: with a long-run relative frequency -
q: in symbolic notation ps (G,F) * q. If the probability is close
to 1, a law of this type may be invoked to explain occurrence G in a
27
given case where conditions F are realised" . The upshot of all
this for Hempel is
The two kinds of explanation by covering laws have
this featiure in common: they explain an eveny by
showing that, in view of certain particular circum¬
stances and general laws its occurrence was to be
expected (in a purely logical sense), either with
deductive certainty or inductive probability.,.
27
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Historical explanation, toby aims at showing that
the event in question was not 'a matter of chance',
but was to be expected in view of certain ante¬
cedent conditions. The explanation referred *-o
(is) rational scientific explanation which rests
on the assumption of general laws.,
Hempel seems to be making two important points. He is arguing that
an explanation needs to show why 'this' is opposed to 'that* happened
and that an explanation in terms of reasons is in effect to redescribe
an action rather than to explain it; for to show that X was reasonable
or rational in the circumstances is not to exnlain it, but to point
30
to grounds that could have been put forward. Secondly, he is
arguing that talk of reasons as motives for actions does not exclude
a causal explanation of the type offered by science, but presupposes
such explanations in the form of a general law of some kind. Thus
the failure of William I to invade Scotland for the reason that he
was uncertain about the loyalty of his nobles presupposes a law-like
generalisation of the form, "leaders do not invade lands when they are
not in control of their own domaiav etc."
I should state here that it is irrelevant for the purpose of this
argument as to whether historians actually generate any laws or merely
consume laws that are 'discovered' by sociologists and psychologists,
though there seems to be no reason, in principle, why they should not
do so.
The above outline gives rise to two related, though distinct, questions.






matter of fact, historical explanations anything like scientific ones ?
It should he again noted that I am distinguishing here between the
thesis that historical explanations can be reduced to causal or
scientific explanations and the thesis that they share a common
explanatory structure.
At the outset it should be noted that an underlying assumption of the
arguments above is that whilst other explanatory activities stand in
particular need of justification, science does not do so. Theology,
for example, is often introduced as being dependent upon an affirmative
answer being given to the question "Does God exist ?" or, for the
more philosophically minded "Is the concept of God in order ?"
Science is rarely, if ever, introduced as being dependent upon the
answer we give to the question "Is the concept of cause in order ?"
It is worth reminding ourselves at this point that criteria of logic
are not, as Peter Winch points out, direct gifts from God but "arise
out of and are only intelligible in, the context of ways of living
31
or modes of social life"." The point Winch is making is that whilst
it would be irrational in science to kefuse to be bound by the results
of a properly conducted experiment, or irrational for a religious
believer to pit their strength against that of God, neither science
nor religion are rational or irrational; they are both non-logical
categories and it is only within them that we can assert of a statement
that it is logical or illogical. Mistakes are mistakes within a
system, not in the abstract. Thus within each mode of social life
(to use Winch's term) there are criteria that are not themselves the
Winch, op cit, 100-1.
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subject of challenge. (This is not to deny that they may be overlaps
between different modes.) For example, the uniformity of nature is
presupposed by science and makes the rejection of unsatisfactory
theories a possibility, it is not something that is demonstrated by
science. In this sense science is incapable of external justification,
it is only within science that particular results or theories can be
justified by appealing to the appropriate criteria.
The assumption being made, that the criteria of science are the
criteria for all rational activity may be said to beg the question
since it assumes that all other arguments are proto-scientific; as
if science was whet we had all been trying to do, but have previously
failed to achieve.
A general view of this type is expressed by Ian Jarvie when he writes
I should only claim that science is a paradigm of
rationality - for us and tout court ... the paradigm
of rationality is action taken with full knowledge;
the paradigm of full knowledge is scientific knowledge;
therefore any action to gain scientific knowledge is
at the heart of any idea of rationality.^
It might also be thought that talk of 'full' knowledge in the abstract,
as if all knowledge was of the same type, is equally question begging,
People often talk of the growth of knowledge since the 17th century as
if it were clear what they meant. Does, for example, a new archaeological
discovery, a new proof in mathematics, an undiscovered archive, the
average inside leg measurement of British postmen increase the sum of
knowledge ? And, if so, by how much ? Would the disproof of a
theory mean that there xras more, or less, knowledge ? It is surely
reasonable to imagine a rational decision being taken without recourse
I Jarvie in Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences, ed. Cioffi and
Borger (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970), 268-9.
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to 'full knowledge' in the sense indicated by Jarvie at the start of
this chapter. A judge making a decision about a natter which puts
the rights of the community against those of the individual by
appealing to precedent and case law is acting rationally, but hardly
in the terras envisaged by Jarvie.
It is tempting to believe that since science has transformed our world,
the scientific method can go on expanding its scope ad infinitum and
subsume Ureas that were previously thought to be distinct. It is
this view that underlies the expressed hopes of sociologists and
psychologists about their subjects. But as Lichtenburg once
remarked
We must not believe that when we make a few more
discoveries in this field or that, that this
process will just go on for ever. The high jumper
jumps better than the farm boy, and one high
jumper better than another, but the height that
no human can jump over is very small. Just as
people find water wherever they dip. man finds the
incomprehensible sooner or later.^
34
Science, like everything else, has its limitations. My argument
so far has been that a scientific account cannot be the only and
need not be the best account of any given occurrence.
It might, however, still he maintained that although there are no a
priori reasons for equating historical models of action with scientific
ones, as a matter of fact the two are the same. I mean here that
33
Quoted in M O'C Drury, The Danger of Words (London, Foutledge & Kegan
Paul, 1973), 30.
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The element to which science has become a part of our culture is
aptly summed up in the following quotation prom the TV critic Clive
James, discussing Flash Gordon on the box. "When Flash's pal Dr
Tiarkov talked nonsense, it sounded like nonsense. When Dr Who talks
nonsense, it sounds like, science." C James, The Crystal Bucket
(London: Cape, 1981), 27.
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their character is scientific, not that an empirical investigation
has revealed that this is what historians consider themselves to be
doing. Indeed, this has to be so since, as far as I am aware, even
the strongest proponents of the covering law model admit that few, if
any, historians base their work on this approach. This is, I believe,
a damaging point against their approach and is seen by some as enough
to dismiss it completely. This may be too quick, for even the most
brilliant exponents of a subject may be unable to give an adequate
philosophical account of itfhat they are doing. Deeply religious
people are not always good philosophers of religion, distinguished
scientists are often poor philosophers of science and brilliant foot¬
ballers are not always good commentators on their sport. On the
other hand, though the relationship between a practice and its
exponents is undoubtedly a complex one, it inusc be admitted that an
account which in no way resembles the practice it is 'describing' is
an unconvincing one. Why call it that at all ? Thus the response
'so much the worse for historians' who fail to come up th the
standard of the covering law model is a little too cavalier fn its
attitude.
A second response to the way historians write is that the standard of
explanation set by the covering law model is an ideal 'to which they
are moving. But an ideal must be of the same form as those attempts
to meet it, and that is precisely what is in doubt. Elsewhere,
Lichtenburg wrote that 'Materialism is the ®ymptote of psychology' and
this sums up the relationship between the hopes of the covering law
theorifits and the practice of historians.
I shall now attempt to argue that if we look at the practice of
historians, and look at what it is they are trying to explain, then the
covering law account does not really help us- for laws of this sort
are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions. Moreover, general¬
isations which can be made by historians on the basis of their
investigations (eg All reformation parliaments were packed) are
different in character to scientific generalisations based upon experi¬
ment and hypothesis. In doing this I shall meet the two points raised
earlier in connection with Professor Hempel about the need for general
laws.
The first point to be made is that if scientific explanations were to
be brought into historical study, then plainly the notions of cause
and of precision in measurement would play an important part in those
explanations. Fut while it may be true to say that there are some
elements of human behaviour where such methods are appropriate, it is
not true to say that it must he the case for all human behaviour,
including some of those areas of most interest to the historian. An
analogy with psychology might help here. In 'The Danger of Words'34a
Matrrice Drury argues that there are two kinds of psychology, labelled
(in a manner that Dorothy Parker could scarcely better) A and B.
Psychology B is 'scientific' in character, dealing with quantification,
expressing itself in such manifestations as Eysenck's Introvert/
Extrovert ecale and drawing out abstract traits that people share (eg
Boswell and Pepys were both 'extroverts'). Now clearly there may be
a place for measurement of this kind in psychology (for example,
measuring the performance of young children in learning manipulative
skills or Verbal ones) as there may be room for quantitative information
in history (the number of cattle in 13th century Palestine may tell us about
Crusader society), However, as Drury points out, there is also room
for psychology A. This, for Drury, has nothing to do with measurement,
M. O'C. Drury, The Daughter of Words, London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1973)
nor the 'science of behaviour'. It rests on insight and intuition.
In this sense, the great novelists such as Jane Austen, Tolstoy and
Oostoyevsky are nsyehologists because they have nenetrating insights
into hunan emotions, weaknesses and behaviour. P-rury quo res a
letter from Simone TTeil to one of her pupils which shows precisely that
understanding of another hunan being. The importance of this for
Drury is that it deals with something that is immeasurable. Qualities
such as love, kindness, goodness and so on cannot be measured like
the reactions of a child. Moreover, the subject is an individual,
not people in general. A scientist might be interested in any piece
of chalk, not a narticular bit, but this attitude, transferred to
humans would only lead to shallowness of understanding. To say that
Boswe11 and Pepys share an abstract trait on the Eysenck scale is
neither of interest to us, nor especially important. Two things follow
from this. Firstly that psychology A cannot be replaced by
psychology B because the aspects of human behaviour we have been dealing
with cannot be measured more accurately, since they cannot be
measured, in that sense, at all. Secondly, the historian is, in
«
some aspects of work, interested in precisely tho3e immeasurable
qualities which would be trivialised and misunderstood if they were
thought to be amenable to measurement. Greater precision cannot be
achieved.
The language of history, just like our everyday talk is littered with
examples of the term 'cause'. But are historical causes like scientific
causes in every case ? In some cases an historical narrative nay
well take note of something that mgght be explained in terms of
causation that would be appropriate to a scientist. For example, the
course of the Black Death during the 14th century was caused by rats carrying
certain bacillus, the Lisbon eqrthquake in 1759 \ras caused by pressure
under the earth's crust and faults in the rocks nuound the city, or
whatever. However, it does not follow that all Historical causes
must be understood in this sense. People ae.to.for reasons as well as
causes. Hie antecedent conditions of human actions do not, in this
sense, form an homogeneous entity. Dispositions, to use P.yle's
phrase, such as 'ear, jealousy, the desire for revenge, religious
belief and moral commitment are not reducible to certain necessary or
essential conditions. A person's anger or jealousy may take the
form of writing a poison pen letter or kicking the dog, keeping a
stony silence or shouting at someftne. Intentions, motives and
beliefs, all of which are crucial to historical! explanation are not
objects in the world and cannot, therefore, logically the the object
of scientific investigation and explanation. Beliefs, for example,
are not caused, not do they act as caused in the way that gas
igniting causes an explosion. They do not, in that sense, have a
duration or a spatial location. It would surely be absurd to say
"As I was believing in God, the 'phone interrupted me' or to ask
"Where do you believe in God ?" To say that X did Y because he
believed p is to assert a logical relationship between them, not
35
simply to bbserve a chronological succession of events.
This brings us to a second difficulty for the notion of cause in-
explaining human behavoour. To say that A is the cause of B, we
must be able to separate them, otherwise B might be part of A. But
could we do this with a person's beliefs ? As we have noted Marx's
talk of social being determining consciousness in his 1859 preface
exhibits the confusion I am referring to. Though it is tempting
to say that a person's rmiddle-classness" causes their Liberalism, it
35
See Chapter 1.
is hard to imagine a satisfactory exposition of "middle-classness" that
did not mention a oerson's beliefs and hence that very liberalism.
Hempel, and others., might disagree here, and clad"' that there is
nothing in princ'""1 that prevents a causa? explanation of an action.
Without going into details, it seems that there is a further afgaaent
against this position, namely that the meaning of an action (or
utterance) such as a warning or greeting is not something that can
be vonveyed by a nurely causal explanation* for we would not only
need to understand the meaning of a phrase but also to understand
what saying something like that (with that meaning) would mean in a
given situation. A causal explanation might be able to give us
the bpdily movements of X but the fact that we can give the conditions
(in a causal sense) for an action taking place, we cannot give a
causal account of the feature of that action which makes it an
action of warning as opnosed to one of greeting, or a practical joke.
36
The difference is expressed by Wittgenstein" as the difference between
me raising my arm and my arm going up. Agency in the first sense
is not a natural phenomena.
There are then, limits to a scientific account of human actions which
prevent history being reduced to scientific inquiry (a thesis V7hich
may haWe consequences for the social science.s). But what of the
argument that the structure of argument is the same in history and in
o
science ?
The first point to be made mere is that the 'general' laws unveiled by
those who favour this argument are often rather vague and trivial (in
16 . . .
Philosophical Investigations, paras bl2ff.
the sense that they do not have a wide explanatory span). In short,
a general law that looks as if it might explain a great deal (for
example, Popper's law from the sociology of military power "Big armies
will defeat small armi.es if they are both equally well led and have
parity in weapons") suffers from a great number of counter examples
which require further and further modification to the generalisation.
At the extreme, we could imagine a 'law' which only explained one
battle! The point of this is to note how the move is not, as in
science, towards bringing more and more identifiable phenomena under
a general law, but towards making more and more distinctions between
individual battles which bring out their particular course and
consequences. Indeed this would have to be so, for if there were no
relevant differences between the battle of Agincourt and the battle
of Lutzen, then how could we usefully distinguish between them ?
It would burely be absurd to say that what really interested us here
was that two smaller armies defeated two larger ones. What interests
us is the whole range of different circumstances that surrounded tfeem,
Now it is, of course, true to say there may be common features
between two battles in terms of tactics, weapons, and so on and that
it may be useful in discussing, say, the battle of Agincourt to draw
parallels with the battle, of Crecy. But this is not the same thing
as bringing two identifiable phenomena under a law; rather it is
laying two events side by side (and it is worth remembering that the
differences interest historians as much as the similarities).
The problems above are related to the difficulty involved in specifying
the antecedent conditions of an historical event, in the way that
these can be isolated in a scientific experiment. Science does not
tell us what is the case but what will be the case under conditions
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T - T,. It is difficult to see how, in history, we could isolate the
o b
relevant factors; that is, make sure that only conditions Tq -
and that are not present as well. In short, that the two are
the same. And as we have noted, if we could show that two events were
the same then there would be a further difficulty; for if the Russian
Revolution had had the same antecedent conditions as the French
Revolution it would have been ... the Frer.fch Revolution .' We would
then be left with the problem of distinguishing between them,
something that is surely relevant to historical inquiry. If this
sameness could be achieved, it would be useless for history. It
might be worth adding here that part of the point of scientific laws
is that they enable us to predict (and are confirmed or falsified by
their success) events in the area of which they speak. It is not,
however, clear that anything like this happens in history. Firstly,
because we know what has happened and cannot therefore, test our
hypothesis in this way and secondly because the multitude of conditions
surrounding each event make it impossible to ensure that the causes
and effects are only within that closed class of which our law is
meant to explain.
It might be argued here that we are talking of probability only. But
two further difficulties arise. If it is a matter of probability
(no matter how close to 1) then something else could have happened or
caused X to happen. In that case, we are left with the question posed
by hempel why this and not that ? Secondly, imagine that we want to
find out about Edinburgh University and are using some general obser¬
vations about British Universities to help us. Uow would this be
of use ? If Edinburgh is part of our original sample then we do not
need the rest (it would be absurd for the general conclusion to
contradict what we know of the particular we are interested in<2 since
it cannot be- aore accurate than that which we already know about
Edinburgh. If Edinburgh is not part of the sample, then how do we
know (if the conclusion is only probable) that it is the same ? We
would then have to look at it, in which case the general theory
becomes redundant again. A general theory might have heuristic
value, but that is a different matter. If someone were then to argue
that such a theory could "fill in' where there was no positive
evidence, then this would run contrary to historical practice.
Historians might develop an explanation which links together scattered
evidence (as any study of the early middle ages will show) but they
would never substitute abstraction for evidence. If we not know why
William I failed to invade Scotland (that is, there is no evidence)
then any number of theories would be on an identical logical footing,
and the first duty of the historian would be to find evidence, not
construct a theory.
The earlier discussion of theories leads to a final point against the
identification of science and history as similar types of inquiry.
This is connected to the question of how a scientist stands in
relation to the phenomena he/she investigates as opposed to how an
historian stands in relation to other societies. As Peter Winch
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points out, the concept of gravity does not belong to a falling
apple, but to the scientist's account of such an occurrence. The
criteria for scientific explanations belong to the scientist, or at




Cakeshott) the concept of war (which might be invoked to explain
certain events in the pa3t) does not belong to the observer (in this
case, the historian) but to the conflicting societies themselves.
Winch's discussion brings in another important and related point. For
the scientist it is his/her grasp of the theory (of gravity) which
enables him/her to understand what is happening and to bring together
related phenomena under that law. But for the historian it is only
to the extent to which we independently understand the diffextent situ¬
ations (various battles, say) and their significance that we are in
the position to call then the sane thing. In science, understanding
the theory makes it possible to understand individual phenomena, in
history it is only our understanding of the individual events that
enables us to be in a position to relate them at all. The two
processes are almost exactly the opposite.
Finally, a remark about Hempel's suggestion that an account offering
reasons for actions is not a genuine explanation, but only a redes-
cription. To show that X is rational is still not to say why it (as
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opposed to anything else) was done." What is being said, hovrever, is
that to cite a reason (X intended to do Y) is not only to say that Y
was rational but to explain the action by giving the point of that action.
39 .
To use an example of Skinner a policeman uttering a warning to a
skater not only means something by the words he utters, but means
something by uttering them. That is to say, be intends to warn the
skaters (rather than p&ay a joke on them) and recovering this intention
38
See Gardiner, op cit, 102.
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Q Skinner, 'Social leaning' and the Explanation of Social fiction, in
Gardiner. Philosoph' of History, 106-27.
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explains the action in the relevant sense by explaining its point.
Following J L Austin, Skinner terras this the illocutyry force of a
statement, and though this side of matters does not concern us, we
can see that a non-causal explanation is quite adequate in tuese
circumstances. (The first chapter indicates where X disagree with
Skinner on the usefulness of this concept.)
IV
Assuming that the ah >ve arguments are correct ' -"story is a distinct
method of inquiry -rora science. This now leaves the question of the
relationship between history and, what Cakes' .oft terms, 'the world
of practice*. It seems, moreover, that acceptance of the previous
section cuts us off ^rom at least one avenue for distinguishing
between history and practice; for if history could be 'scientific'
in some sense then it ought automatically to be canable of becoming
too objective and dispassionate enquiry. There are three related
issues at stake in this section. Ue need to see if it is possible
for the historian to be interested in the past for its own sake, to
see if this can be done without lapsing into the language of practice
and to see (bearing in mind one of the criticisms of the covering law
theorists) xjhether this bears any relationship to the way historians
actually write.
The case that mora]. religious or political language must enter into
the work of historians is a powerful one. Though it is accepted
that the historian should not be the partisan supporter of a cause or
nation, it is undoubtedly true, as Professor Walsh argues, that the
activities of other people often interest us in the same way that the
activities of foreigners might concern us, even though we are unable
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to influence them in any way. " Furthermore, since the historian
does know the resuLlfc of what happened in the past, there, is nothing
wrong, in principle, with reading the past in terms of its subsequent
developments and how they affect u9. Finally, says Walsh, because
the past is about people, there is a difficulty in not taking sides
(unlike science) for in as much a9 the historian analyses and tells
a story, his/her position must be that of a narrator with precon¬
ceptions, presuppositions and so on. This iast point can be taken
two ways. It can be seen as a psychological remark about historians
or a logical remark about the nature of experience. Just as there
can be no 'raw" data or blank' mind so eveyyone must bring precon¬
ceptions to their understanding of the past (in Kyle's phrase,
'theory-laden') and, it might be argued these preconceptions must
be of a political, moral or even ideological nature.
The historian is not, so the argument goes, ari impartial or neutral
observer of events and this shows itself in the actual practice of
history writing. In some cases values will be implicit within
narrative accounts of the past. This may take ftae form of certain
moral principles being unstated, though applied, within a work or
it may take the form of implicitly rejecting a way of understanding
the past (for example, seeing history as what 'great men' do, rather
than as the interaction of 'social forces'). Thus a Marxist
historian might accuse, a Liberal of implicit bias where the latter
talks of the actions of statesmen and the importance of treaties in
a description of the outbreak of the Great War, rather than talking
A noint raised by Professor Walsh in a seminar.
in
about class and the declining rate of profit. Values may also be
explicit, in the sense of judgements either or particular individuals
or events. In a paper entitled 'Moral Judgements in History and
History Teaching', Am tow-Beer** gives some exanrles
♦
George I £f not the worst, was perhaps the least
generally attractive of monarchs^
On Gladstone's foreign policy
In the harsh Bismarkian age he. stood for the humaner
liberalism of the mid nineteenth centuryy and
the value of that attitude can be appreciated today
when we see to what Bismarkianism led . ,,,43
And finally a longer quotation in which the moral judgement is woven
into the narrative, rather than standing as an individual comment.
For twenty years Charles of Anjou dominated the
Mediterranean stage. He had shorn himself to be
one of the great statesmen of his time ... But he
died a failure. His personal assets were many.
He was bold, imperturbable, vigorous and unsparing
of himself, ... he was a competent soldier and
administrator. His piety was sincere ... But
these assets were not sufficient for the role he
chose to play. He. failed as a mars. There was
no kindliness in his nature, no pity nor any
imaginitive sympathy. His personal ambition was
too crude and obvious. His piety was its servant
... He was a man of honour according to his lights,
but they were narrow and selfish lights. Men
could admire him.... But few of them loved him.
It was the lack of human understanding that was
his downfall. His human weaknesses were a certain
vanity ... and a certain excess of confidence
hhat as the years went by led him to underrate his
enemies. Finally and fatally, it was beyond his
comprehension that the Sicilians should so care for
*
A Low-Beer, in Studies in the Nature and Teaching of History (Eds.







their freedom that they mould rise against the
most powerful prince of the age.^
The point being made by Ann Low-Beer is that it is difficult, not to
say impossible, to imagine any credible historical narrative in
. . 45
which such terms could be eschewed completely. Citing Berlin
she goes on to syy "History is written in everyday language, the
languape of ordinary sneech, which is shot through with evaluative
notions. Only a severely technical language can escape these
general, often loose, moral connotations implied in our everyday
speech. And, as Berlin points out, it is impossible to conceive of
description of people and actions, of narrative or story, in some
entirely neutral technical language.She then goes on to make
the point that, many ordinary descriptive terms have an evaluative
element: does the historian for example, call an event a 'massacre'
resulting from 'religious persectuinn' !>r should he/she try and find
a neutral term such as 'killing', the difficulty being that killing
is not a synonym for massacre ?
There are several important points raised by the above discussion -
relating to both the objectivity and neutrality of history. But
before discussing these issues fully, I want to try and clear up one
nrohlen which is central to our understanding of history as an
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One way of getting to grips with this problem is to return to Oakeshott's
writings and ask if he is offering a characterisation of history that
i-s a priori or a posteriori. At times it looks as if he is offering
us the latter. In On the Activity of Being an Historian' he tells
us that there are no necessary or sufficient conditions for history,
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and that history is what it has become'. The analogy used is that
it has emerged loke a game played by children, starting off in a
rough and undisciplined way and only later acquiring a firm or
specific character. '.'his character is something found only, though
not always, in the works of historians. A comparison that suggests
itself is with Wittgenstein's injunction in the 'Philosophical
Investigations' to look and see how a word is used if we want to know
what it means. history is what historians do (though this does not
mean that particular historians cannot be mistaken) and the logic of
historical writing becomes clear from examples of that craft, in the
same x*ay that the logic pf praying becomes clear from looking at
actual prayers.
As has already been suggested, this position does seem to differ in
some respects from that outlined in 'Experience and its Modes', and
in other of Oakeshott's earlier writings. A clear example of this
comes in a review of Professor Walsh's 'Introduction to Philosophy of
History , where he dismisses that author's appeal to historians as
4F
begging the question. If, to use an example of my oxm and not
Oakeshott, all historians started to dig roads or make paper aero-
P.ationalism in Politics, 137.
In the Philosophical Quarterly, vol 2, 1952, 276-7,
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planes, we would not say 'that is what history has become'; rather
we would say that history was no longer being written at all. The
implication here is that there is an external standard against which
the writings of historians should be judged. In "Experience and
Its Modes' this standard is the coherence of the world of history as
a possible manner of understanding experience. The fact that
historians are prone to disagree about what they are doing (if they
care to gxve an account ut all) leads Oakeshott to suggest that the
only alternative to linguistic anarchy and a multitude o£ competing
uses is a discipline that is capable of internal coherence in the form
of rules that are independent of historians. In short, we can have
either an arbitrary head count of historians or a coherent world of
ideas which can, on the basis of its own (necessary) presuppositions,
resist the intrusion of the non-historical in all its forms.
To say that this gives the impression of a logical structure 'out
there' in some crystalline form is, no doubt, to put things too
crudely, but Oakeshott must (it seems) hold that such a world is
there irrespective of what any or all historians do. In this respect
his earlier position is more akin to that of the 'Tractatus' and the
search for an underlying logical form. The emergence of history
as a specific activity is to do with the 'discovery' of these latent
possibilities rather than the development of logic through a practice,
history must, in this sense, be logically complete as a coherent
enterprise before the first historian puts pen to paper or quill to
parchment. If this is so, then it is difficult to reconcile this
with Oafeeshctt's later view that history is 'what it has become'.
Each way has its difficulties. Either we seen to be offering no
solution to differences iretween historians, or we cannot, apparently,
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link the logic of history to the practice of historians at all. Two
points are worth making here. Firstly, the question of coherence.
There is a well known story that Russell, on finding an apparently
insoluble contradiction in one of his theories, wrote to Frege and
received the reply "Arithmetic is tottering". The plain implication
being that if the very foundations of mathematics were fl«wed by
contradiction then the whole edifice of mathematical reasoning must
collapse along with it. Not only, thought Russell, would we no
longer be justified in trusting mathematics, but universal scepticism
would be inescapable. Analogously, it might be supposed that if
two of Oakeshott's postulates of historical inquiry were found to
contradict one another, then history would also be 'tottering".
On the face of it, this seems an odd conclusion. How, we might ask
can a contradiction in set theory destroy the certainty of an.
arithmetical proposition such as 2 + 2 ~ 4 ? In a similar way, if
two of Oakashott's postulates were contradictory, would this mean
that there had never been a coherent historical statement ?
Wittgenstein reminds us that generating a valid inference is related to
the question of following a rule. But a rule, he argues, and its
application are not something to be grasped in abstracting; we need
to see how the rule is applied in an actual practice
Not only rules, but also examples are needed for
establishing a practice. Our rules leave loop¬
holes open, and the practice has to speak for
itself.A9
The rule exists in_ the actual practice and cannot exist apart from such
a practice. A formula can, for example, be taken in a variety of
L Wittgenstein, Cm uertainty (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969^ para 139.
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ways - like a sign-post, or series of chalk narks, there is no one way
of interpreting there, that is something that arises out of the
practice itself.^ Two points are being roa'e here. Firstly,
history does not have to be logically complete in the sense of the term
indicated above, ((In one sense any activity is always logically
complete -• it is what it is - though it may not be logically coherent))
before any valid historical statements can be made; all that matters
is that a particular inference is valid in that case. Secondly,
the rules of a u" v.ipl:ue are not independent of the practice of that
discipline, but shot- themselves in that practice. In this sense, a
contradiction is only a contradiction when it arises and how we
resolve that contradiction may involve many things, 'sealing it off',
adopting a new convention and so on, none of which necessarily
involve the wholesale restructuring of the activity in question.
This would seem to 1 earn- us with the problem referred to earlier of
'begging the question*. Which historians, Oakeshott might ask,
would you choose, and what if they all took up another ? If anY
particular historian can be-wrong, why (logically) can't they all be
wrong ? It does not Follow, of course, that the move from a
particular to a general proposition is valid in thss way. For
example, a particular statement can be false, out not all statements
can be so. In a similar way, although a memory may be false, not
all memories can be so, otherwise the dcstir. von the question tries
exploit would collapse. Thus, with history, it is only because
there is a general consensus of reactions and standards that arise
from an established wa\ of doing things that we are in a position
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Ic«eBtlgatiopgparas 85-87.
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to decide that X isn't writing history. 'The practice speaks for
itself. Wittgenstein puts the. general point like this (following
TJinch I have reversed the order of the paragraphs to make them
clearer)
242 If language is to be a form of communication there
must be agreement, not only in definitions but
also (queer as this may sound) in judgements.
This may seem to abolish logic, but does not do
so - It is one thing to describe methods of
measurement and another to obtain and state
results of measurement. But what we call
"measuring" is partly determined by a certain
consistency in results of measurement.
241 "So you are. saying that human agreement decides
what is true and what is false ?' It is what
human beings say that is true and false: and
they agree in the language that they use. That
is not agreement in opinions, but in a form
of life,,.^
This is a general epistemological point and ve must be clear about what
is being claimed. Wittgenstein is not saying that what is true or
false is determined by whether such judgements accord with those of
others, not that we base our judgements on what we observe other
people doing. Bather, that there must be agreement in what he calls
a form of life for (in our case) historical judgements to be intelli¬
gible at all. Agreement in definitions is logically prior to
agreement in judgements. In claiming that history is being written
only when certain preconditions are satisfied, without reference to
the practice of history itself, Oakeshott is elevating one set of
conditions above others without any apparent justification.
Having argued that we need to look at the nractice of historians, we




and discuss the place of 'practical' judgements (in the Oakeshottian
sense) in historv.
TheiAssue of partiality in selection of tonics has already been
discussed and need not detain us further* Suffice it to say that
we can see that sbbie.ctivity in selecting a question does not imply
subjectivity in the answer that we give.
The question of objectivity and neutrality in history has two dimens¬
ions to it, the logical and the practical. The first dimension is
about what we mean by saying that a work of history is 'objective' as
opposed to 'subjective', or 'neutral' as opposed to 'partisan'. The
second is to do with how far historians meet those standards, and ia,
strictly speaking, outside of the concerns of this fchasis since it is
our task to investigate logic rather than performance. How far, and
in what way, can history be objective ? The first point that needs
to be made is to reject an all-embracing scepticism about the possi¬
bility of objectivity that might he offered v those of an ideological
disposition. Under this argument we brin" '■"•alues' or 'theories' to
everything - either explicitly or, more usually, implicitly - and
make judgements on the basis of these unchallenged 'assumptions'.
If this is intended as a logical remark about the possibility of
experience (that is to say facts must be understood within some
framework of thought in order to be facts at all) then it simply proves
far too much. for,, if this is the case then there can be no such
thing, as an objective judgement (since every judgement will involve
some 'theory' or whatever) and it is surely Vbsurd to criticise history
for its lack, of objectivity when this is something it could never
achieve !
Clearly, the discussion must focus around another way of looking at
things, and following from the argument above, accept that accusations
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of subjectivity or bias depend upon the acceptance of standards of
objectivity. In history, this is bound up with the- concept of
evidence and the limits we may legitimately place on what any
particular piece of evidence shows. This means that the concept of
objectivity in history (in the sense of agreed criteria, or at least
agreement over hat would count as criteria) is not incompatible with
selecting or interpreting, since we can always ask the question Does
Elton make out his case ?" and expect a reasoned justification for
ignoring certain documents or another interpretation. The possibility
of historical facts is not undermined by the existence in historical
works of places whe<»e either opinions or judgements are offered. For
example, when Pollard and Elton disagree about the role of Cromwell
in the reign of Kerry VIII there are places where they offer evidence
which is automatically accepted or bwyond doubt and others where they
offer questionable evidence or an interprc tsLdon that is open to
disagreement. It also means that the concept of objectivity is not
disturbed by the possibility of disagreement amongst historians
tprovided that their disagreement is something that has some reference
to evidence) nor by the fact that the evidence can first point one
way and then the other, with no apparently final solution in sight.
A good example of this is the debate between Tavney, Trevor-Roper and
others on the role of the gentry in seventeenth century England. It
is often tempting to try and seek an unassailable certainty for a
subject or discipline and to think that if that standard cannot be
reached then there is nothing other than prejudice and opinion. An
analogy is with the position of those philosophers who continue to be
worried by the failure of inductive reasoning to live up to the
certainty that deductive reasoning apparently gives. My point is
10
that the lack of such a standard is based upon the false notion that a
certain type of reasoning is reasoning par excellence and that all
reasoning must meet that standard. In hhe case of induction we need
to remind ourse'. ha* it it not an iiz 1 h. V--tier. and
, the case of history we need to remind ourselves that getting at the
truth does not mean truth in some general or abstract sense but,
quite simply, assembling all the relevant details on the basis of the
evidence we have and ■-.resenting them in sued a form that rational
agreement or dispute is possible. Thus we can embrace an Oakeshottian
scepticism about never being able to get at tin *ast and still
maintain that history is objective and rational.
It is a fact, often lost sight of, that ther s a large measure of
agreement amongst historians and that bias or partisanship in history
are something that ",-i :an clearly recognic in work,
but even if we accept that the question of objectivity can be put
aside - that is to say the logical principle ; wV cb mjeghk form the
basis of objective as opposed to arbitrary or subjective judgements
can be made clear (as opposed to the fact that some issues, because
of lack of evidence or conflicting evidence . will at any given time
be irresolvable between rival historians) if:aa o' neutrality
cannot. We cannot, apparently, avoid juco oats of value in the
language we use to describe events. This does not mean that such
judgements would be subjective, in the sense understood above, for they
would be capable of defence in terms appropriate to historical
discussion and might, of course, turn out co be false, Rather, it
seems to imply that we cannot just describe an event, we must judge
it in terms which, as part of 'ordinary language' will be the same as
those used for our oddinary moral or political talk. Hence success,
failure and bad kings and the rest are all legitimate historical uses.
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This issue might he said to affect the matter of objectivity indirectly,
since if historians can come from different (non neutral) frameworks
then on what basis can they disagree or agree ? This issue will be
taken up in the last chapter.
This whole area does not seem, to me at least, to be one where cut and
dried distinctions can be made in all cases. One of the overall
difficulties in Oakestiott's account is that he makes out and dried
distinctions when the whole issue is far more complex and the boundaries
are far less firm than he imagines. This latter point is one made
with great force by Wittgenstein inhhis later writings and in particular
in the 'Philosophical Investigations'. An important notion introduced
in the 'Investigations' is that of a language game, and though the
term has been devalued by much sloppy usage and inappropriate citation,
it has a part to play here.
Philosophers often talk about something called ordinary language',
which people called 'we1, speak. One point that Wittgenstein seeks
to establish in the cInvestigations1 is that language is used in many
different ways and in relation to many different activities (praising,
warning, describing, reporting, etc, etc). There is, he argues no
essence to these uses, but that they are related - a complicated
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network that criss-crosses and overlaps. Different assertions,
which on the surface appear quite similar, do not always belong to
the same 'game'. For example, "The letter is in the post-box" and
"The pain is in my head" are quite different 'games'. I should ptmnt
out here that 'games' in this sense do not always correspond to
clt »nara
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activities. To use the example above, these could belong to the same
activity - the doctor7s diagnosis, based upon my claim "The pain, etc."
could be followed by me posting a sick-note to work. The same word
may, then, have a different use in a different language game. What
I wish to suggest is that history and morality or ideology are
different 'language games' and that we cannot assume that words used
in one simply transfer their meaning when used in the other. This is
not to deny that we cannot make moral judgements about the past, but
that this belongs to a different area. In order words, evaluation
in the historical sense need not entail evaluation in any moral or
politicil (or indeed ideological) sense.
It is the apparent failure to see this that leads Oakeshott, mistakenly
in my view, to attempt to exclude such terms as cause, failure and
so on from 'history proper'. To use another analogy of Wittgenstein's
he is paying too much attention to the surface grammar' of the
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concepts involved and not enough to their 'depth grammar.' To say
that X causes Y may be to make a connection of a llunean kind about
forces, but it need not do so. To say that the invasion of Belgium
by Germany was the immediate cause of the Great War is a perfectly
respectable usage that only the most arbitrary linguistic legislation
could say must be a scientific or practical term. There may actually
be a place for a scientific causal connection within an historical
narrative (his death was caused by Bubonic Plague), though the point
of causal talk would be different here, since we would be interested
in the effect of X's death on sebsequent events, or merely the fact
of X's death.
Ibid, para 664.
The same general point can be made in relation to such terms as failure
and accident. It is not that these terms are, per se, illegitimate
but that the purpose of using them in practical, as opposed to historical
writing is different. Harold Godwin, for example, failed to win the
battle of Hastings, '-'illiam died by accident when his horse threw him.
In practical talk such statements refer to a world of other possibil¬
ities. harold could have won, William might have survived and so on?
one contingent event occurred rather than any other. But for the
hsatorian, failure and accident do not speak of -possibility in this
sense, there is only what happened, Harold lost and William died. To
say that Harold failed at Hastings is not to usurp the language of
practice but to use a term in a different, though related way. One
way of putting the point might be to say that though there can be
failures and bad Kings in history, there are no such things for
history. As we nave seen, the point of describing something as a
failure depends upon the logical possibility of success and whilst
this is perfectly possible in the world of practice, it is impossible
witahin history since tnings are (in the relevant sense) unalterable
and the alternative is not, therefore a logically possible object
of historical inq-uirv.
This last point is related to a distinction worth making between 'value
judgements' in the subject matter of history and 'value judgements'
in the historian's treatment of that subject matter. Documents,
diaries, newspapers and all the other written evidence we hirae for the
past are written in the practical idiom, They show bias, prejudice,
ignorance of a wider perspective and so on. Anyone who has read the
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'Deads of Frederick 3arbarossa'J willahave no difficulty in
Written by Trader?ck'8 uncle , Bishop Otto of Freising.
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recognising this description. But the historian, unlike the eighth
century chronicler Kennius does not merely "make a heap of what I
have found'. It is the task of the historian to judge the material,
assess it in the light of other evidence and to place it in the
context of a coherent account of, say, the "Tiird Crusade, twelfth
century Germany, or whatever particular aspect of Barbarossirs
career that interests him. But the method of evaluation and the
force of the terns use is different from that of the subject matter,
for the point of tie activity is different. The author of the Deeds',
Bishop N, wanted to support his nephew's political career, the
historian wants to find out what happened (including whether or not
the 'Deeds' are accurate).
Part of the difficulty in failing to see the disjunction between the
two 'language games' is due to our concentration on "political' or
social' history areas where we have (possibly) strong opinions in
everyday life. But if, for a moment, we consider the history of
science, or of music, art or even philosophy it is easier to see the
difference between, in this case the historian's evaluation in
describing the story of Lavoisier and the discovery (if that is the
right word) of oxygen and a scientist's evaluation of the correctness
of the theories advanced, which approximates to the historian's
description of a political event and a moral evaluation of it. It
is easy to see that the scientific evaluation belongs to another game,
but not so easy to see that the same is true of the moral or political
evaluation.
At this point someone might be inclined to say I admit that the
historian is in the business of trying to construct as objective account
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as is possible given the material he/she works with and that this will
certainly involve challenging and criticising contemporary accounts
where they are biased. But in offering an account of, say, the events
in Paris in 1572 the historian either has to accept those contemporary
accounts that describe the 'Massacre' in Paris, or to offer an
alternative term wf ich imply a different moral judgement."
The answer must 1 e, not necessarily, Both Pc-rl' . and Ann Low-Peer
talk .about a technical language, as if such a language (like some
computer programmes) would weed out certai- --'ords and only deploy
'factual' ones. My point is that words like massacre, persecuhon
and so nofed not be understood in a moral way Indeed the Oxford
English Dictionary las as one definition of "assacre "hitter defeat
or destruction" and defines one use of persectuion as 'subject to
penalties on grounds o: eligious or political beliefs". Perhaps
this will be clearer : we try and examine v' ai: mal.es a morel
judgement a moral judgement.
Plainly this is not a matter of words carrying a moral 'load'
wherever they go. To say that Alexis Arguello 'murdered' Jim Watt
in a fight, or to describe a run-out in cricket as 'suicidal' carries
no moral weight at all, though it is, of course, evaluative. What
makes a moral judgement moral is the conte- < ich it is offered.
In some cases, a moral judgement for one person will be amoral for
another. For example, the term suicide mirk'- used as a purely
factual description of a death, but if a Per e Catholic were to so
describe a death then that description would entail a moral judgement,
since suicide is one of the ways that a Catholic can do wrong; in
this example the situation might pose a dirh . ra for the Catholic that
would not exist for another person.
116
In this sense, drawing attention to a moral judgement is not pointing
out a feature or minor detail of language 'Look, there is a moral term"
but aather it is drawing attention to a particular whole within which
moral language can operate. My argument in relation to history, and
value judgements in that subject is similar, we should not look for
a fact here or a biased piece of reporting there, but look at the tone
of the whole, see that the emphasis is placed upon some aspects rather
than others. The point of the activity is a different one. Hie
historian may or may not like certain things that have happened in
the past (the Highland clearances or the shipping of Cossacks who
fought for Hitler back to the USSR) but the task is to recount what
happened and why it happened and in this context, to say that Eden lied
to the Cossacks or the Highlanders were treated brutally is fair
comment which does not necessarily involve any more, political or
ideological stance at all. Rather it implies a judgement of a
different sort. On the other hand, the person seeking to look at
the past morally (and we all do this at times) seeks not ju3t to
understand what happened and why, but to assess the significance of
tftoae facts in terms of notions such as 'decency', 'justice', 'evil'
and 30 on.
A clear example of the use of the past in this xjay i3 given in the
writings of those usually described as 'Whigs'. Though we are
capable of assessing some of their writings in terms of ftaSOorical
standards of accuracy and so on, the purpose of the writing and the
way in which they see the past quite clearly has another intention
behind it. Butterfield is quite correct to suggest that they
substitute the genuine historical question rHow did religious liberty
come about ?" with the altogether different question "To whom bhould
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•re be grateful for religious liberty but t : objection to them
is not only that th y praise and condemn or: the ' asis of present
dispositions (rather than to try and understand why people behaved in
that way at all), hut th it they also see t* : • .ash n n quite
unacceptable manner o historians. For example, the discovery by
Bishop Stubbs of Victorian liberal democracy In the baggage carried
over by the Angl '"axons, in Magna Cart ' other unlikely
places involves ?. 1 r number of mistakes about: understanding the
past as history ' «■»>• involves seeing 1 ■■ •••• » in an anachronistic
way. The histori . could attack Stubbs cither "or imputing beliefs
and opinions that > e Faxons could not (logically) have held or
disagree with hi i. 'erpretation of document and other evidence on
factual grounds.
V
The above arguments have attempted to show that there are indeed a
variety of ways in which we can understand the past, some of which are
concerned to illuminate events which took place in the past, some of
which are intended to illuminate our present experience. Context is
all important here; we have to see where and how talk of the past
fits into a wider framework, if at all. When Richard Cobb tells us
the condition of France at the time of the revolution"^ that is one
thing, when Paine tells us that this is because the pre-revolutionary
political order denied fundamental needs of human nature, that is
quite another.
See H Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (London: G Bell
and Sons, 1931).
^ Skinner's article, Weaning and Understanding in the History of
Ideas is excellent on this.
see R Cobb, Paris and its Provinces 1792-1802,(Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1975), or R Cobb, Les Armges Revolutionnaires:
Instrument de la terreur dans les departements (Paris: Mouton, 1961).
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If it can be shown that all attempts to look at the past need not be
of the same sort, and need not be covertly ideological, then we can
now look at what is particular about the way in which ideological
traditions of thought have looked at the past. It would, of course,
be a great mistake just to say that there are historical and practical
ways of looking at the past and to lump all 'practical' understandings
together without any further analysis or investigation. As we shall
see later on, though the religious believer and the ideologist both
share a 'practical' interest in the past, and both believe that the
past has a special significance in terms of directing present actions,
it by no means follows that religion and ideology can be seen as
identical enterprises. Too often the category 'practical' is used
as a bucket into which the rejected candidates for the appellation
'disciplines' or 'geniine knowledge' are thrown, rather as A J Ayer
and others tried to put theology, ethics and alaost everything outside
of logic and science into a vast bran tub of pseudo-intellectual chaff.
My intention in the following three chapters is to look at the ways
in which the past i_s used in ideological thought and to then make the
contrast between ideological thought and other examples of 'practical'
(or at least, non-academic) thought. Before doing so it may be worth
making a few general observations. Firstly, as has been suggested,
the past is important in ideological thought because it helps to make
clear what ought to be done in the present. This prescriptive force
will be different within particular ideologies in the sense that it
will be based upon a different key to the situation. For example, a
Marxist will act in accordance to furthering the class struggle, whereas
a Conservative might act in order to preserve a traditional liberty.
Both will, however, draw inspiration from the past. The Marxist will
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see the evidence for the inevitability of proletarian victory and the
Conservative will draw comfort from the disasters that have befallen
those who have put their faith in revolutionary change. As the former
draws strength from Marx's assertion that "The history of all hittahetO
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existing society is the history of class struggles"° so the latter
draws comfort from Burke's belief that "People will not look forward
59
to posterity who do not look back to their ancestors". The same is
true of other ideologies, some of which will not be dealt with here.
Nationalists, whether in Scotland or in Israel, look back to a nation¬
hood that has been destroyed and must be restored. Feminists look
back to the way in which men have exploited women and Liberals look
back to the progress from ignorance to knowledge.
All draw strength from the fact that understood in a certain way,
everything in the past contributes to their picture of the world,
nothing is irrelevant or excluded. In this sense the facts about the
past are special, and achieve a coherence that would otherwise be
denied. It is clear from this that not everyine has an ideological
understanding of the past, even if they do make moral or political
judgements on the basis of information drawn from the past. The
person who finds the dropping of the atomic bomb or the peesecutions
of French Protestants in the seventeenth century abhorrent need have
no ideological axe to grind. The person who sees the former as part
of the strategy of post war Imperialism and the latter as part of the
battle between reason and superstition, does. Locating the significance
of events through a 'key' such as 'class struggle' is important here.
5 8
The Communist Manifesto, Penguin, 1979.
59
Quoted xn Q Hogg, The Case for Conservatism (Penguin: Harmsworth,
1959), 87.
I should make clear here that questions of significance, and questions
of truth or falsity are different and the latter cannot be replaced by
the latter. Thus it is not ray intention to protect any ideological
writings about the past by deflecting the question of truth into one
of significance. An example might make this clearer. A biblical
scholar might make the point that the significance of the creation
story in the Book of Genesis lies, not in its literal meaning, but in
its dramatic power as a narrative which draws our attention to the
fundamental gulf between God and Man which springs from our sinful
nature. But this fact (assuming it to be one) does not prevent us
from asking the question "Is the human race descended directly from
Adam and Eve ?" We can and the simple answer is "No". In a
similar way, all kindsofifppertinent questions may be put to a Marxist
or Liberal historian about their account of the past. My point is
that for the Marxist the past does have a significance that it does
not have for the colleague who is not of an ideological disposition.
In particular, the matter of significance (as distinct from truth)
will need to be understood in terms of other aspects of a particular
ideology, for example, the views about human nature, social change or
political activity. At this level the question of truth may not be
the most appropriate one to ask, in the same way that it may not be
the most apposite inquiry to ask if Adam really ate the apple.
Talk about the past may enter into an ideology in many ways, and not
all of them will be dealt with in a comprehensive fashion. As we
shall see, some of Marx's work can be described as mythical (in the
sense of telling a story which makes sense of present experience, yet
remains rooted in past happenings and future predictions) and this
mythical element combines with varying degrees of ease with claims to
academic detachment. In a similar way, Liberal contract theories are
quite tike the Genesis myth mentioned above; their significance lies
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in relating a view of political society, not in a factural reconstruction
of the earliest men and their habits. But not all myths about the
past are ideological and all ideologies do not have to have a mythical
element. I shall only be raising the question of myths when it seems
relevant to do so here.
The past enters into ideological thought as part of the overall scheme
which that ideology propounds. It is not an independent entity, but
part of a wider whole. Oftly by looking at that whole can we make sense
of the past understood ideologically and the intention is now to look
at examples of such thought in that context.
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CHAPTER THREE
The purpose of the next three chapters is to look at particular
ideologies, and to illustrate the uses to which the past is put.
The ideologies I shall be concerned with are Marxism, Liberalism and
Conservatism. As has already been stated, these are not intended to
be exhaustive of the range of ideological thought, but to be illustrative
of it. In each chapter, I shall start by trying to make some general
comments about the main themes to be found in a particular ideology and
at the overall conceptual structure to be found there. I shall,
therefore, look at some of the main trends and divisions within an
ideology, but without deciding between them. This will be followed by
a discussion about the view (or views) of history and the past that
are to be found in an ideology and how this relates to the general
conceptual framework already outlined. This will be further illustrated
by reference to specific authors who are to be seen as representatives
of a tradition of thought within an ideology. Needless to say, this
may involve some simplification, but not, I hope, in any misleading way.
The literature of, and about, Marxism is littered with claims as to
what Marxism is really about. Some of the fiercest ideological
debates (as we shall note in more detail later on''") take place between
those who claim to be Marxists. This very fact could lead us into a
long and nnproductive survey of the disciples of the various traditions
within Marxism itself, without the possibility of reaching any conclusion
other than the commonplace observation that the works of Marx like the




a wide variety of readings, some of which are difficult to reconcile
with each other. Given the length of Marx's career as a writer, the
different topics he dealt with and the different roles he adopted
(journalist, historian, philosopher, polemicist and so on) this is
scarcely surprising. Only a thinker of great dullness and little
enterprise would leave no unresolved ambiguities in their work. As
1 shall argue later on, the search for what Marx really meant is
futile because it is impossible. This does not mean that any inter¬
pretation of Marx is in order, or that we cannot say some attempts to
come to grips with his writings do frfcem more justice than others. The
process is not an arbitrary one, but neither can there be an essence of
Marxist thought nor an original set of Marxist doctrines from which all
2
genuine Marxist thought must be shown to develop.
It is, nevertheless, possible to make some general remarks which do
justice to the broad sweep of Marxist thought whilst noting that all
Marxists may not put equal weight on each element. A convenient
starting point is that Marx places great emphasis on the concept of Man
3
as a producer (as opposed to a rational agent or sinner). He takes
up the point that in order to survive, men must produce their means of
livelihood, and that production of the basic necessities of life is
prior to any 'higher' activities such as art, literature, and the Rubik
cube. How they do this is, however, not a matter of pure choice since
the world they are born into and act upon has certain natural resources
and certain (possible) productive processes. In acting upon these
resources by means of existing methods, men change the environment and
2
For a fuller discussion see Chapter 7.
3
For example, the discussion in K Marx and F Engels, The German
Ideology, ed C J Arthur (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1970), 42-3.
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thereby open up the possibility of new productive processes or make
their development an urgent necessity, which in turn become the limits within
which t^e next generation will start. For Harx, productive activity
is social activity and to imagine a form of productive activity is, to
adapt Wittgenstein's aphorism, to imagine a form of life. Beyond the
most primitive subsistence economy all production involves the division
of labour and this, for Marx, entails the unequal distribution of goods
and property. It is the basis of class society, which establishes the
division between the owners and the producers, the exploiters and the
exploited.
In any particular society there will be a dominant class which will
control the material forces of production which that society has
developed. Not only that, the dominant class will also be the ruling
4
intellectual force and through its control of concepts will present its
rule as being in the common interest and by implication, that its
downfall will lead to the ruin of society as a whole. The way in
which concepts are controlled in Geoege Orwell's "1984" would be an
explicit version of this. Thus the ideas of a society are as much
instruments of class rule as are the productive processes and machinery
of government.
A consequence of the relationship between productive/technological
forces in a society and the institutions of that society is that
society is dynamic: that is to say it changes. The way in which
Marx sees this relationship operating is captured in the following
quotation:
4
K Marx and F Engels, Selected Works in Three Volumes (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1969), Vol I, 47.
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the material productive forces of a society come
into conflict x*ith the existing relations of production,
or - what is but a legal expression of the same thing -
with the property relations within which they have been
at work hitherto. From forms of development of the
productive forces these relations turn into their fetters.
Then begins an epoch of social revolution.^
New productive forces cannot be kept within old social institutions
and so the dominant class is ousted by its rivals - violently. The
ideas of the previous ruling class are then unmasked; for they can
be seen as partial and biased rather than universally benevolent or
necessary. The new dominant class, arising as it does on a broader
social base then presents itself as the benefactor of society as a
whole and its ideas become dominant. Thus after the English revolution
in the 17th century talk of 'divine right of kings' is replaced by
bourgeois contract theories as the explanation and justification of
political society and Locke replaces Filmer. This process continues
until a final revolution, led by the proletariat, ends class socetiiy.
So far, What Marx might be said to offer us is a theory of social change,
perhaps more properly called sociological than historical, which
claims great explanatory power and, above all, preaches no values.
Men are primarily producers of the substance of their lives and the
productive relationships they enter into engender conflict and change
through class antagonism until classes are abolished. But there is a
second theme in Marxism that is worth mentioning here which does not
always sit easily with the confident rationalism of the previous
assertions. In some of his earliest writings, especially in the 1844
manuscripts, Marx discusses the concepts of alienation and estrangement.
5
Op. cit., Vol III, 363.
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The place of these notions within Marx's thought is a matter of deep
division amongst Marxists. There are those such as Avineri^ and
McLellan^ who argue that the concept of alienation in particular is
fundamental to Marx's thought as a whole, and provides much of the
implicit philosophical backing to the seemingly dry economics of
Capital. As McLellan puts it:
Nevertheless, the second of Marx's major analyses,
and the one most evident in his early writings, that
of alienation, has acquired an importance far greater
than he imagined.R
and
The continuity in Marx's thought has been demonstrated
beyond all doubt by the publication of the Grundrisse
• •
*9
Radically opposed to this interpretation are Althusser and his followers
who hold that the concept of alienation belongs to the early 'humanist'
thoughts of Marx and was replaced by a more rigorous scientific analysis
in Capital and the later works.^ Occupying an intermediate position
are those such as the English Marxist, Terry Eagleton, who assert that
Marx does indeed retain the concept of alienation throughout bis works,
but the character of the concept is refined and made more precise and
scientific in the later works; for Eagleton, alinnation in the early
works is a moral concept, in the later works an objective scientific
concept.^ This is not a debate that can be usefully contributed to
—
S Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1968).
^
For example, D McLellan, Marx before Marxism (London, Penguin, 1972).
Op. cit., 273.
9
Op. cit., 281 ff.
L Althusser, For Marx (London: Allen Lane, 1969).
^
T Eagleton, Marxists and Christians: Answers for Brian Wicker, New
Blackfriars, 56 (October 1975), 465-70.
here, except perhaps to note that it shows little sign of abating
precisely because there are ambiguities and inconsistencies to be
found in Marx. There is, however, no doubt of the importance of the
concept, the debate surrounding it, and the way in which this strand
of thought enters into Marxism.
Most commentators on the 1844 aanuscripts seem to agree that alienation
is a term adopted from Hegel but made, as it were, concrete. For Hegel,
alienation is the penalty that must be paid for the development of self-
consciousness: the mind is externalised in its works, and yet confronts
them as works. It is a divided mind that has not-yet reached harmonious
self-consciousness. For Marx, the division is between the worker and
the object he has created through his labour. In a capitalist society,
the worker creates wealth through his labour power which confronts him
in the object that he has created, and this is taken from him and
expropriated by the capitalist. According to Marx the worker is
alienated from himself, from the object of his labour, from other men
and from his 'species being'. Or, as a Marxist once put the matter
to me, "Capitalism can pay a worker £100 a week ( it was a long time
ago) but it can never make him human". In general, Marx sees human
labout under capitalism as subjecting Man to his unconsciously formed
creations rather than helping him to master the world he lives in.
This subjection is not, as in Hegal, a condition of existence, it can
be transcended in the Communist society where men are no longer the
slaves of the power of capital. This is, importantly, as true of
capitalists as of workers.
As we have already noted, these various elements are given different
weights by opposing schools of Marxists. For example, those who see
Marxism as primarily 'scientific' often stress the economic aspects
of his work, claiming that they offer an objective account of economic
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structures, lay bare the real basis of society and make it possible to
predict economic change through a study of the contradictions that
capitalism (or any other economic system) generates in the course of
its development. This tradition of thought is associated in the
popular mind with many of those who immediately followed Marx, especially
Engels, and current 'official' thought in Eastern Europe. On the
other hand, there are those who advocate the view that Marx's chief
claim to fame is in the elaboration of a philosophical doctrine of
human nature which, though not entirely separated from economic circum¬
stances, offers an account of what it is to be truly human and the
way in which communism, by overcoming the worker/owner dichotomy, can
free human beings to realise their true potential as unalienated
Men. Certain European dissidents within the Marxist camp and members
of what used to be called the 'New Left' are prominent here.
What is important for the purposes of this thesis is the way in which
these elements come together in Marx's treatment of the past, and how
the understanding of concepts such as prodacer, and alienation help us
to understand the part the study of the past plays within Marxism and
for Marxists. In other words, not only are we interested in what
Marxists hold about the past, but the point of investigating the past
and attempting to understand it. I shall be suggesting that Marx's
writings on the past are an odd mixture of empirical and conceputal
points which are cast in the form of a dramatic structure such that
knowing the end of the story, we can locate the significance of present
or past actions. Marx's writings on the past can be studied as
history and commented upon for their veracity, attention to evidence
and so on, but to see them purely in terms of understanding the past
for its own sake would be to miss out an important dimension, in the
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same way that anyone taking Burke's "Reflections on the Revolution in
France" just as a rather eccentric account of recent political events
in France would, one might feel, be missing the point of it all.
Historical materialism (even if there is no evidence to suggest that
Marx ever used the phrase) is taken by many commentators to be Marx's
crowning achievement. This has led to many audacious claims being
advanced on Marx's behalf by enthusiastic disciples. Engels, for
example, in the course of his peroration at Marx's graveside stated
that:
Just as Darwin discovered the law of development
of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of
the development of human history.^
The Italian Marxist, A Labriola, holds that critical communism
'foresees' the future, because of the immanent necessity of history
13
seen in the future of its economic substructure and in the 'Funda¬
mentals of Marxism Leninism' we find the Marxist 'time telescope'
through which the proletarian future can be seen; the vision of which
the boorgeois academic can only turn away from.^ It is this inter¬
pretation which has been taken up by a variety of Marx's critics
15 16
including philosophers such as Popper and Acton and historians such
17
as Alan Taylor. The root of their objection is that this view is,
in Popper's celebrated phrase, 'historicist'.
12
Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol III, 162.
13 ....
A Labriola, Essays in the materialist conception of history, trans.
C H Kerr, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966).
Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism (ed) 0 Kuusinen (London: Lawrence
and Wishart, 1961), 18.
15
K R Popper, The Poverty of Historicism,(London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1957).
^
H B Acton, Illusion of the Epoch. MarxismtLeninism as a philosophical
creed (London, 1955) .
^
A J P Taylor, in his introduction to the Penguin edition of The
Communist Manifesto, (Lodtindon, 1967).
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But it way, of course, be unwise to try and treat Marx and Engels as
a single philosopher here, or even as two thinkers with no substantial
disagreements between them. Though this was Lenin's view, and hence
represents orthodox Soviet Marxist opinion, it has been increasingly
challenged in recent years with, as has already been mentioned, the
new emphasis found since the publication of some of Marx's earlier
writings. The clear separation of Marx, Engels and Lenin as thinkers
is, for example, the basis of Isaac Deutscher's critical review of
Act&n's 'The Illusion of the Epoch'. The case for the identification
of the views of Marx and Engels on history (and on materialism in
general) is based upon such undisputed facts as their close friendship
and working relationship over many years, their joint authorship of
several works and in the case of Engels' own 'Anti-Duhring', on the
fact that Marx read the proofs and is accepted as having written
Chapter 10 of that work himself. Given the fact that Engels'
abridgement of that work, published as 'Socialism, Utopian and
Scientific', became better known and more widely read than most of
Marx's own works, it is not surprising to find that much of the
Marxism of the early Marxists was the creation of Engels as much as
of Marx. But it is claimed, an Engils who was in full agreement
with his collaborator.
Against this is the view that an examination of their respective writings,
especially the '4844 manuscripts' reveals a wide divergence between
18
the two. Schmidt and Avmneri both suggest that Engels (and by
18
A Schmidt, The concept of nature in Marx (London: New Left Books,
1971).
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implication Lenin) is more akin to the mechanistic materialists
attacked by Marx. Avineri claims, for example, that Engels uses
dialectics in an un-Marxist way and produces only a vulgar form of
Darwinism.
... whilst Marx built his system pari passu with the
construction of his dialectics, Engels just applies
a dialectical scheme to a given set of natural
science data, as if the dialectical scheme were just
an external, formal method, not an imminent content
of the subject matter. The different approach leads
to different results.^
This is echoed in Lichtheim's view that for Marx the understanding of
human nature is necessary for the understanding of history, but for
Engels, human nature is an aspect of general (evolutionary) nature
20
and therefore, knowable through laws. For such scholars, Engels
has been an obstacle rather than an orable.
Now, as has been stressed above, the purpose here is not to decide
which of these views are the correct interpretation of Marx. Such
an enterprise is, in this context, beside the point since we are
dealing with Marxism and not merely with that set of writings attributed
to Marx himself. Thus, even if we could agree that Engels and
Lenin did not share common cause with Marx on all issues, nor derived
each refinement of Marxism from one of his works (rather in the way
that some fundamentalist. Protestants require that every doctrine be
grounded in the bible) it xrould not stop us acknowledging that Engels
and Lenin are still accepted contributors to the Marxist tradition
and as such, can fairly be described as 'Marxists' in the context of
discussing the Marxist veew of the past.
19
Avineri, op cit, 70.
20
G Lichtheim, Marxism. An historical and critical study (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965).
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Since the views on historical materialism attributed to Engels and
Lenin (if not always to Marx) are an important strand in some Marxist
conceptions of the past it is necessary to look at what is involved
in them and to assess their coherence. A version of this view may
21
be found in Maurice Cornforth's 'Historical Materialism' in which he
argues that there are three guiding principles which historical
materialism employs in the understanding of social affairs. These
are 1) that social development is regulated by objective laws
discoverable by science, 2) that there is a superstructure of ideas,
cultural, political, and social developments that arise on the basis
of the material life of a society, and 3) the ideas and institutions
that thus arise play an active role in the development of material
22
life. These principles follow from the application of general
materialist doctrines to the study of society. The important points
to note here are 1) the possibility of prediction based on correct
apprehension of the 'objective' laws, for
... the great social movements arising at different
periods of history exemplify the same causal
connection operating in different circumstances. If,
for example, three hundred years ago there was a
movement to get rid of feudalism, and today there is
a movement to get rid of capitalism, these movements,
different as they are, repeat the same process - they
both arise because an existing social system has
become a fetter upon economic development.^
Though history has as an important element the activities and
intentions of people and not just the blind interaction of natural
forces, it is possible, through the laws of economic development to
21






see how the victory of capitalism over feudalism was inevitable, as is
the victory of socialism over capitalism. 2)TThere is an explicit
distinction made between the economic base of a society and its
political, cultural, etc. superstructure such that the former determines
the latter. It is the advent of capitalism that gives rise to the
'Protestant ethic' rather than oice versa.
Thus in the 'Communist Manifesto' a study of the necessities in that
epoch reveals the 'inevitability' of the fall of the bourgeois and
2A
the victory of the proletariat. Though judicious manipulation and
the intervention of exceptional individuals may shorten or prolong
the birth pangs of the new era, the child cannot be abhorted, nor kept
95
in the womb beyond its rightful time. And, as Marx notes elsewhere*"
the midwife of such a birth is force.
Opponents of Marxism are usually able to entertain themselves at this
point by pointing out the very poor track record of prior predictions,
as opposed to post hoc rationalisations. Engels, for example, can be
found advancing the claim that revolution could not survive in one
country and that it would break out simultaneously in England, the USA,
26
France and Germany and the failure of revolution to occur in the
advanced western capitalist countries after the Great War, but in
Russia is held to have necessitated Lenin's discovery of imperialism
and the law of uneven development. Popper, on the other hand, offers
a logical objection of the form; the course of history is greatly
influenced by advances in knowledge and that we cannot predict such
advances, since if we could it would be present knowledge and not future
24
K Marx and F Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London: Penguin,
1967), 94.
25
See K Marx, Capital (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House,
1961), Vol I, 751.
26
Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol I, 31-2.
knowledge. We cannot, therefore, predict the course of human history.
One is reminded here of Humphrey Lyttleton's rejoinder to the question
"Where is jazz going ?" - "If I knew where jazz was going, I'd be
27there." Certainly there is something odd about the idea that we can
see the future on the basis of certain knowledge in the present; for
the future is not 'there' to be seen. As yet, it has no substance.
This does not mean, of course, that all talk of the future must be
either nonsensical or deterministic (in the sense that if it is true
that I will die on 30 May 2052 it is true now that I will do so), for
as agents we can decide what to do tomorrow and this shapes the way the
future will be. The power that determinism holds over us here only
holds as long as we see ourselves as spectators rather than as agents.
If we accept this then our pox?er to decide is seen as a consequence of
our imprisonment tather than as an expression of our freedom. But
when we say, for example, "It was inevitable, there was nothing I
could do about it", the second statement is a ground for the first and
28
not vice versa."
Both these objections are related in the sense that it is the unpredict¬
ability of advances in human knox<7ledge that makes particular assessments
of Xvrhat is likely to happen such a risky affair. How could Engels have
foretold the development of the British Railways Pension Fund or even
the advent of such an exceptional character as Lenin in such a backward
country as Russia ? The ability of capitalism to survive the onset of
terminal crises has been a sad reminder of the fallibility of such
predictions.
27
Quoted in P Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, 94.
78
I owe this example to Mr D Cockburn.
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It is the rejection of a strict interpretation of such phrases as
'iron laws' and the rest that has led to a different conception of
necessity in Marxism. This interpretation is based upon passages
such as the following from the '18th Brumiare of Louis Bonaparte':
Men make their own history, but they do not make
it just as they please; they do not make it under
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circum¬
stances directly encountered, given and transmitted
from the past. The tradition of all dead generations
weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.2g
The notion of necessity here is not so much that of inexorable laws,
but of the appropriate behaviour of capitalists and proletarians in
a particular, given situation. The relationship of capitalist to
worker is a result of the economic relationship they have with each
other, something that is outside their control as individual agents.
The capitalist may se£l his shares and 'opt out', but this will not
change the structure of capitalism. In order to succeed in industry
or business as a capitalist entrepreneur will still be forced to
abide by the laws of the market place, to kill or be killed. And,
it is in pursuing his interests as a capitalist that the individual
will be forced away from reconciliation with labour since, according
to Marx, the only way to succeed as a capitalist is to (in effect)
cut the living standards of the workforce.
Perhaps the most appropriate analogy here is with the notion of
necessity we find in classical tragedy. Here, each act is uncaused
in a strict sense, but the combination o^ the particular situation
and convention drives the characters towards a series of events that
29
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seem to flow logically and irresistibly towards their terrible end.
Thus the death of Agammemnon in the first part of the 'Orestia'
(itself the 'inevitable' consequence of earlier eeents) leads us
inexorably to the pursuit of Orestes by the Furies at the end of the
sequence. No wonder then that the French Marxist, Lucien Goldmiann
sees capitalism itself as a tragic hero, for as in great dramatic
tragedies, the moment of supreme triumph is the moment of inevitable
downfall. Having conquered the world, Marlowe's Tambourlaine is
still doomed. The situation for both the tragic hero and the
capitalist is one in which things are too vast to be overcome by
the individual will. This is echoed in the 'Preface to the Critique
of Political Economy', where Marx writes:
In the social production of their life, men enter
into definite relationships that are indispensable
and independent of their will, relations of production
that correspond to a definite stage of development
of their material productive forces. The sum total
of these relations of productions constitutes the
economic structure of society, the real foundation,
on which rises the legal and political superstructure
and to which correspond definite forms of social
consciousness. The mode of production of material
life conditions the social, political and intellectual
life process in general. It is not the consciousness
of man that determines their being, on the contrary,
their social being determines their consciousness.?n
To be fair to Engels here, there are points at which he too argues
that the relationship between social being and consciousness is not
a strict one way process, as in the following letter to Bloch
According to the materialist conception of hisgory,
the ultimate determining element in history is the
production and reproduction of real life. More than
this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence
30
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if womeone twists this into saying that the economic
element is the only determining one, he transforms that
proposition into a meaningless, senseless, abstract
phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but
the various elements in the superstructure ... also
exeerise their influence on the course of historical
struggles and in many cases preponderate in deter¬
mining their form. There is an interaction of all
these elements in which, amid all the endless host of
accidents ... the economic moment finally asserts
itself as necessary.^
Though these passages are not without their difficulties, they clearly
present what is, on the surface at least, an attractive picture of
social and historical change. For it is undoubtedly the case that
there are certain economic boundaries to what we might count as
reasonable behaviour which we do not assent to at birth, but which are
part of the society we come into; nor is society the construction of
an individual or individuals. We can all see the way in which events
such as the general series of prices rises which affected England in
the 16th and 17th centiuries brought about major social transformations
(the bankruptcy of aristocrats, rise of certain merchants, etc.) without
being the result of the conscious actions of individuals.
Part of the problem with the strand of Marxist thought we have been
discussing; that which subscribes to the second proposition quoted
from Connforth earlier; is the formulation chosen appears to be subject
to insuperable difficulties.
None of what follows should be taken to imply that economic reasons are
in themselves never important in constructing a narrative of historical
events. Clearly they are often the main, if not the overriding reasons
in many spheres of activity. The claim made on behalf of Marx can be
31 Op cit, vol III, 487.
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understood in two ways. Firstly, it can be taken as an empirical
claim to the effect that there is always and everywhere, as a matter
of fact, a definite relationship between relations of production and
forms of social consciousness. This claim would, presumably, be open
to refutation by the production of societies with identical production
relations but with very different moral/political sonventions or by
the production of two societies with similar moral/political standards
but with different production arrangements. It would not, we should
note, simply be enough to assert a chronological or purely contingent
relationship between the two, any more than the fact that riots
follow a period of increasing unemployment shows the latter caused the
22
former; post hoc ergo propter hoc. But this gives rise to the nub
of the difficulty, for how could we discover whether such a relationship
between relations of production and social consciousness was in fact
the case ?
We seem to be offered a model which suggests that economic activity
gives rise to social and political relations, such that changes in the
economic foundations become transmitted to the 'superstructure'
which then alters in the appropriate way. The trouble with this, as
33
both Acton and Plamenatz point out is that it is extremely difficult
to conceive of such a separation. Economic and/or productive
relationshins can only b_e such relationships in the context of an
already existing social and legal framework. If these were taken
away, there would be nothing left that could be meaningfully called
Which is not to say, of course, that the two are never related.
See J Plamenatz, Man and Society (2 vols.), (London: Longmans,
1963), especially Volume II.
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an economic or property relationship at all. The kind of organisation
that Engels presupposes in his claim that men are producers and that
there is a division of labour, already assumes the existence of social,
moral and legal norms. In short Marxists have assumed that which they
wish to explain. The mistake is analagous to that of contract
theorists who attempt to explain society by a contract, the concept
of which only has meaning within a society that already has political
and legal norms. It would be difficult, then, to assign chronological
priority to economic activity, simply because we could not distinguish
it in the relevant sense.
On the other hand, Marx's claim might be taken as implying the iogical
priority of economic activity over other kinds of human activity, it
is, as he and Engels claim the fundamental activity that distinguishes
humans from others.
Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness,
by religion or anything else you like. They themselves
begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as
they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a
step which is conditioned by their physical organisations.
By producing their means of subsistence men are
indirectly producing their actual material life.
The way in which men produce their means of subsistence
depends first of all on the nature of the actual means
of subsistence they find in existence and have to
reproduce. This mode of production must not be
considered simply as the production of the physical
existence of the individuals. ... What they are,
therefore, coincides with their production, both with
what they produce and with how they produce. The nature
of individuals this depends upon the material conditions
determining their production.^
What one would want to suggest here is that production of any kind,
and human activity (as opposed to animal activity (apes might have a
3 #
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system of signs for communicating with each other!)] would be language
based and as such have a series of moral conceptions and categories
which would be implicit in that language. In other words a moral
language is fundamental to human society such that we would not
35
imagine a society without moral values, norms and conventions. ~
These concepts might differ widely from society to society and be
retated to 'productive relations' (a society with no private ownership
might have no concept of stealing, the change from a co-operative
agricultural society to an individualistic, hunting, one might lead
to a breakdown or reappraisal of a moral code and so on) but they are
implicit in any natural language we can iaagine. As Peter Winch has
36
argued in a paper entitled 'Nature and Convention' moral activity is
not like scientific activity, for we could stop doing the former, but
not the latter. The demands of morality are always with us, just
because we are human and to avoid them by saying "I'm not interested"
as we would with science would merely count further against us. As
Wittgenstein puts the matter in his lecture on Ethics, we could
imagine saying "I'm not very good at tennis, but I don't want to
improve" but hardly imagine saying "I know I'm behaving badly, but I
37don't want to do better". If this is so, then moral ideas, far
35
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point is that they still have a moral code which is prescriptive in
the relevant sense, even if that code is abhorrent to us. For a
fuller discussion see C Battersby, Morality and the Ik, Philosophy,
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from being the result of economic relationships, will be of fundamental
importance in deciding what those relationships will be and how they
will develop. This is not to say that an economic motive might not be
dressed up in moral terms (someone attempting to regain sovereignty
for economic reasons might couch their claims in terms of fighting for
freedom or democracy), but that is clearly a different matter.
Some Marxists have tried to avoid the above difficulties by positing a
different relationship between economic relations and other ideas than
that imagined in the crude 'base/superstructure' model. For example,
38
the Hungarian Marxist, Georg Lukacs claims that the fundamental
category of Marxist thought is that of the 'dominant moment'. This
notion is connected with the argument found in Engels and elsewhere
that there is always an interaction between the economic base and the
social, political, etc., superstructure. In the terminology of Lukacs,
they form together a 'totality' where for any given X and Y there will
be a reciptXDcal relationship between them such that the txro are not
conceived of as discrete entities. Thus, production and consumption are
related in such a way as to form a totality in which production is the
dominant moment. But Lukacs is saying more than that we must look at
the economic structure of society in order to understand it. He holds
that human society is the necessary outcome of productive forces and
that the kind of productive forces will bring into existence certain
conditions in which men are faced with a question to which there are
concrete alternatives, and to which they try to formulate concrete
answers. But although the 'questions' are necessary, in the sense of
being imposed independently of any human will, the answers we find are
not. Thus, although capitalism can only be overthrown by the proletariat
38
Most of the following is drawn from G H R Parkinson, Georg Lukacs
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aask and romantic face: Lukacs on Thomas Hann in Against the Self
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realising its historical mission, and the class nature of capitalism
puts a 'question' to the proletariat (suffer or gain your freedom) there
can be no guarantee that the proletariat will in fact realise this
and overthrow its opporessors. According to Lukacs, the proletariat
will only succeed in overthrowing capitalism when it achieves
'proletarian consciousness'. This is not any easy concept to grasp
since it is not, Lukacs insists, what proletarians actually think, nor
the average or sum total of what they think. Nonetheless it is not
fictional, rather it is hypothetical; that is, what proletarians
would think in a situation were they to grasp its essence correctly.
For Lukacs, such consciousness is the 'locus of objectivity' for the
proletariat is the only class that does not need a distorted ideology
to be the class that it is. It requires no illusions about itself,
unlike the bourgeois which needs to see itself as Carrying out the
interests of its own class (cf the liaster/Slave dialectic in Hegel).
The proletariat, since its interests are those of society, needs no
such illusions. In a world where there seem to be only the relative
standpoints determined by class ideology, objectivity becomes possible
through the correct grasp of proletarian consciousness.
But the concept of 'totality* even if it is a closer interpretation
of Marx, only offers a solution that is more apparent than real. We
can see this if we press the question of what determines change within
a given totality. Suppose that we had a totality in which there were
economic and extra-economic aspects, how exactly would we separate
the two since as we have seen what is to count as economic will be
«
partiallyconstituted by extra-ejtonomic ideas and will also contain
non-economic ideas ? The problem is still that either the category
of economic is artificially restricted or that we are left with the
uncontroversial claim that people are motivated by a mixture of
economic, moral and social reasons.
Another way of construing the importance of Marx's view of history
is in terms of his distinction between 'appearance' and *reality'
in capitalism. He argues that most economic analysis sticks to the
level of appearance and thus fails to understand capitalism as a
set of social relations. This is bound to be the case since
appearances directly cnntradict the 'real' nature of capitalism. Thus,
one might suggest, anyone who claims that non-economic factors can
dominate economic ones is simply stuck at the level of appearance.
The attraction of such a claim, which has been already indirectly
mentioned in the earlier discussion of 'false consciousness* stems
from two seemingly uncontroversial points. Firstly, that it is often
the case that humans do offer rationalisations for behaviaar, their real
motives are not what they appear. Secondly, the historian as an
observer is often in a better position to see what xras 'really' going
on thaft the people who were living at the time. He may, for example,
be able to correct Thomas More's views on what happened during the
enclosures because he has more evidence than was available to
contemporaries or, more interestingly, he may be able to explain the
inflation that took pleee in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries in
a way that was unavailable to contemporaries, just as a modern
scientist could explain the 'real' causes of the Lisbon earthquake.
The important questions, here, concern the conditions for the ineilli-
gibility of such claims. In the case of rationalisations being
offered for actions we nay have in mind someone like Shakespeare's
Lear. In the situation we are given, Lear believes that Goneril and
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Began are his 'true* daughters, that Cordelia is ungrateful,
Gloucester a traitor and so on. When unassailable evidence is put
to him that this is not so, Lear offers excuses, or simply refuses to
face the truth till the situation is bypnrid redemption, and disaster
overtakes. But certain things need to be pointed out. There is an
implied distinction between the normal (true) description of the state
of affairs and that offered by the person offering a rationalisation,
based, as we saw, on the tension that exists between Lear's beliefs
and the way things in fact are. Lear's beliefs and description could
be true, but in fact are not. Now normal is not an abstract term
that can be applied from outside; what is normal and what is abnormal
depends on the social life of the agents involved. That is to say,
calling Lear's reaction abnormal is to contrast it with the normal
standards of his society. Secondly, therefore, the actions we wish
to describe as the results of 'self-deception' or as rationalisations
must be intelligible within the way of life that the agent moves in.
We could not attribute a 'Christ complex' to someone living in a pre-
Christian society. As Peter Winch points out, a society with a
different conception of fatherhood to ours could not be analysed in
39
terms of certain Freudian categories. Even unconscious motives
cannot transcend the bounds of sense. Closely connected with this is
the idea that the person we accuse of offering rationalisations for
his or her behaviour must be capable of understanding the alternative
description we offer them. If a person does not have the concept of,
say, personal property, we cannot describe them as being jealous of
X's car. In an article entitled 'The causation of ideas',W H Walsh
39
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distinguishes between conscious and unconscious assumptions, but the
examples he gives of the latter are notddifferent in kind, but are
capable of explicit formulation if need be. (I do not bother to
remind myself that language is rule governnd before I speak, but could
do so).
The difficulty with the Marxist view is that it does not examine
individuals within the categories of their society, but challenges those
categories themselves. In short, it gives actions and reasons a
meaning outside the framework within which talk of meaning has sense:
for, like it or not, the meaning of an action is that which it is
understood to have within the society concerned. With Lear,
his actions are unreasonable given the circumstances, but the Marxist,
in calling actions the result of 'false consciousness' is not making
this contrast at all. For example, however,normal or reasonable the
offering of religious reasons for a Crusade or whatever may be within
a society, they must be rationalisations of real economic motives.
But to come to any situation with a pre-comreived notion of what
certain actions must or 'really' means an only result intthe error of
finding the 'real' meaning of an action, only to discover that we have
put it there ourselves. We cannot change the structure within which
an action or utterance has meaning without changing, or even destroying,
that meaning. And in doing so we cease to discuss the reasons and
motives of real Men in favour of the very 'abstractions' that Marx
castigates in other contexts. To sum up, to say that whatever reasons
X gives as religious must be rationalisations destroys the contrast between
normal and abnormal religious reasons that makes such a contrast
possible in the first place. It also begs the question, for in order
to say what X is really doing, we must already have decided what is
important and what to leave out as superfluous - and this seems to be
arbitrary legislation. An example may make the discussion clearer.
A person may cling to religious belief because of the death of his
father, and in time come to invest God with all the (perfected)
attributes of his human father. We may call this a neurosis,
masquerading as religious belief. The important thing is to note
that 'masquerading' denotes a contrast, not with normality per se, but
between genuine and abnormal religious belief. In other words, it is
religious criteria that are the basis of our distinction.
If we examine the second set of examples outlined above, we can see
that in the case of More's belief about enclosures we have a shared
set of criteria for judging whether or not they were expanding and that
More was mistaken. It is important to note though, that he could
have been right, and that his mistake was something he could have
apprehended had he possessed the relevant evidence. There is no
conflict between appearance and reality here. Furthermore, in as
much as the historian is constructing an account of the enclosure
movement, More's account does not enter as evidence (since we know
from bfetter sources that he was in error), and in as much as he is
explaining More's attitudes and actions, it is irrelevant that More
was wrong in his assessment.
In the example of inflation being caused by an increase in the money
supply, two answers seem possible. If the society or period under
discussion has any conception of a relationship between prices and
the amount of money or availability of goods, then we seem to have
a situation analogous to that of More, ie there are shared criteria
for explaining, what happened, and such an explanation could have
been brought out. Suppose, however, that there is no such con¬
ception. Here I am inclined to say that we can only try and bring
out what is involved in such a situation in terms of its proximity
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to a concept that is available to us, in this case, 'inflation'.
That is to say, they had what we would call inflation. But in this
sense there is no conflict between the respective descriptions
offered; one is not what was 'really' happening and the ohher false,
for that would presuppose those common criteria that are, ex hypothesi,
missing. The point is that although people in the past may have
been mistaken about certain things, and may have offered rationalisations
for some behaviour, they could not, in general be mistaken about what
they were doing, nor, in general be offering rationalisations.
So far, we have seen that Marxism offers a variety of 'materialist'
understandings of history, some of which are strongly determinist,
others less so. The common thread that seems to unite them is the
belief that the motive force of human history is to be found in human
material activity, in production. The particular state of the forces
of production at any time explains the 'superstructure' of political
and social ideas and organisations which perform the function of
supporting that economic system. Production has gone through a
series of epochs - Asiatic, feudal and bourgeois - the end of which
has been characterised by the overthrow of the ruling class, by class
struggle. Capitalism, although it is an enormous advance on
feudalism and has allowed men to control in unparalleled ways the
forces of nature, contains the seeds of its own destruction for it will
inevitably lead to a concentration of capital into fewer and fewer
hand9, a falling rate of profit and the impoverishment of the propertyless
workers. This will be the prelude to revolution. Moreover, as we
have also seen, capitalism involves the alienation of men from each
other, such that they are not truly human until they can escape from
the chains of capitalist economic domination.
There are difficulties with the various versions of this account,
either in the form of apparent counter examples or failed predictions,
or in the form of suggesting that the productive forces of a society
cannot be used to explain historical change in the way imagined.
One further set of points worth making is to draw attention to the
connection between historical materialism and materialism in general.
Cornforth, for example, suggested earlier that the former was simply
a case of the application of truths from the latter. According to
Engels, and following him, Lenin, the world is 'really' there ia a
way that is independent of consciousness. What we receive through
our sense are 'copies' of reality. Now it may be argued here that
such a conception of knowledge leaves the 'real' world as unknowable
as it is for the greatest sceptic, since we only ever see a 'copy'
and that if this is intended as an argument against a general scept¬
icism it will not do. But, more to the point, it will not do as an
account of how we know of the past since the past is not something
we can even perceive a 'copy' of. As we have seen, there is
evidence for past events which, no doubt, 'really' happened: but
it must be stressed that in a strict sense we can never get as 'what
really happened' since it must be mediated for us through the evidence
that we have available. We can, of course, compare one piece of
evidence with another and use one to reject or mmdify the other, but
we never compare evidence with the 'real thing'. What we know of
the past cannot be other than evidence for it, or to put the matter
another way, the past has to become evidence before we can encompass it
It is possible to find a more subtle version of materialism (in
general) in Marx himself. As Avineri and others point out, reality
is, for Marx, shaped through consciousness; it does not cnfvaJtet of
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'impressions' or 'sensations' that are private and incorrigible.
This is, I take it, the force of the various remarks in the '1844'
manuscripts^' about the senses as 'theoreticians' that sort out and
identify experience. Unlike the empiricist, the Marxist does not
enter a world of buzzing sensations. The intellect is something
active rather than passive and in the first of the schematic 'Theses
on Feuerbach^ there is the claim that it is Idealism rather than
materialism that has developed the importance of 'sensuous activity'.
There is, perhaps, some parallel with the Greek notion of the senses
'reaching out' to apprehend reality, in contrast to the empiricist
nfction of the mind as a blank photographic plate. The emphasis
here is on 'practice'. A good theory is one that works and enables
us to enhance our mastery of the world. But again, this not only has
a difficulty in terms of theories in general (since we can all
imagine successful actions being based upon false theories) but it will
not do as far as the past is concerned since it is difficult to see
how 'practice' could refute or confirm speculation about it. Indeed,
looking back at the past to enable us to solve present problems even
through the spectacles of historical materialism, does not alwa_yv
work. As Regis Debray pointed out, the only thing that can protect
the revolutionary from being misled in this manner by history is his
ignorance. As he put it "it was the good fortune of Castro and his
A 3
companions that they had not read the works of Kao-Tse Tung".
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II
The point about the issue of practice here is one that is related
to a much wider theme in Marxism as a whole. As the eleventh thesis
on Feuerbach makes clear, theories are not enough, academic speculation
needs to be linked to political action. In his 'Introduction to
the Philosophy of History', Professor Walsh claims that the "proof
of the Marxist pudding is in the eating, and it is not philosophers
whom Marx invites to sample his dish". But neither, in one sense,
is Marx offering has dish to professional historians either. It is
clearly intended to be something that nourishes the revolutionary
proletariat by providing them with the knowledge that will enable them
to assess their political actions intthe present. As Lichtheim puts
the matter, history, for Marx, does not culminate in the contemplation
of the past but in the shaping of the future. J Marx is offering us
not just an interesting account of 'real' as opposed to 'forms' of
true motives, but a theory which is almost universal in its sweep.
The past for Marx is not just an historical category which needs
explanation according to the general principles of materialism, it is
part of his overall conception of political action in which classes
are constantly struggling and in which knowledge of any sort is a
weapon in that struggle. Though any use to which Marx's theory of
explanation may be put by working historians is independent of that
theory itself, as a theory of historical explanation, to merely use
it as part of a different enterprise is to mislead the reader as to
44





the part the past can be said to play within Marxism as a whole. In
as much as Marxism is ideological in the sense indicated in Chapter I,
the past is part of that ideological view of the world. The past is
part of that overall picture, rather than the whole of the picture seen
in a certain way.
We have already noted several of the themes and key conceptions of this
overall view. Men are primarily producers, the mode of production has
led to class society, and within capitalism, workers are alienated and
estranged - not fully human. It is important to see that part of
Marxism's force here is that not only claims great explanatory force
(any event can be understood with the use of the appropriate analysis)
but, above all, preaches no values. It explains but it does not
prescribe. The analysis of the economic structure of capitalism, the
nature of profit and the discovery of 'surplus value' do not rest on
any moral conception of justice or fairness. The worker is not
'cheated' by the Capitalist, it is merely that the exchange value
offered to the worker for his labour is less than the productive labour
of a day's work, the difference being the capitalist's profit or
surplus value created by the worker.^ As Alasdair Maclntyre points
out in his 'A Short History of EthicsMarx tried to excise all
references to justice for the working class from the documents of the
First International; for morality cannot alter class interests or
change class structure.
But all of this changes if we look at Marxism more closely. The
first thing to note is that Marx's theory does not start with a past
state of affairs and develop till the Communist society is achieved. Its
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basis is quite firmly in the analysis of 19tn century society and its
particular economic and social structures. As a political activist,
Marx wanted to make sense of the contemporary world such that it is
intelligible to those intent on changing it in the required way. The
guidance offered to anyone sharing Marx's view is to unite with the
working class. Though the past, as conceived by Marx might bear out
his analysis, it cannot start it. The famous claim in the 'Communist
Manifesto' that "The history of all hitherto existing societies is the
history of class struggle1 is not an empirical generalisation, it is a
a whole way of understanding the past. There can be no counter
examples, as there could with a generalisation or hypothesis, since it
is a condition of any past event that it is an illustration of class
struggle. As David Manning points out, the failure of a revolution
to occur in Britain or the USA does not refute Marx's argument, it is
l\ 8
merely another factor to be taken account of within that theory.
The failure of Engels' predictions are said, for example, to show the
truth of Lenin's theories about the unevenness of capitalist development.
In this sense, the past has no independent existence outside of the
categories of Marxism and as such can only confirm those theories -
to Marxists at least. To be sure, it can be argued that such an
approach 'flattens out' historical or past events, since they are, in
one sense, all the same - illustrations of class struggle - and that
there is no real difference between past events. The whole operation
is reminiscent of a kind of historical magician who says to his
audience "Give me an event, any event, and I will show you how it
illustrates class antagonism !'
L
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Such an approach may, of course, lead to the charge of unfalsifiability
and, therefore, of theoretical vacuuity. To some extent this is
the price that must be paid for certainty in our actions in the
political world. It is not possible to change things if ve always
have one eye open for events that will upset our schemes of understanding.
Two points should be made here. Firstly, it would be absurd to argue
that people never change their mind, or transfer political allegiance,
often in quite a majrr way. Conservatives do become Socialists,
Nationalists become Liberals and so on. Clearly one reason for this
may be the way in which an adherent feels that an ideology no longer
reflects the way that the world is. Indeed, there are many former
Marxist intellectuals who were initially attracted by the view of
history in Marxism but have been unable to reconcile it with their own
academic concerns for truth (as they see it). Ideologies are not
hermetically sealed from each other and a view may lose its grip of
force to compel over time. But, and this is the second point, it
will not do to conclude that the Marxist view of the past is an
elaborate fiction which is obviously implausible and can only be kept
afloat by gross intellectual turpitude. Marxism, as indeed do all
ideologies, has a plausible relationship to the political world, or
to the past. It would have been unlikely to have achieved anything
at all if its explanation of the past bore no resemblance to the
events which took place. In a complex theory such as Marxism it is
unlikely that any simple knock down argument would immediately convince
an adherent that the whole enterprise was mistaken and equally unlikely
that a prima faciae objection to class struggle in history would
resolve the problem against Marxism straight way.
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The past and the present are, to a certain extent, conflated in
Marxism. By that I mean to say that the past is not a category that
is rigidly distinct from or held apart from the present. The impression
sometiiacpes given is that there is an impartial world of facts about the
past, understanding of which gives us the confidence to act in the
present. Now the present, for all the talk of scientific analysis
rather than moral prescription is essentially a sphere in which we
must act. Though it may be possible to stand outside other societies
and watch the dialectic at work, we cannot remain indifferent in our
own. Marx did not preach social Quietism. The Marxist is part of
his own analysis and as such, cannot stand apart from its consequences.
He roust choose, in Stokely Carroichael's arresting phrase to be 'part
of the problem or part of the solution'. There is here a tension in
Marxism, for the question of how we are to act now cannot wait on the
results of historical investigation, it must depend for its motive
power on the ability to convince people that they ought to act in a
certain way. But the grounds that we offer for this are clearly
related to values that we hold, or wish to convince others of. The
mere fact, if it is one, that Communism is inevitable cannot itself
determine our attitude towards it. We are Marxists because capitalism
is exploitative and denies human freedom, not just because it offers
to explain things to us. If we did not believe that the increasing
impoverishment of the workers was a bad thing then it would be difficult
to see the point in acting at all. And it is worth noting that the
language Marx and his successors employ in describing both capitalism
and their intellectual opponents combines in fair measure both rational
argument, abuse and exhortation. Marx did, after all, describe
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capitalism as being like a vampire, the dead labour that sucks on
49
the living. And, equally validly, V7e may feel that Communism does
not usher in an era of freedom, but leads to collectivism and the
erosion of human freedom; thus we would choose to reject it. In
the case of our attitude to a future society in Marxism the picture
is complicated by the incomplete vision that is offered to us. As
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R N flerki notes, part of the problem here is that the promised
abolition of the distinction between the private and the public (should
such a thing be logically possible) ^ can be seen either in terms of
the virtual abolitann of the state, through greater expression of
individuals, or through the elimination of the individual through
greater state control.
The fact that we are offered a vision of a future society in which
alienation and exploitation are abolished draws our attention to the
mythical quality in Marxism. I do not mean myth in any derogatory
sense here; rather I mean the notion that there is a dramatic structure
to the Marxist account of historical change, with a certain eschato-
logical flavour. In the ^German Ideology', for example, Marx paints
history as a dramatically coherent set of events and in as much as
we know the end of the story, we can locate the significance of those
events that are occurring now. At the end of the story is the
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It can be plausibly argued that the 'abolition' of one concept would
lead to the 'abolition' of the other, since they derive their
particular use from being contrasted with each other. If nothing
is private, then nothing is public either.
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communist society in which people spend part of their day in manual
work, part in intellectual labour and part in cultural activities, an
arrangement which is the antithesis of the present division of labour
under capitalism. How, or if, the structure of the Marxist account
is taken from Hegel's equally grand historical thesis does not concern
us here. What matters is that tie have a highly speculative account
of history in the sense that not only are great claims made for the
theory in terms of providing the key to the understanding of the past,
but also in perceiving those trends that will shape the future.
In one sense Marx starts from his own present (19th century capitalist
society) and sees the past as an extrapolation of current trends
receding awayiin one direction and the future as a projection of those
trends in another. But there is a certain air of paradox about the
fact that it is, in a sense, only by claiming to have solved the
problems of the future that Marx can give us confidence for understanding
and solving the problems of the present. In other words, in Marx's
historical framework we act in the present, not on^the basis of our
knowledge of the past, but in the confidence of our knowledge of the
future.
It is worth repeating here that thi3 does not mean Marx is offering us
just a 'story' with no connection with events in the past. Part of
the plausibility of the entire enterprise depends on there being some
kind of relationship. The stress laid by Marx on underlying economic
causes is by no means absurd and the search for economic motivation
is certainly not irrelevant. But equally, the fact that there are
matters of historical worth in Marxist writings on the past, and the
fact that many historians have been stimulated by Marxist theories, does
not mean that Marx is automatically offering us history which should
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just be seen in terms of its chherence as a way of explaining past
events. If, as I have suggested, Marx and Marxists are not interested
in understanding tohe past for the purpose of illuminating what
happened, but want to use the past for the purpose of shaping the
present and controlling the future then they are engaged in a different
enterprise: an enterprise that cannot be 'translated' into history
proper without losing its own character. An analogy would be the
way in which some matters of historical fact and detail are, no
doubt, present in Shakespeare's history plays" but we could not
'translate' them into history without destroying their character as
a work of art. Equally, there would be no way of 'translating' a
rain dance into purely scientific (or even, possibly, anthropological)
categories and still retaining its significance.
At the back of both Marx's views on history, economics and social
organisation in general is a theory of human nature - about what it
is to be 'really' human. As we have already noted, this is related
to his view that Man is, first and foremost a producer, homo laborens,
and that under capitalism he is alienated and estranged, both from the
object of his work and from other workers. But it is difficult here
to see a logical connection between an obvious metaphorical use of the
term alienation (we could agree that the brivht, grammar school
educated university graduate from the north who finds success in
London - so beloved of certain novelists - becomes alienated from his
working class roots) and the more complex metaphysical uses to which it
is sometimes put. Though I may feel alienated in Edinburgh, it is not
entirely clear that this is because it confronts me, or I confront
myself. Likewise, though it may be reprehensible not to support a
strike and this may bring me into conflict with others, there is
nothing in this which needs recourse to metaphysical theories of
human nature.
Me can see the sense in which a factory worker might be degraded by his
job, but to say that his labour confronts him in the object he has
created is surely to make a Rylean category mistake, for though my
labour makes the table possible, it is not another ingredient along
with the legs, top and glue.
Not only is the use of the concept of alienation a mixture of
metaphor and metaphysics, it is not quite the neutral, descriptive
term that is sometimes implied. It does, after all, depend upon a
view of what the 'real needs' of a Man are. Not all needs, nor even
felt needs, can be genuine - no matter how real they are felt to be.
Advertising would be seen to exploit people in precisely this way,
by convincing them that they really need a video recorder or whiter
shirts. To fight for the realisation of those capacities that Marx
and his followers deem to be those of 'real men' is, in this sense,
to adopt a primarily moral attitude here. In a similar way, freedom
is not just a description of legal relationships and all freedoms are
not legitimate - the freedom to exploit, for example.
Some Marxists, those associated with the 'scientific' view of
Marxism, often claim that terms such as exploitation are scientific
and not moral terms, in the sense that Marx does net equate it with
'denying the dignity of the human being', but in explaining an
economic relationship whereby surplus value is extracted from the worker.
The two issues may indeed be separate, for feudal serfs were not
exploited in the sense of having surplus value extracted, but were
denied dignity; but this is beside the point, for the force of Marx's
comments is that capitalism operates a rigged lottery by its mani¬
pulation of such terms as justice and fairness auch that the extraction
of profit from the worker by the capitalist can be seen as a legitimate
(indeed, praiseworthy) enterprise.
The ability, in this sense, of Marxism to generate commitment to
political, social and economic change depends on the way in which it
can convince people that they are being cheated, that their limes will
be transformed, for the better if they act in a certain way.
It is only, we might add here, because Marxism does have a conception
of human nature in quite a specific sense (ie not in a common sense,
man in the street or top of bus way) that it can identify the problems
of capitalism as problems at all. Alienation, exploitation and
estrangement are not, as it were, separate from capitalism- they
cannot be identified separately from it, or independently of it, in
any Marxist account. They go together in the way that progress and
Civil Society go together for Liberals such as J S Mill. As we shall
see, this is connected with the way in which ideological accounts of
the past differ and compete, for it is arguable that the prob&ims the
Marxist sees in capitalism are not mis-identified by the Liberal, but
not seen as problems at all. Alienation is not something that we
discover to have occurred in the past through painstaking historical
research, it is something that we talk about only if we are Marxists,
and not Liberals or Conservatives. Alienation, like the concept of
sin for Christians, focuses attention on what, from a certain point
of view, is significant in being human.
The implication of this is that whilst it is possible for soma of the
historical claims made by Marxists (eg "The rate of profit fell in the
years leading up to the outbreak of the Great Mar") to be put to the
test of evidence and hence to "objective** scrutiny, it would be
misleading to see the x^hole enterprise in this way. For, as we have
seen, the description of capitalism is not in the same form as the
historians use of that term. It does not stand as a description of a
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certain set of economic and legal relationships that pertain at a
certain time, it also functions as an evaluative notion, such that
anyone admitting X as an example of a capitalist society, cannot
avoid the conclusion that it is exploitative and that Men are
alienated within it. Thus, although a Marxist underfetanding of the
past is related to certain events in the past having taken place,
the relationship is not one of straightforward dependency.
Ill
Having looked in somewhat general terms at the relationship between the
past in Marxism and other aspects of Marxism, it is time to consider
some concrete examples that might illustrate these points more clearly.
My intention here is to look at two authors from within the British
Marxist tradition, E.P. Thompson and Perry Anderson. Both are
concerned with the past and with the claims of 'historical materialism',
and both have contributed extensively to Marxist literature in this
area. I have chosen them because they quite clearly represent
different approaches to the issue within Marxism, and have to a
greater or lesser extent, formulated their positions in opposition to
each other over a number of years. Equally important, they see
their disagreements as being within Marxism, and as such, part of a
'comradely debate' rather than an engagement with political or
ideological opponents. It is worth pointing out here that their
interest in the past does stem from rather different concerns and
comes from rather different directions. Thompson is, first and
foremost, an historian, whose researches have been otiginal. In
describing himself as a Marxist, his claim is that 'historical
materialism' is a useful tool for understanding the past - without
wishing to see it reduced to the level of a rigid dogma. Anderson
is, on the other hand, primarily a Marxist theoretician, who believes
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that 'historical materialism' is the key (or part of the key) to the
understanding of history as a process of transformation from feudalism,
to capitalism, to socialism. As we shall see later on, one of his
criticisms of Thompson's work is that he fails to appreciate the
contemporary relevance of the past towards formulating the correct
political strategy now. To that extent, I suggest, he is closer
to what I have been describing as mainstream Marxist thought than
is Thompson. Thompson has a rather 'softer' view of history. The
difference between them might be expressed by saying that Thompson
is a Marxist historian, whilst Anderson believes in Marxist history.
Thompson's views can be amply illustrated by looking at two of his
books, perhaps his best known works: 'The Making of the English
52 53
Working Class' and 'The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays'
The former is a work which has received widespread praise from both
professional historians, and fellow Socialists. The latter is a
work concerned to a far greater degree with theoretical matters and
inter-Socialist polemics. In particular it 'rubbishes' (I do not
think that the phrase is too strong in this context) a number of
fellow travellers including Anderson, his collaborator from the New
Left Review, Tom Nairn and the prominent French Marxist, Louis
Althusser. It is important to note that the polemical and theoretical
elements in 'PT' are quite intentionally brought together; for
Thompson sees, especially in the works of Althusser, not only concept¬
ual confusion and bad history, but also the ghost of Stalinism lurking
in the background. The practical consequences for British Socialists
(so the argument runs) would be disastrous if they succumbed to
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French irrationalism. In this sense, 'PT' is as much a part of
the debate about the future of Socialism, and the form that working
for Socialism in Britain might take, as it is a dispassionate look
at some misconceptions about the role of evidence in historical
writings.
Anderson does not claim to be an historian in the sense that Thompson
does. Most of his work on the past is based upon the researches of
others. His position will be illustrated by three works, 'Passages
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from Antiquity to Feudalism', 'Lineages of the Absolutist State'
56
and 'Arguments within English Marxism' . The first two can be
seen as parts of a single work, divided by chronology rather than
methodology and the third is both a defence of Althusser against
Thompson and the elaboration of a distinct position by Anderson
himself. Again, it should be pointed out that in the more theoretical
'AWEM', polemic and argument are mixed together with a discussion of
underlying political strategy.
'MEWC' is an enormous and detailed book, which was originally intended
to be the first chapter of a short book on working class politics
between 1790 and 1921. In fact, it covers the period from the French
Revolution to the Great Reform Act of 1832, at the end of which
period "The working class presence was ... the most significant
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factor in British political life". The very weight of detail
makes it difficult to summarise, and it must be recognised that these
details are quite deliberate on Thompson's part, for he is "... seeking
to rescue the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the 'obsolete' hand
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-loom weaver ... from the enormous condescension of posterity".
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And one way to rebut the claim that working class history is of no
interest or significance is indeed to quote chapter and verse in
order to illustrate its vitality and intellectual standing.
Thus, Thompson looks in great detail at a number of intellectual
and political currents that had emerged, or were emerging at the
end of the eighteenth century. Starting with the London Corresponding
Society ("... often been claimed as the first definitely working
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class political organisation formed in Britain" ) he looks at the
way in which the influence of Tom Paine, the rise of Methodism and
the impact of the industrial revolution transformed a number of
disparate organisations and causes into something that could be
genuinely described as a class. This development is, he stresses,
an historical phenomenon, rather than a category - it is something
that happened. The main thesis of the book can be broken down,
roughly speaking into three sections.
Firstly, Thompson looks at the agitation around democratic reforms,
fueled by the French Revolution and Paine's 'The Rights of Man' which,
he argues reached a high point around 1792 in terms of co-operation
between "intellectuals and plebians".60 Radicals such as John Thelwall^'1'
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saw in 'manufactory' a potential centre of political rebellion,
but the history of agitation between 1792 and 1796 was "the story of
the simultaneous default of the middle class reformers and the rapid
6 3
'leftward' movement of the plebian Radicals".
Secondly, he looks at the relationship between changes in productive













thesis in this area (claims Thompson) is the simple equation that
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steam power + cotton mills = new working class. As Thompson puts
it:
The physical instruments of production were seen as
giving rise in a direct and more or less compulsive
way to new social relationships, institutions and
cultural modes ...It is, perhaps, the scale and
intensity of this multiform popular agitation which
has, more than anything else, given rise (among
contemporary observers and historians alilae) the
sense of some catastrophic change.,.,.bb
But he is wary of too quick a judgement.
We should not assume any automatic, or over-direct,
correspondence between the dynamic of economic
growth and the dynamic of social or cultural life.
For half a century after the 'breakthrough' of the
cotton mill (around 1780) the mill workers remained
a minority of the adult labour force in the cotton
industry itself ... in 1830, the adult male cotton
spinner was no more typical of that elusive figure,
'the average working man1, than is the Coventry
motor-worker of the 196li5's.,.,.66
The radical movements, which might be seen as expressions of the
new working class, he points out, also drew strength from a hogt
of smaller trades and occupations. The important point for
Thompson is that:
...when every caution has been made, the outstanding
fact of the period between 1790 and 1830 is the
formation of the 'working class'. This is revealed,
first, in the growth of class consciousness: the
consciousness of an identity of interests between all
these diverse groups of working people and as against
the interests of other classes. And second, in the
growth of corresponding forms of political and indust¬
rial organisation. By 1832 there were strongly based
and self-conscious working-class institutions ... and
a working class structure of feeling. The making
of the working class is a fact of political and
cultural, as much as economic history. It was not
the spontaneous generation of the factory system...The







These comments tie in with other remarks made in the preface by
Thompson, especially the comment about the working class being
present at its own meeting.88
Thompson's view is of some interest here; for although he argues
against those whom he accuses of seeing the working class as a
'thing', he agrees that the working class does exist as a component
of social structure - it is not an abstrattion or convenient collective
noun. He also argues that class consciousness is the way in which
the working class handles experiences in cultural terms rather than
the product of an objective relationship between worker and productive
forces. Thus, even if experience is determined, class consciousness
is not.
We can see a logic in the responses of similar
occupational groups undergoing similar experiences,
but we cannot predicate any law. Consciousness of
class arises intthe same way in different times and
places, but never in just the same way.^g
In bhe end, he writes "it is the political context as much as the
steam engine, which had the most influence on the shaping consciousness
and institutions of the working class"70. The reasons that Thompson
brings forward for the working class evolving in the way it did include
both economic exploitation and political oppression, or rather the
perception felt by the emerging class of these two factors. The
first point leads directly to the question 'did wage levels and the
standard of living decline during the industrial revolution %' and
thus to the question of exploitation.
The importance of this question is the way in which it apparently
links an evaluation of a certain kind, 'exploitation' with a factual





whether wage levels and/or standards of living decreases for the
working class during this period. As we shall see later on, the
question is far more complex than this.
Having examined the various social groupings within the working class,
their life style, their religion and finally their life outside of
work, Thompson turns to his third section, in which he looks at how
the working class started to make its presence felt as an organised
force. Here he draws our attention to the fact that the period can
reasonably be divided into two distinct eras, the first from the
French Revolution to the end of the French Ward (1790 - 1815) and
the second from Waterloo to the Reform Act of 1832. The particular
importance that Thompson sees in this break is the qualitative
difference in post-Waterloo radicalism.
This radicalism was not (as in the 1790's) a minority
propaganda, identified with a few organisfeiions and
writers. After 1815 the claims of Rights of Man had
little novelty? they were now assumed.^
The years leading up to Peterloo in 1819 were the high point, the
'heroic age' of popular radicalism. But to repeat the point, it
was not just the increased level of activity that characterised the
later period, it was during this period that the working class started
to develop and alternative system of organising work and society.
This came through the birth of Unions, experiments such as Owenite
socialism and the start of the co-operative movement. The analysis
of society that stemmed from the movement is workh noting.
Fundamental Principles
First - that labour is the source of all wealth;




Secondly - that the working classes, although
the producers of wealth, instead of being the
richest, are the poorest of the community; hence,
they cannot be receiving a just recompense for
their labour.,!*■ (Emphasis in original)
And it is the specific nature of this analysis and working class
action to secure it that leads Thompson to claim that it amounts
to 'working class consciousness'; both by virtue of the identity
of interest between working men thus established, and by its
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institutional forms. At the end of 'MEWC' Thompson returns to the
theme that it is the birth of 'collective self-consciousness' that
was the great spiritual gain of the indistrial revolution and that
this must be set against the loss of a way of life which, had,
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perhaps, been more human. We may say, therefore, that the central
point of Thompson's argument is that the birth, or making of the
working class is characterised prec&4ely by an awareness of that
phenomenon, rather than the mere existence of certain identifiable
economic factors.
The way in which Thompson sees the argument of 'MEWC' related to
Marxism is developed (though not always explicitly) in 'PT'.
Thompson is, I think, concerned to do three things in 'PT'. Firstly,
he wants to look at those factors which make history the disciplined
inguiry that it is; secondly, he wishes to show that 'historical
materialism' (as he conceives it) is quite compatible with those
canons, and thirdly, to show that the approach of Althusser and his
disciples leads to vacuuity and sterility - for such an approach
never engages in the real world at all, it is always stuck at the





examination of the Marxist tradition and, at a political level, a
coining to grips with the crisis within international communism
since 1956.
(i) History, for Thompson, is a distinct type of inquiry that
cannot be replaced by, say, science. The adecruacy of any historical
account is directly related to the concept of valid evidence and to
the concept of coherence. Thus any account may be criticised at
two levels - either in terms of its factual inadequacy of in terms
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of its conceptual confusion. The two levels do, however, come
together. An example of this would be the question of historical
evidence and how it is to be interpreted. Thompson is very clear
that evidence does not just present itself as a series of brute
factos for the historian to uncover like nuggets in the desert.
Evidence is both the creation of a particular time and place (and
hence must be understood in terms of that time and place) and must be
subject to the critical scruttng of the historian, who does not
necessarily take it at face value. Thus there is a relationship
between fact and interpretation, such that both move together. An
analogy might be between the fact that there is a relationship
between the categories through which we understand the world (and
without which no understanding at all would be possible) and empirical
facts that set limits upon those categories. As Thompson puts it:
That facts are there, inscribed in the historical
record, with determinate properties, does not, of
course, entail some notion that these facts disclose
their meanings and relationships (historical knowledge)
of themselves, and independently of theoretical
procedures ...The historical evidence is there, in its
primary form, not to disclose its own meaning, but to







His criticism of Nairn and Anderson, contained in the essay 'The
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Peculiarities of the English' is that they are so concerned with
setting models of historical activity, and delineating 'ideal' forms
of revolution, that they completely fail to do justice to the actual
evidence that is available. In particular, the use of a model,
suggests Thompson, will only pre-determine the answers that the
evidence will give, and may blind the historian to all kinds of
connections that can and should be made. In short, Nairn and
Anderson are not engaging in genuine history at all but looking for
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the answers that their model already predisposes them towards.
And hence their story twlls us nothing.
The criticism of Althusser is much more vehement. Althusser is not
interested in history at all ("His comments display throughout no
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acquaintance with, nor understanding of, historical procedures ...J )
and this leads him to the error of claiming that 'real' history is
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unknowable and therefore, non-existent. Althusser's most astonishing
glaim is, according to Thompson:
We should say the same of the science that concerns
us most particularly: historical materialism. It
has been possible to apply Marx's theory with success
because it is true'; it is not true because it has









This, for Thompson, is an exact reversal of the truth, and takes us
on to the second point - tine compatibility of 'historical materialism'
with the canons of historical reasoning. For Thompson, Althusser
seems to give up alaost every empirical claim that Marxists might
consider to be important. As the above quotation shows, Althusser
is claiming that the grounds for supporting Marx's view of history
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are non-historical.
This claim goes even deeper, for Althusser is, apparently, at great
pains to argue that 'Capital' is not about history either.
Despite appearances, Marx does not analyse any
■concrete society', not even England which he
constantly mentions in Volume One, but the CAPITALIST
MODE OF PRODUCTION and nothing else... We must not
imagine that Marx is analysing a concrete situation
in England when he discusses it. He only discusses
it in order to 'illustrate' his (abstract) theory of
the capitalist mode of production.^
Thompson, on hhe other hand, sees 'Historical materialism' as one of
the most important e&gacies within the Marxist tradition, precisely
because it is empirical and, therefore, open to criticism from the
canons of historical logic. Indeed, he argues that historical
materialism is not derived from a broader philosophical framework
but is, itself, the common ground for all Marxist practice. This
does not mean that it derives nothing from the activities of Marxists
within other disciplines, but that in the end all Marxist roads lead
back to historical materialism. This means that the Marxist view of
history does not differ from history on any epistemological grounds,
but only in terms of its characteristic hypotheses and the categories
that it uses (e.g. class). As he puts the matter "The court has been
sitting in judgement upon hiilorical materialism for one hundred years
and is continually being adjourned. The adjournment is in effect a
"This is, of course, Thompson's version of Althusser. Whether or not





tribute to the robustness of the tradition". One point worth
mefcfcioning here, since Thompson specifically brings it in to the
discussion about the principles of 'historical materialism' is that of
judgement in history. Thompson is quite certain that there are
correct historical procedures for 'recovering' what happened in
the past - though historical knowledge is always provisional and
always falls short of positive proof - but that once the past has
been recovered, we are quite entitled to judge it as if it were the
present. Thus we can shake hands with Swift and Wppose Walpole:
and although this will change nothing in the past it can change
everything for us, because it allows us to assert those values which
give history meaning for us, and which we intend to enlarge and
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sustain in the present.
Historical materialism is then, 'true* because it stands up to the
test of evidence, and not because it is derived elsewhere from a 'true'
theory.
The final point I wish to discuss in relation to Thompson's argument
in 'PT' is the way in which he sees Marxist history and Marxism. I
have already suggested that this is one area where he and Anderson
differ. Thompson is quick to condemn the decline of 'historical
materialism' into dogma, and makes plain that it is not his intention
to defend Marx on each and every occasion.
(Our) exploration may still be within the Marxist
tradition, in the sense that we are taking some of
Marx's hypotheses and central concepts, and setting
these to work. But the end of this exploration is
not the discovery of a (reformed) finite conceptual
system, Marxism ... There is no innermost altar that
is sacrosanct against interrogation and revision.
Here lies the difference between Marxism and the
Marxist taadition. It is possible to practice as a




For the general outlines of the argument see Ibid, pp231-238
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For Marxism I would not fight ...
oo
What in fact Althusser and his disciples have done is to put Marx into
87
the prison of Marxism"'' and by creating a Marxism of 'closure' (that
is a theory that is safely hidden away from uncomfortable empirical
evidence or logical criticism) thay have turned Marxism into an
ideology of the present day. Thus Thompson ends by revising his
88
argument in 'An Open Letter to Lezek Kolakowski' and claiming that
Marxism is no longer a single tradition, but has split in tow.
This break came about (in practical terms) in 1956 and there is no
middle ground for compromise or discussion. The only thing that
libertarian socialists can do with the 'theoretical practice' of
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Althussarians is expose it and drive it out. "If I thought,"
writes Thompson, "that Althussarianism was the logical terminus of
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Marxism, then I could never be a Marxist." All of this is in
the polemical tradition of Burke and Paine.
What then of Anderson ? Let us start by examining what he has to
say in 'PAF' and 'LAS'. He is quite clear that neither of these
works is, in the conventional sense, history.
It is necessary,hhowever, to stress at the outset
the limited and provisional character of the accounts
presented in each work. The scholarship and skills
of the professional historian are absent from them.
Historical writing in lihe proper sense is inseparable
from direct research into original records of the past ...














The discussion for which they are designed is
primarily one within the field of historical
materialism.^2
This is because
It has been a general phenomenon of the last
decades that Marxist historians... have not
always been directly concerned with the theoretical
questions of implications raised by their work.
At the same time, Marxist philosophers, v/ho have
sought to clarify or to solve the basic theoretical
problems of historical materialism, have often
done so at a considerable remove from the
specific empiricll questions posed by historians.
...the aim of this study is to examine European
Absolutism simultaneously 'in general' and 'in
particular': that is to say, both the 'pure'
structures of the Absolutist State ... and the
'impure' variants presented by the specific
and diverse monarchies of post-mediaeval Europe.n,y j
Thus Anderson covers the period from classical antiquity to 1917
in a range of countr&es from Greece to Japan and from Russia to
Turkey, in considerably fewer pages than it takes Thompson to take
us from 1790 to 1832 in England. This in itself is instructive,
for Anderson is far less concerned with the detail of events than
with the global theory that they contribute towards. And at the
back of his mind is always the question phow tan this study be
integrated into the general corpus of Marxist theory ? I shall
not, therefore, follow the steps of Anderson's voyage first from
antiquity to Feudalism and then from Feudalism to the Absolutist
State, in the same way that I have traced the argument in Thompson.
Anderson's work does not invite such treatment. If we look at 'PAF'
and his nonclusions in ' IAS', then the general picture lie is trying
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The Roman Empire collapsed because of, or rather, was determined by,
the dynamic of the slave mode of production and its contradictions,
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once Imperial expansion was halted. The symbiosis of Roman and
Germanic social formations produced a cataclysmic collision and
96
fusion from which Feudalism emerged in Western Europe. Feudalism
started to emerge in the 10th century, expanded in the 11th and 12th
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centuries, and reached its zenith in the fcBih century. 'Full'
feudalism was into the former Carolingian lands of Western
Europe, and spread slowly and unevenly out to England, Spain,
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Scandinavia and finally - in a less perfect form - to Eastern Europe.
A unique feature which transcended the period was, of course, the
Church - overarching the period at a cultural rather than social or
economic level. The feudal mode of production, Jmiiilce the slave mode,
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or capitalism, had no imperialist pretensions. It was moreover,
with one exception (Japan) a mode of production that was confined to
Europe and never appeared outside it.
At the Renaissance, a dramatic change took place, there was the
historical turning point at which Europe outdistanced all other
continents in dynamism and expansion. The new and singular type of
State that arose in this eppch was Absolutism, and the absolute
lOO
monarchies of this period were a European phenomenon. The basic
characteristic which divided the Absolute monarchies of Europe from,










increase in political sway of the Royal State was accompanied, hot
by a decrease in the economic securitv of noble land-ownership, but
by a corresponding increase in the rights of private property".
Subsequently, Absolutism emerged in Eastern Europe but in a different
way, for Eastern Europe had no urban bourgeoisie and still retained a
feudal 'cast' of state.As the various Absolutist states formed,
the international system of rival states came into existence at a
political level, but this did not render Europe into an homogeneous
whole "On the contrary, representing distinct historical lineages
from the start, the Absolutist States of Western and Eastern Europe
followed diveroent trajectories down to their respective conclusions."
These were the overthrow of the Western monarchies by the bourgeois
and the overthrow of the Tsar by proletarian revolution."1*03
As we have already noted, Anderson's story is quite a general one -
it is in fact part of a history of everything, and the temptation is
to say that this is because he feels that this enterprise is necessary
to both outline and to justify the Marxist historical programme.
Anything and everything can be explained.
At this point it is worth letting Anderson explain how and why he
differs (as a Marxist), from Thompson. This argument is contained
in 'AWEM'. It falls into four parts, an investigation of the nature
of historical inquiry, the role of human agency in history, the nature
of Marxism and the phenomenon of Stalinism.
There are three main areas of disagreement in terms of the nature of
historical inquiry. Firstly, Anderson argues that Thompson's
invocation of the principle of falsification does make it akin to the





scientific activity. Secondly, he clenies that history is, or should
be, the Queen of the humanities, and thirdly, he resists Thompson's
argument about the approximate nature of historical knowledge.
Some historical facts, such as the date of the October Revolution are
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as certain as anything. There then follows, in the discussion of
agency in history an attack upon what Anderson sees as three major
theses in 'MEVJC' - that the working class made itself as much as it
was made, that dousness is the key to understanding class, and
that the working class had been 'made' by 1832. How if fc|iefehe first
proposition Thompson means that the working class was not merely the
necessary creation of a change in the forces of production, but
welded itself together through its own agency, Anderson suggests that
by omitting the impact of certain sectors in the industrial revolution,
the financier/rentier configuration of London, and the impact of the
American and French Revolutions, he leaves the reader unable to judge
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the issue and "the parity between agency and necessity ... is never
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really tested" . As Sfir as the second point of dispute is concerned,
Anderson is content to cite Cohen's recent book"11"' on Marx's view of
Mstory to demonstrate that the correct Marxist position is that class
is everything to do with an objective relationship to the means of
production, and nothing to do with a sense of identity, at least as far
as the definition of class is concerBBd. Thirdly, Anderson argues that
Tom Nairn is correct in seeing two lipases in the history of the working
class - the first phase which Thompson describes and then a second
phase of moderate and supine reformism. Thus the working class could
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the latter part of that century. It is the lack of a connection
between these phases, the discontinuity of the story, that we should
stress instead of the continuity in development that Thompson seeks
to establish.
It is clear that Anderson's criticisms are also about the inadequate
base within Marxism in Thompson's ideas. Perhaps the most fundamental
criticism is that he equates 'history' with the 'past.' and that
'historical mat-rJ-lism' is assimilated to 'the practice of writing
3 08
history' . Though Thompson claims that the major strength of
historical materialism is its adequacy as an account of the past, the
'founders' of 'historical materialism' had quite another aim in mind.
For historical materialism ...was also 'scientific
socialism', in other words the enterprise of under¬
standing the present and mastering the future - a
political project at one with the idea of proletarian
revolution. In this perspective, historical
materialism is not confined to, nor even over-whelmingly
concanfafcH&fcdd upon, the past. The history with which
it is concerned is at least equally the present. Indeed,
what else is Capital actually orientated towards ? Its
essential 'empirical' reference point is that of the
English economy in the 186&'s.,^.,
And again,
one of the central purposes of understanding hhe
past is to provide a causal knowledge of historical
processes capable of furnishing the basis for an
adequate political practice in trie present ... This
is the ambition of the Communist Manifesto.^Q
Thompson's approach leads him into a dangerous moralism, in which the
judgements he makes and proclaims - condemning V7alpole and praising
Swift - simply detract from the real importance of such characters
on the stage Sf history. For "historical materialism, as for






foremost a set of lines of force for transformation, not a gallery
of model lives for imitation.
How ®re we to understand these two authors, their disputes, and their
relevance to our discussion on Marxism and the past ? It should be
remembered here that the purpose of this section is to outline their
respective views rather than to criticise them.
For Thompson, the main attraction of historicailmaterialism is in
the way that it he ps us to understand the past through offering
serviceable categories which enable us to make sense of the evidence
that is presented to us. Tlius class ia a useful concept in terras of
explaining the collective actions of individuals in a given eppch
though it is noticable that Thompson ha3 far less to say about the
concepts of, say, alienation and exploitation, except to see them as
justifiable moral judgements for describing the reality of Georgian
and Victorian England. Such concepts are not 3acred dogmas and must
bow to the evidence. Part of the problem here is that the evidence
may or may not be conclusive (or to put the matter in Popper3peak,
there may be no decisive refutation available): it may be provisional
or ambiguous, in which case it is scarcely surprising that the court
of history is still sitting in judgement. An example of this difficulty
is the question Thoirposn himself raises about wage levels during the
industrial revolution, did they rise or fall ? As he indicates, the
question admits of no general answer. Not only did different
sections of the working class fare differently, but the examination of
different periods within the industrial rev&lution will produced
different results. In short, a whole range of evidence does not point
conclusively in either direction. There are two points that this
raises in connection with Marxism. Firstly, the concept of class or
11;LIbid, p98
even of exploitation could hardly hang in the air for Marxists whilst
they awaited the judgement of history (it is still the concept that
shapes the evidence and not vice versa) and secondly, such agnosticism
would simply produce acute political paralysis rather than fueling
the embers of revolutionary praxis. Thompson is, I believe, wrong
in not recognising that the concepts logically precede the evidence,
rather than being derived from it. The plausibility of the explanation
even if it can'.- t i entirely convincing gives the impression that
the evidence is more important than it in fact is.
One of the interesting impressions gained from Thompson's work is
that his Marxism is much more obvious in his theoretical writings
than in his historical works. I tend to agree here with Anderson
and Cohen that Thompson's view, especially of class consciousness is
a very different one from that in Marx. The concept of the 'working
class' seems to fulfil an heuristic, rather than a Marxist' role in
'MEWC'.
Whatever the relationship between the two in Thompson's work, the case
of Anderson is very different. With Anderson the question that
really needs to be asked is "To what extent is his work history at all ?
His own admission of not doing any original research is, in fact, a
major flaw; for surely we want to say that the sstablishment of
historical truth cannot be done wholly by proxy. How does Anderson
know that the facts of the period he describes supports his analysis
without having found out at least some of the facts for himself ?
We can only assume that in choosing works that support his analysis,
Anderson is begging the question. Racing through the past in this
way is unlikely to convince anyone who is not already in agreement with
Anderson already. The effect of Anderson's way of treating hfee past
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is rather like that of a fast train going through the countryside,
where everything is reduced to an indistinguishable blur for the
passengers.
Moreover, as we have seen, the examination of hhe past is secondary
to questions within, or about, Marxism itself. His study is primarily
intended to resolve questions about the gap between the abstract and
the concrete within Marxist theory. In other words, its role is
within the Marx:' ■t jigsaw 6s of greater importance than discovering
what happened in 18NN. The talk about 'pure' absolutist states (or
their form) is indicative here, for it sets the category of the
'absolutist' state above the evidenne required bring 'impure'
manifestations of that state into being. It is hard to imagine
what evidence could be bimight ±o dissuade Anderson from his
analysis, and hence is question begging.
Finally, Anderson specifically links the past to both the present and
the future in terras of political action. Thompson does not specifically
indulge in this; he judges the past as if it were the present (e.g.
he makes the decision to side with Swift and against Walpole) and
in doing so brings that judgement into an atemooral moral realm in
which an actiona and our reaction are logically related by moral
112
values and not contingently related by time. Anderson flattens
the chronology by rendering past and future as extensions of the
present, but as we have already seen (see Chanter 2) this does not
make the relationship atemporal in the way that a. moral judgement is,
it meeely makes it absurd; for the present can always give rise to a
past and future that are acceptable to it in terms of justifying tour
current activities.
112
Though it might be argued that his choice of period (18th and 19th
century working class history) fives maximum prominence to his own
notions of the 'her4ic period' in working class history.
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Let me recap by saying; firstly, at the outset of this chapter
1 tried to indicate that there are limits to which any summary of
Marxism can cover all the alternatives on cffer. This chapter has
not been intended as an exhaustive trip around world Marxism, but
to locate strands and arguments that are advanced by a substantial
number of Marxists and cannot, therefore, be dismissed as straw men.
Secondly, there are those who would say that if marxism fails to live
up to the stand rd_ of history when talking about the past then it is
unfalsifiable and, therefore, intellectually valueless. Even if this
were so, and even if it is impossible to recall the past as history
(pace Oakeshott) in a way that will be useful to present endeavours,
it does not follow that Marxist writings on the past are incoherent or
nonsense. As I have tried to show, they are 'historical' in content
(in the sense that the people and events in them are not made up
unlike, say, a mythical understanding of the past such as the Book of
Generis where the people and events are fictional - or mythological)
but not in form. They belong to an ideological understanding of the





As one might expect of an ideology that places the liberty of the
individual conscience at its heart, there is no single version of
Liberal doctrine. In the introduction to their book "The Liberal
Tradition", Alan Bullock and Maurice Shock draw our attention to what
they term 'the intellectual incoherence* of Liberalism.* By this, they
simply mean that not only have Liberals disagreed on matters of policy -
that is to say, whether or not law X or proposal Y will advance Liberal
values - but also on matters of principle. They have disagreed over
what real Liberal values are. Thus Robert Paul Wolfe, in "The Poverty
2
of Liberalism' is quite wrong in equating Liberalism with Utilitarianism;
for it can be legitimately claimed that Locke, T H Green, L T Hobhouse
and Lord Macaulay were all Liberals, though not Utilitarians. Indeed,
it is difficult to imagine two more opposed moral doctrines than Mill's
'principle of utility' and Green's notion of 'moral self-realisation'.
Maurice Cranston makes a similar point when he states that Liberals were
all in favour of freedom, but could not agree as to what 'freedom'
3
consisted of. Even so, it would I think be mistaken to argue on the
basis of this (as Plamenatz seems to) that there must either be an
agreed ancestor for all Liberals (Locke) or that Liberalism is not a
single ideology at all.^ Locke may indeed have been a prominent figure
*
A Bullock and M Shock, The Liberal Tradition: From Fox to Keynes
(London: Adam & Charles Black, 1956 ), xix.
2
R P Wolfe, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).
3
M Cranafc-on, see his entry on Liberalism in The Dictionary of Philosophy
(London: Macmillan, 1967) and Freedom: A new Analysis (London: Longmans, 1953)
4 . 65 fl
J Plamenatz, Readings from Liberal Writers (London: Allen & Unwin, 1965).
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in Liberal history, but it is not obvious that all true Liberals must
therefore be Lockians; nor does it follow from the fact that there are
several varieties of Liberalism that there are several Liberalisms.
One fact that counts against such a view is that contributors to the
Liberal tradition of writing, such as L T Hobhouse in his book
"Liberalism","* even when disagreeing with the premises of another
Liberal's arguments (Mill, for example) still sees himself as debating
with other Liberals and contributing to a single tradition, rather than
as defending Liberalism against a rival doctrine such as Socialism. In
this sense, the contributions of Mill, Hobhouse or Green are statements
possible Liberal arguments that may at any particular time fall into
disrepute or be replaced by others that see, in the circumstances, more
plausible or effective.
Though the actual term 'Liberal* does not appear till the second decade
of the 19th century, being a term of abuse and applied to those who were
sympathetic to the Liberales in the Spanish Cortes, the sources of
inspiration for Liberals go back into the 17th century at least, where
several of Liberalisms characteristic themes were given a theoretical
expression by Milton and Locke. In "Areopagitica", Milton** is
concerned to establish the claims of liberty of conscience in religious
belief and to oppose censorship. He contrasts England with its concern
for liberty of thought with what he saw as the stultifying effects of
Catholicism and the Inquisition on the continent. Milton was careful
^
L T Hobhouse, Liberalism, (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).
First published by the Home University Library in 1911.
J Milton, Areopagitica, in The Works of John Milton (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1931), Vol 4, 293-354.
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to exclude Catholics and atheists from the category of those allowed to
follow their conscience, though in fairness to him this was not because
of their beliefs but because of the Catholic Church, which prevented
any English Catholic from being a good citizen by claiming an allegiance
to the Pope that was prior to any allegiance to the civil authority.
Locke too was in favour of toleration in religious matters, arguing in
effect that although a person could be cured by a medicine they had
no faith in, they could only be saved through a religion that had their
assent. Locke and Milton both base their arguments on an assumption
that is absent in the writings of most later Liberals, namely the
existence of God. They are both theologically based Liberals. Thus
Locke argued against Filmer that all men, as rational creatures, have
a filial relationship to God and that the king is in no special
position as the intermediary between the will of God and the rest of the
human race. The subject therefore, as a rational God-fearing creature
has the right to resist the attacks of the wicked on God's world, even
if the opponent is the king himself. Government for Locke is held on
trust from God and any projects that go against the law of God have no
ultimate legitimacy. It is clear from this that Locke's criterion for
human morality is not historical or culture relative but rooted in an
ahistorical notion of 'human nature* or 'natural law'.^
Some of the rights that Locke took to be God given and unalienable,
freedom of conscience, the right to private property and so on were
particularly influential amongst the founding fathers of the United
States and the authors of its constitution such as Jefferson. Those who
have followed this particular path may be said to represent the minimalist
^
See for example J Locke., Two Treatises of Government (introduced by
P Lazlett) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
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strand of Liberal thought on the subject of government. The best known
exponent of this argument is probably Adam Smith, who argued that as
supremely rational agents men were capable of articulating and organising
their desires and that the interplay of these diverse desires would
lead, via his famous 'invisible hand', to the general benefit of all.
Every individual is continually exerting himself to
find out the most advantageous employment for whatever
capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed,
and not that of the society, which he has in view. But
the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather
necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is
most advantageous to the society.g
Government interference, over and above the provision of a framework
for the interplay of market forces through the law, applied without
favour to all, can only distort the delicate mechanism of the market and
upset it.
It is thus that every system which endeavours, either
by extraordinary encouragements to draw towards a
particular species of industry a greater share of the
capital of the society than would naturally go to it,
or, by extraordinary restraints, force from a particular
species of industry some share of the capital which
would otherwise be employed in it, is in reality subversive
to the great purpose which it means to promote ...
All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore,
being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simply
system of natural liberty establishes itself ©f its own
accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the
laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own
interest in his own way ... According to the system of
natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to
attend to; first, the duty of protecting the society
from the violence and invasion of other independent societies:
secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every
member and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining
certain public works and certain public institutions which
it can never be for the interest of any individual, or
small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because
the profit could never repay the expense to any individual
Q
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Everyman Edition), Vol. I, 398.
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or small number of individuals, though it may
frequently do much more than repay it to a great
society.g
It is this aspect of Liberalism that still finds favour with modern
American Liberals such as F*eidman.
It may be interesting to note as this point the fact that such views
are associated in the 20th century with Conservatism more than
Liberalism. It is ironic that Mr Enoch Powell who, before his conversion
to the cause of Ulster Unionism, has always been regarded as a 'true'
conservative (compared to Heath or Sir Edward Boyle) should be, in
economic matters, a disciple of the Liberal, Adam Smith. The story of
how this transformation has come about is b«?nnd my competence, but it
is certainly true that the decline of Liberalism as a political force
has led to its being 'squeezed' on either wing by Socialists and
Conservatives, and this in turn has increased its inability to define
for itself and potential adherents a position that is distinctive
from, on the one hand, Fabian Socialism, and on the other, free market
Conservatism. That is to say, it is an acute problem for modern
Liberalism to reclaim arguments and policies adopted by its rivals and
thereby to reassert its political independence as an intellectual
force. It was this problem that was the subject of J M Keynes' address
"Am I a Liberal in 1925, in which he held out for a party
'disinterested as between classes' that avoided Socialism and Conservatism.
My suggestion is that Liberalism has become blurred at the edges and
cannot put sufficient distance between itself and its ideological rivals
9
Ibid., Vol II, 180-1.
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Address to a Liberal Summer School, reprinted in J M Keynes, Collected
Works (London: Facmillan, 1972), Vol ix.
on either side. An example of this lack of distance on one border may
be found in the ease with which Dr Rhodes B^yson made the step between
Cobdenite Liberalism of the 'Manchester School' and Thatcherite
Conservatism. Finally, it is also worth noting that the Anarchist
William Godwin started out as a Liberal who believed in a minimum of
government intervention, and moved, not towards Conservatism, but to
the stance of actually abandoning government altogether. Fortunately
for Liberalism, such examples are rare.
But, as the Bullock and Shock collection makes clear, not all Liberals
have been either disciples of Locke or believers in 'laissez-faire*
economics. In the 19th and 20th centuries another strand of Liberal
thought has developed around the idea of positive freedom. It is this
section of Liberal thought that is expressed in Hobhause's book and in
the economic writings of Keynes. Hobhause, for example, though
committed to the preservation of individual liberty and freedom, did
not see them merely in terms of what was left over once the government
had its say. Freedom was not just the area in which the government
did not interfere. Indeed, liberty and freedom were things that the
government could promote through its legislation, in particular by
ensuring equality of opportunity (which, given the entrenched social
hierarchy of capitalism, could only be done through state intervention).
Hobhouse aaw Mill's distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding
actions as a product of 'the old individualism' and suggested that the
real distinction was between coervice and non-coercive actions, the
function of the state being to override individual coercion and to
gnewfiitt &fa«s 'geiKsr&l mjtl' being _ frustrated by raealsitrant individuals.
"The object of compulsion" he wrote "is to secure the most favourable
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conditions for inward growth and happiness so far as these conditions
depend upon combined action and uniform observance".^ A similar
view was held by T H Green
... the mere removal of compulsion, the mere enabling
a man to do as he likes, is in itself no contribution
to true freedom ...
If I have given a true account of that freedom which
forms the goal of social effort, we shall see that
freedom of contract, freedom in all the forms of
doing what one will with one's own, is valuable only
as a means to an end. That end is what I call freedom
in the positive sense: in other words, the liberation
of the powers of all men equally for contributions to a
common good. No one has a right to do what he will
with his own in such a way as to contravene this end ...
Could the enlightened self-interest of individuals,
working under a systeta of unlimited freedom of contract,
have ever brought (the suffering classes) into a state
compatible with the free development of the human
faculties ? No one considering the facts can have any
doubt as to the answer to this question ... Ask yourself
what chance there was of a generation, born and bred
under such conditions, ever contracting itself out of
them.12
As has been noted, interventionist Liberalism is perhaps best
represented in our own century by J M Keynes, who believed that
government spending should be used to 'even out' the fluctuations of
the market and prevent the slump/boom cycles which characterised
'laissers-faire' economic theory, K Keynes, who was definitely not a
Socialist, feared that recurrent depressions would push the masses
who hore the brunt of economic hardship into Socialism and thereby
lead to the destruction of democracy and liberty. It is perhaps
another of the paradoxes of Liberalism that some of Keynes' arguments
Op. cit., 147.
^
T H Green, Liberal legislation or freedom of contract, quoted in
Bullock and Shock, op. cit., 181-3.
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might have been written with Adam Smith in mind.
Let us clear from the ground the metaphysical or
general principles upon which, from time to time,
laissez-faire has been founded. It is not true
that individuals possess a prescriptive 'national
liberty* in their economic activities. ... The
world is not ao governed from above that private
and social interest always coincide. It is not so
managed here below that in practice they coincide.
It is not a correct deduction from the Principles
of Economics that enlightened self-interest always
operates in the public interest. Nor is it true
that self-interest generally is enlightened ...
13
Keynes wanted economic unites to be of a size between the individual
and the State, which would both give individual flair and energy a
chance to blossom whilst preventing the worst excesses of 19th century
capitalism.
If the 'free market' doctrines of Liberalism have been taken over by
Conservatives, those of limited state intervention have been taken
over by Social Democrats. Keynsian policies are at the heart of the
programmes of Western Socialist parties such as those of Germany and
Britain and the idea of positive freedom can be seen in such recent
Labour legislation as the Sex Discrimination Act, the Race Relations
Acts and the notion of 'positive discrimination' in schools. These
ideas, or rather tha philosophical presuppositions behind such ideas
do not start with Keynes; in the writings of Bentham one can see a
doctrine similar to that of Fabian Socialism being developed. The
idea of establishing a minimum standard of living, the mixed economy,
the limited redistribution of wealth and economic gradualism are all
13 .......'The End of Laissez-faire' reprinted in Essays in Persuasion, °P ext.
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to be found in his writings.*^ There is, it should be noted, a
tension in Bentham's writings between the claims of individualism and
of 'welfarism' which is also present in Liberalism as a whole. Such
tensions do not mean that Liberalism is like a theory that contains
a contradiction, it means that the capacity of all Liberals to act in
concert for a particular aim is diminished. Such tensions are the
lifeblood of internal ideological disputes.
But, even accepting the considerable differences involved, there are
still persistent themes that have marked Liberalisms passage through
time. Though Liberals have given very iifferent answers, they have
seen some rivals as fellow members of a common tradition (Hobhouse's
attitude to Mill) rather than as members of a rival family (Hobhoase's
attitude to Msrx). Amongst the most persistent of these themes are
liberty, progress, balance, reason and the importance of the individual.
They are not isolated judgements, but part of a wider whole.
For example, in general, Liberals regard the individual as the basic
building block of society. It can in fact be argued that until the
advent of Liberalism*"* there was no understanding of 'the individual'
as a political phenomenon, in the same way that there were no classes
before Marxism.*" Mediaeval political theorists, for example, seem to
have regarded individuals merely as parts of an organic whole and do
not discuss, at least in the senseuunderstood by Liberals, the -rights
of the individual in relation to those of the state. Cases such as
14
For an account of this see D J Manning, The Mind of Jeremy Bentham
(London: Longmans, 1968), Chapter 17.
15
I do not mean that Liberalism has a starting date in time. I am
referring here to the first theoretical expressions of Liberal ideas.
*^
That is to say, there were no classes before Marx in the same way that
there were no sinners before religion, or for the sake of controversy,
no Oedipus complexes before Freud.
those of Sir Thomas More, and perhaps more clearly that of Thomas a
Beckett, were not about the rights of the individual conscience but
about the rights of God as opposed to those of the state.^
The nature of the individual is, for Liberals, universal. That is
to say, despite the surface accretions of different cultures, or the
effects of a deprived childhood, or inadequate toilet training, the
underlying nature of human beings is the same, be they European, Chinese,
Xhosa, or Azande. Factors such as individual circumstances or social
conditioning cannot, of course, be ignored, but given similar circum¬
stances, people are basically the same. It is this kind of theory
that underpins the Liberal belief that education is the great leveller
of prejudice and superstition and that eventually, Truth will out. In
this respect so cynics would say the human race hbs remained a sad
disappointment to Liberals. A second consequence of the belief that
all races are the same is that given the correct circumstances, democracy
and the Civil Society will emerge in any society. It is the duty of
Liberals, therefore, to ensure that the correct circumstances do arise,
which brings us back to the power of education and certain aspects of
19th century British colonial policy, embodied in Macaulay's "Great
Minute" on Indian Education.
Individuals are, in the Liberal sense, complete outwith society. The
reasons for holding this are not always the same. In Locke, for example,
there is the belief that men come complete in the state of nature artd
Compare Locke's attitude to the sanctity of private property and the
claim of Aquinas that a starving man could take his neighbour's food
and that no crime was done thereby.
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and then construct society in order to maximise their desires. There
i6 also the belief in Locke that they have a 'mind* rather tike an
empty bucket which is filled up by impressions and the like, thus
dtisnsising the particular individual you or I will be. But, since
these impressions are qualitatively the same, bad, or incorrect impressions
can, via education, be replaced by the correct ones. If people are
the same the world over, the Civil Society that Liberals take to be
the most civilised form of government is, in principle, attainable by
everyone - with help from Liberal politicians. A similar view, applied
to economics, can be found in W W Rostow's "5 stages of economic
growth".*®
Given the fact that for Liberals it is the individual who is the
fulcrum of political activity, they are against the expropriation of matters
of individual concern by the state. Socialism must lead to moral and
political degeneration by sapping individual initiative and create
nothing but dull conformity; or so Mill argued in 'On Liberty*.
Paternalism is also misguided, since it deprives people of the
opportunity to develop creative seif-determination and, more importantly,
moral responsibility. Socialism and paternalism are both misguided in
the belief that through state action a concerted attack can be made on
the evils of the world, or even the imperfections of a society. The
struggle against such imperfections is the responsibility of the individual




W W Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
19601.
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Popper's argument, to be fair, derives from his attack on Marxism and
on the analogy drawn by Marxists between Marxism and science. Popper
argues that scientific innovation does not consist of 'overthrowing'
existing/
_l9 3
Liberals are not then, Utopians. Though the Civil Society is the
best form of society, and representative democracy the best form of
government, they are not perfect. Popper argues that the advantage
of democracy is that governments can be removed from office, and this
makes parliamentary democracy merely the least bad form of political
institution. Government is not a natural phenomenon, but a rational
construct which men have brought into being in order to protect the
individual from the licence of unbridled power. The problem of power
is solved by the rule of law, whereby everyone is subject to the
impartial demands of legal restraint in return for protection. By
submitting themselves (a la Locke) to a voluntary association, men are
able to go about their lives without fear of cmercion by the mighty,
abiding by a series of rules that favour no particular section of the
community.
It is important for Liberals that government should be balanced and not
in the hands of any interested party, even if that party is in the
majority. The tyranny of the majority over the individual conscience
is as abhorrent as the tyrrany of the minority. Mill and Macaulay,
though convinced democrats, were careful to stress the dangers of mob
rule, and in particular the possibility of the descent into totalitarianism.
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theories, but in making piecemeal extensions fto refutations of them.
Thus if Marxists do want a political programme based upon science,
they will settle for piecemeal change. It is worth noting here
that both Liberals such as Popper and Conservatives such as Oakeshott
both reject the wholesale removal of the imperfections of society by
the state, through a programme. However, the combination of
fallibilism and rationalism in Popper's positive programme is very
different from the Oakeshottian conception of politics in general:
for piecemeal social engineering still comes from the same roots as
massive state planning. See his comments on Hayek in the next
chapter.
For both Mill and Macaulay, government should be in the hands of the
most progressive class of the time. Thus Macaulay wanted to extend
the vote to more property owners, but not to everyone, and Mill regarded
the middle classes as the most dynamic section of the community, the
aristocracy having petrified into reactionaries and the workers not
being ready to handle the reigns of power responsibly. But even a
progressive government should not have too much power concentrated in
its hands, and this is why Liberals believe in the separation of the
executive, judicial and legislative functions of government; it is the
best way of maintaining a balance that cannot lead to either anarchy
or totalitarianism.
If Liberals are, in the sense indicated above, pessimists about human
nature, they are optimists in their belief in the power of human reason.
It is important to note that Man, for Liberals, is a Rational Being,
or at least has that potential. We have already noted that Liberals
see the Civil Society as something that all nations and races can
achieve and furthermore that there has been progress from what Popper
terms 'closed' or tribal societies, to 'open' democratic, scientific
ones. The weapon with which other forms of social order are defeated
is not force, or the mysterious workings of the dialectic, but Reason.
Reason is seen in contrast to habit or the authority of a tradition.
Bantham for example, regarded custom as the root of political evil; for
established relationships are based upon nothing more than sentiment,
prejudice, contingency and ancient usurpation. He wrote "when will
the yoke of custom - custom, the blind tyrant of which otherttyrants
make their slave - ah! when will that misery-perpetuating yoke be
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shaken off ? - When will Reason be seated on her Throne ?" In
20
J Bentham, Plan of Parliamentary Reform (London: Hunter,
1817), cxcviii.
Benthain's case, he actually went as far as suggesting that all traditional
and habitual behaviour (and institutions so based) be done away with and
replaced by a rational sotiety based upon the stern but just principle
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of utility. Benthatn felt that without (in his sense) a rational
foundation, human relationships must be incoherent and he sought to
bring that coherence through a rational legal system, based upon a
rational moral code. Not all Liberals have gone to Bentham's almost
nihilistic lengths to reform society, but there has still been an
emphasis on directing the human will down the path of reason, as
opposed to accepting recevied opinion. Kant's argument for moral
autonomy is of this form. Ha suggests that X cannot be a moral
authority for me, since I only ought to do what X says if that which
he commands is right. But if I am in a position to say whether X's
command is right then I do not need his instruction. In short, to
recognise anyone as an authority is to recognise the authority of our
own reason. (This ties up once more with the notion of the individual.)
Liberals believe something like this to be true and count the tyranny
of tradition and of dogma as the principal enemies of reason.
For Bentham and to a lesser extent Mill, reason appears as little more
than the exercise of a technique. Moreover, as we acquire knowledge
through the exercise of reason we become wiser, Bentham held that
each generation is wiser than the last, and a similar claim is made in
relation to historians by Macaulay. Wisdom appears to be the
application of knowledge, guided by the appropriate techniques. In
Though, of course, he admitted that he could not give this a
rational foundation.
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this sense, history for example, has a purely practical role for Bentham,
it is what we learn politics from. The fact that it did not contain
enough practical information was one of the reasons for Bentham's
22
comparitive dislike of history. Reason in this sense is connected to
the logic of choice. It decides, on the basis of experience, the
policies best suited to obtaining desired ends without conflicting with
other ends. (In the case of Bentham and Mill desires are those things
which produce pleasure or happiness.)
Bentham has at least two problems in this equation. Firstly, he must show
that pleasures and pains are qualitatively the same and can be 'set off'
against each other in equivalent units. Secondly, there is a tension
between the two principles he rests the notion of happiness on. For
the individual this principle must be one of hedonism, ie what gives me
more pleasure than pain, but this cannot be squared with the principle
of utility, where I should strive for the greatest happiness of the
greatest number, irrespective of my own feelings. Since my own feelings
are the only ones I can (logically) know about, it is difficult to see
on what information I could possibly base such a calculation.
Two things are worth noting here. Firstly, there is a strong 'rationalist'
(in Oakeshott's sense) element in Liberal thought. The technique, based
upon reason, for solving political problems can be a substitute for
political experience and can guide the novice through the maze of political
contingency. Secondly, as has been stated, wisdom is simply the increase
of 'hard' knowledge, and the growth of knowledge leads invariably to the
abandonment of prejudice and superstition.
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Now Bentham's account of reason and technique and his conception of
knowledge are seriously misconceived. The desire, in the face of laws
or institutions that seetn arbitrary or corrupt, to replace them by
better laws should not deceive us into thinking that some laws are
unreasonable (in the sense of irrational) and others not, for rules
cannot be rational or irrational, they determine whether or not actions
are legal or not. Like Voltaire, Bentham seems to have thought that the
only way to have decent laws was to scrap all existing ones and start
again. But what is rational or irrational does not replace a tradition,
it is only intelligible within a tradition. If all laws were rewritten
they would not be more (or less) rational than the present legal code,
and any additions to these new laws would spring from the context of
those laws and problems associated with them, that is a tradition of legal
thought and not 'reason' pure and simple. That 'reason' cannot roam
in an unrestrained fashion over all questions is true even in science.
The scientist who isolates a new phenomenon or, like Newton or Einstein,
substantially recasts the mould of scientific enquiry, does not make his
discoveries in vacuo but builds on, and out of, related discoveries and
theories. The worth of these discoveries is not an extra quality
attached to the phenomenon disclosed, but is only intelligible when
considered in the light of existing theories that are confirmed or require
modification on that basis. In short, 'reason' is context bound. This
means that certain things constitute the framework of reason in a
particular context and cannot be challenged withen that context - there
are no foundations in Bentham's sense for all enquiry to rest upon if it
is to be rational. And, what is reaaonable differs from context to
context. Reasonable belief in an experiment and reasonable belief in a
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friend's sincerity may not be amenable to the same kind of enquiry.
Secondly, it is surely mistaken to equate one kind of knowledge with
knowledge tout court. This is a point made powerfully by Michael
23
Oakeshott in his essay 'Rationalism in Polities'. It may be true that
some knowledge can be reduced to a matter of technique and written down
in books to guide or inform the apprentice or learner in a particular art
or craft. But there is more than this to many activities, including
politics. The sort of judgement that allows the experienced chess
player to faok at the board and say "I like the feel of white's position"
or the judgement with which the experienced politican decides whether he
can sack X without splitting the party cannot be learnt like the multi¬
plication tables. Such knowledge, 'practical knowledge' as opposed to
'technical knowledge' in Oakeshott's terminology, is no less real than
the latter. Furthermore, the ability to expound in writing the
technical aspects of, say, golf, does not mean that one is a successful
practitioner of the game. The best coaches are rerely the most
successful tournament players. Technique may be important, but it comes
to very little if it is not blended with experience, if only for the
reason that without experience we would never be in the position to
recognise a situation in which technique X was required. Tossay 'Always
drive an overpitched delivery" depends on the (non-technical) ability to
recognise a full tos6. In a similar way, Machiavelli's injunction to be
ruthless to riots and civil disturbances depends on the rulers ability
to judge between a riot and mere high spirits. And it is worth remarking
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that the greatest practitioners of a sport or politics are those who can
recognise the occasions when such maxims should be broken.
Thirdly, the accumulation of facts may leave us none the wiser, as opposed
to being in possession of more information. It is by no means clear
24
that Bentham was wiser than Socrate*. As Rush Rhees points out a
modern science undergraduate probably knows more physics than Newton ever
did, but that neigher makes him a wiser or better scientist than Newton
was. Even if we were to waive the earlier difficulties involved in
talking about the 'growth of knowledge' (as if knowledge were a single mass
that was constantly having new bits added to it) there can be no move
from technological progress to pregress in the sense understood by
Liberals - that is to say a more civilised society. There is no reason
to believe that increased technical mastery of the environment must (as
opposed to could) lead to a more, civilised and humane society.- ask a
Jew in Nazi Germany or a modern day Palestinian. As Chesterton's Father
Brown once remarked, the trouble with infallible machines is that they
are operated by the most fallible of creatures - man.
So far I have made some schematic remarks about Liberalism in general,
drawing our attention to some of its more important and characteristic
ideas. These ideas, though presented in opposition to other ideologies
such as Marxism are not so very different in form, despite differences in
content. For example, there is a strong element of rationalism in both
Marxist and Liberal thought. Marx and Engels both believed in the power
of 'reason' to swwep away the dross of bygone ages. It is probably an
24
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ideological distortion that Marx makes in his Xlth thesis on Fueurbach
for Bentham was as concerned as any to change society and make it conform
to his copious plans for transformation and improvement. It is also true
that Popper's 'Social Engineering' may be seen as the other side of the
coin to the technological conception of politics that he criticises in
Marx. And, seen from one point of view, Popper's belief in 'Progress*
and the movement from the 'closed' to the 'open' society is as historicist
as the Marxist view it attacks.
II
In the rest of this chapter I want to turn to look at two particular
contributors to the Liberal tradition who were both historians. In
their works we shall see (I hope) tome of the characteristic themes of
Liberalism that have been noted above. The two men are Thomas Babbington
Macaulay and Lord Actfbn. It should be stressed that these men are not
being presented as archetypes of Liberalism, but as examples of it.
As such, it is an irrelevant objection to say that they are both from
the 19th century and cannot, therefore, be typical of modern Liberalism.
Even if there were typical Liberals who wrote history today, this would not
lessen the importance of Acton and Macaulay as examples. In the
chapter on Marxism a distinction was elaborated between Marxist historians
and Marxist history. To follow this theme through, I should claim
that Acton and Macaulay both believed in Liberal history. An example of
a Liberal historian (that is an historian who happens to be a Liberal
in politics) would be Alan Bullock, and I will be drawing attention to
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some of the points made in his own major work 'Hitler: a study in tyranny'
where appropriate.
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Both Macaulay and Acton were actively involved in politics of one
type or another. In Macaulay's case he sat as an MP till he lost his
Edinburgh seat in the election of 1847 and retired from public life to
write his 'History of England'. A fairly typical example of his
political beliefs can be found in a speech made in Edinburgh during
the election campaign of 1839.
I entered public life a Whig; and a Whig I am
determined to remain ... I mean by a Whig, not
one who subscribes implicitly to the contents of
any book, though that book may have been written by
Locke; not one who approves the whole conduct of
any statesman, though that statesman may have been
Fox; not one who adopts the opinions in fashion
in any circle, though that circle may be composed
of the finest and noblest spirits of the age. I
can discern ... a party ... that has the glory of
having established our civil and religious liberties
on a firm foundation
•••27
After listing the various struggles of the Whigs against the monarchy to
ensure eivil liberties for all, he concludes
To the Whigs of the 17th century, we owe it that we
have a House of Commons. To the Whigs of the 19th
century we o«w it that the House of Commons has been
purified. The abolition of the slave trade, the
abolition of Colonial slavery, the extension of
popular education, the mitigation of the rigour of
the penal code, all, all were affected by that party;
and of that party, I repeat, I am a member ...0q
Whigs have, so Macaulay argues, fought for progress against reaction,
and have brought forth civilisation out of barbarism. Equally
importantly, Whigs are characterised by their belief in Reason as against
authority, and progress has been established because it is reasonable,
rather than inevitable. Macaulay's parliamentary speeches are further
examples of an important strain in 19th century Liberalism. He did
have his differences of opinion with other Liberals, for example Bentham
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and James Mill. Even when Macaulay spoke of the end of government as
being the happiness of the people, it is doubtful that he meant it in
any utilitarian sense. Like J.S. Mill, Macaulay was a believer in the
concept of a balanced government and in the dynamism of the middle classes.
For example, one of his speeches in favour of the 1832 Reform Act contains
the argument that in order to continue the progress of British society,
the property ow&ing middle classes must be enfranchised. Moreover,
frustrating the Bill would have the effect of alienating a section of
society and driving them into the hands of those who wished to ferment
anarchy and revolution. The thought of revolutionary upheaval was
repellent to Macaulay, and as we shall see later on, one of the points
that he stresses in his historical writings is the smooth and imperceptible
way that the British have undergone constitutional change. But if
brute reaction would lead to revolution, so too would the indiscriminate
widening of the franchise to the labouring classes. Like J.S. Mill,
Macaulay feared theunhtiwtored masses.
If the labourers of England were in that state
which I, from my soul, wish to see them ... the
principal objections to universal sufferagew
would be removed.
3^)
For, as Macaulay points out, the existence of universal sufferage in
the United States has not lead to revolution. The flifference with
England is that the labouring classes here were often in such a state
of acute distress that they were any easy prey for demagogues.
We know that it (distress) makes even wise men
irritable, unreasonable, credulous, eager for
immediate reltif, heedless of remote consequences ...
It is therefore no reflection on the poorer classes
of Englishmen, who are not, and who cannot in the
nature of things be, highly educated, to say that
2<)
3$
Speech of 2 March 1831 reprinted in Macaulay: Prose and Poetry, ed
G.M. Young, (London: Rupert-Hart Davies, 1952) , pp664-665
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distress ... blinds their judgement, inflames their
passion, that it makes them prone to believe those
who flatter them, find to distrust those who would
servi them.^
Enfranchising the mass of the voters before they were educated enough
to be responsible voters would lead to both conformity, based upon the
will of the majority and intolerance of minority views. As we have
already noted, tolerance is an important aspect of the Liberal society
and it is notaacident that Macaulay's historical writings are full of
the contrast between the toleration (particularly of religious dissent)
shown in England and the oppression of minorities on the continent.
An example of how far Macaulay was prepared bo go in the name of
tolerance is over his support for the bill to give money towards the
upkeep of a Roman Catholic seminary - Maynooth College - in Ireland.
Even though Macaulay argued that the Roman Catholic Church was itself
one of the greatest threats to tolerance and liberty, he was sufficient
of a pluralist to argue that, providing they were within the law of the
land, and providing that they accepted the civil authority of the state,
there was no harm in religious disagreement. To those who suggested
that Chtholicism was an error, cind that money should not Ije given to
the propagation of errors, he responded that if that were so then the
Church of England would need to be suppressed, since it contained
tendencies that were exclusive of each other. Thus, at least part of
the Established Church must be in error, even if we do not know which
part. Macaulay lies firmly within the tradition of Locke and Voltaire
on this point. It is, however, curious to note that this toleration
did not extend to all (just as Milton's tolerance did not extend to
Roman Catholics). The Hindus in India had practices (notably those
of Suttee and Thugee) that Macaulay did not approve of and would not
31Ibid, p665
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tolerate. The reason for this was their social effect rather than
their theological basis, and because they infringed the rights of others.
This view has echos in the modern dictum "I will tolerate anything
except intolerance". We may assume that had the Roman Catholic
Church been as powerful in England as Hinduism in India, then Macaulay
might have been a good deal lessstolerant.
The Maynooth case is interesting because one of Macaulay's arguments is
based upon a form of relativism - we cannot be certain of the truth in
some situations and must, therefore, allow diversity. This view is
in contrast to his opinions elsewhere,* for example, he was quite
certain that it was both possible and desirable to judge between the
relative degree of civilization in two or more societies. This is
clearly shown in his 'Great Minute' on Iniiian education of February 1835.
As President of the Committee of Public Instruction, Macaulay was
confronted by two factions, the Orientalists - who wished to preserve
Sanskrit and the ancient learning of India - and the Europeans - who
wished to bring Western education to India. Macaulay favoured the
latter group, for the overwhelming superiority of Western culture in
science and hittory over that of the Orient was plainly manifest.
I have never found one among them (the Orientalists)
who could deny that a singleshelf of a good European
library was worth the whole native literature of Asia
and India.
It is, I believe, no exaggeration to say, that all the
historical information which has been collected from
all the books written in the Sanskrit language is less
valuable than what may be found in the most paltry
abridgements used at preparatory schools in England.^
On the other band
It (English) stands pre-eminent even among the




imagination not inferior to the noblest which Greece
has bequeathed to us; with models of every species
of eloquence; with historical compositions, which,
considered merely as natratives have seldom been
surpassed, and which, considered as vehicles of
ethical and political instruction, have hever been
equalled; with,just and lively representations of
human life and human nature; with the most
profound speculations on metaphysics, morals, government,
jurisprudence, and trade; with full and correct
information respecting every experimental science which
tends to preserve health, to increase the comfort, or
to expand the intellect of man. Whoever knows that
language has ready access to all the vast intellectual
wealth, which the wisest nations of the earth have
created and hoarded in the course of ninety generations.^
Macaulay plainly thought, as Sir James Frazer was to do, that all reason
is to be found in a single mode of thought - Western thought - and
that all other cultures must be judged by that standard. It never
occurred to hAm that the Hindu belief that the world is held up by a
man on the back of an elephant and so on need not be a rival theory
to that of Newton. For Macaulay the matter was simply one of instruction,
so that Indians can become as proficient as Europeans at science and
history. The problem was one of numbers and resources, hence his
famous idea that the British should "form a class who may be interpreters
between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons Indian
in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in
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intellect." In fact the British chose to ceeate this intermediate
class or caste by intermarriage rather than by education; they became
the Anglo-Indians a class who were, in fact, rejected by both communities.
Bearing in mind some of the general points that have emerged from
Macaulay's political speeches and his activities in government let us hixsw




outset of his 'History of England', Macaulay tells us that his task
is to relate how under the settlement of 1688
the authority of law and the security of property
were found to be compatible with a liberty of
discussion and of individual action never before
known; how, from the auspicious union of order and
freedom, sprang a prosperity of which the annals
of human affairs had furnished no example; how our
country rose from a state of ignominious vassalage,
rapidly rose to the place of umpire among European
powers; how her opulence and her martill glory grew
together; how, by wise,sresolute good $aith, was
gradually established a public credit fruitful of
marvels to which the statesmen of any former age would
have seemed incredible
•••35
Yet, unless I greatly deceive myself, the general effect
of this chequered narrative will be to excite thank¬
fulness in all religious minds, and hope in the breasts
of all patriots. For the history of our country during
the last hundred and sixty years is eminently the
history of physical, of moral, and of intellectual
improvement. Those who compare the age in which their
lot has fallen with a golden age that exists only in
their imagination may talk of degeneracy and decay;
but no man who is correctly informed as to the past will
be disposed to take a morose or despondtotf view of the
present.
This progress is, as we have already noted, due largely to the efforts
of the Whighparty (and those who anticipated WMg policies) against the
machinations of the Tories and the Roman Catholic Church.
Macaulay's main thrust in his 'History' is twofold. Firstly, he extols
the virtues of gradual development, as opposed to "demolition and
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reconstruction" . This is related to his argument that the constitution
under which his generation live, is the same constitution as that which
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existed 500 years ago "as the tree is to the sapling". ' Curiously,
Macaulay holds this link to be something of a drawback; for it means that
35







precedents for party political points can be sought in the past and that
gives the study of history a partisan, not to say party, flavour. Thus
the statesmen are under the spell of the past and hhe historians under
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the spell of the present. Macaulay clearly disapproves of such
partisanship, for it has prevented both sides seeing anything other
than what they want to see. Yet, on the other hand, he is quite certain
that the past is related to the present in the sense that our present
liberties have their seeds in the ages gone by. Our liberties emerge,
rather like trees in a §6g, from the mists of time.
Sterile and obscure as is that p®±tion of our
annals, it is there that we must seek for the origin
of our freedom, our prosperity, and our glory ...
Then first appeared with distinctiveness that
constitution that has ever since, through all
changes, preserved its identify; that constitution
of which all other free constitutions in the world
are copies, and which, in spite of some defects,
deserves to be regarded as the best under which any
great society has ever yet existed during many
ages.40
The strength of the constitution is, for Macaulay, shown in the way in
which the revolution of 1688 can be grounded in the ancient rights of
the feudal age. This revolution was both the least violent and most
beneficial of revolutions
To us who live in the year 1848, it may seem almost
an abuse of terms to call such a proceeding, conducted
with so much deliberation, with so much sobriety,
and with such minute attention to prescriptive
etiquette, by the terrible name of revolution.^
It was, furthermore, the last English revolution. This point is of
some importance, for Macaulay was writing in 1848, a time at which many





His appeal to the English is clearly one of avoiding a destructive
revolution by holding to the principles of a preserving revolution -
that of 1688.
The second thrust of Macaulay's work is the belief that history shows
that states run by democracies have been more 'brilliantly prosperous'
than those that have been governed by autocratic monarchs or churches.
He shared with J.S. Mill (as in 'Considerations on Representative
Government') the view that democracy has civilised man. For example,
Macaulay compares life under the despotism of the Roman Catholic Church
in Europe with that of England under a Protestant Parliament.
But during the last three centuries, to stund the
growth of the human mind has been (the Roman Catholic
Church's) chief object. Throughout Christendom, whatever
advance has been made in knowledge, in freedom, in
wealth, and in the arts of life, has been made in spite
of her, and has everywhere been in inverse proportion to
her power. The lowliest and most fertile provinces of
Europe have, under her rule, been sunk in poverty, in
political servitude, and in intellectual torpor, while
Protestant countries, once proverbial for sterility and
barbarism, have been turned by skill and by industry
into gardens ... The descent of Spain, once the first
among monarchies, to the lowest depths of degradation,
the elevation of Holland, in spite of many natural
disadvantages, to a position such as no commonwealth
so small has ever reached, teach the same lesson.
Whoever passes ... from a Roman Catholic to a Protestant
country, finds he has passed from a lower to a higher
grade of civilisation.^
And it would be possible to quote chapter and verse from 'A History of
England' where Macaulay makes precisely this kind of point about
Protestantism. Even though this general improvement has had some
drawbacks, such as an increase in poverty amongst the poorest and
agricultural classes (cf the debate about the Industrial Revolution
in the previous chapter), its positive side is, for Macaulay,
unassailable. There are fewer deaths, less disease, less brutality
42Ibid, p48
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and above all, more liberty and freedom. The path is, in general,
always an upward one for Macaulay, always forward to progress.
Witness the scorn he pours upon the idea of a golden age, and the idea
of returning to it.
In truth we are under a deception similar to that
which misleads the traveller in the Arabian desert.
Beneath the caravan all is dry and bare: but far in
advance, add far in the rear, is the semblance of
refreshing v/aters. The pilgrims hasten forward
and find nothing but sand ... They earn their eyes
and see a lake where an hour before, they were toiling
through sand. A similar illusion haunts nations
through the Ionggppogre s s from poverty and barbarism
to thA highest degree of opulence and civilisation.
But if we resolutely chase the mirage backward, we
shall find it recede before us into fabulous antiquity.^
As we shall see in our discussion of Macaulay later on, one of the
ironies of the situation is that he is guilty of a similar fault
himself. But before looking more critically at Mecaulay's conception
of the past, let us turn to Lord Acton.
Having noted the vehemence with which Macaulay condemned the Catholic
Church as an enemy of progress it is, perhaps surprising to find that
Acton was both a Liberal and a Roman Catholic. Macaulay conceded
that in some circumstances the authority of the Catholic Church had
been preferable to the anarchy and pure despotism that had preceded
it. Even sol the Church was an inimicable enemy of progress. Acton
on the other hand, believed that the Roman Church had played an important
part in the growth of liberty, rather than in suppressing it. In
'Political Thoughts on the Church' he wrote
The Christian notion of conscience imeratively demands
a corresponding measure of personal liberty ... The
Church cannot tolerate any species of government in
which this is not recognised. She is the irreconcilable
43Ibld, P426-427
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enemy of the despotism of the state ... The Church has
succeeded in producing the kind of liberty she exacts for
her children only in those states that she herself has
created or transformed. Real freedom has been known
in no state in history that did not pass through her
mediaeval action. The history of the Middle Ages is
the history of the gradual emancipation of men from
every species of servitude, in proportion as the
influence of reliaion became more universal...
44
Acton was, of course, careful not to equate the power of the Church that
brought liberty out of pagan despotism with any Catholic State. Indeed,
he was quite prepared to accept that a Catholic State might not have
what he termed a Catholic government, or that a Protestant State mdfdfht
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have such a government. For Acton, any kidd of despotism, be it
that of Louis XIV or of Pope Pius IX, was anathema. The most Catholic
of States could have the most un-Catholic of governments. Indeed, the
whole story of Acton's oppositdmn to Ultramontanism and his opposition
to the view of the Papacy enshrined in the Syllabus of Errors, the first
Vatican Council and the definition of Papal Infallibility shows both that
he held liberty to be the highest of virtues and that he was not afraid
46
to denounce his co-rilgijionists for failing to uphold it.
Liberty, so Acton held, was "not a means to a higher political end. It
47
is the highest political end." This view distinguishes him from other
Liberals such as J.S. Mill who held that liberty was but an end to
happiness. And what did this liberty consist of for Act&n ?
By liberty I mean the assurance that every man shall
be protected in doing what he believes his duty against
the influence of authority and majorities, custom and
opinion.^
It needs, therefore, to be protected against both the interference of
the state and arbitrary power. The rule of law over monarchs and Popes
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Ibid, p3 See also Lectures on Modern History (London: Macmillan, 1906),
alike secures this balance of liberty, for as his famous aphorism on
power shows, Acton was not always an optimist about unfettered human
nature.
The dither important aspect of Acton's view on liberty was its link with
the idea of progress, the Zeitgeist of the nineteenth century. "My
theory", he once noted, "is that Divine government is not justified
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without progress. There is no raison d'etre for the world". The
activity of a provident God meant, for Acton, that there was progress.
Looking at the past, Acton concluded that its mcveeent was towards
liberty, and liberty meant "that condition in which men are not prevented
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by men from obeying their duty to God." In a letter to Dollinger he
wrote:
there is a grand unity in the history of ideas - of
conscience, of morality, and of the means of securing
it. I venture to say that the secret of the philosophy
of history lies there:- it is the only point of view
from which one discovers a constant progress, the only
one therefore that justifies the ways of God to man.^
As we shall see shortly, Acton believed that history confirmed this
view.
If progress and the law of history brought man closer to "the Kingdom
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of God that is Liberty" then attempts to ensure equality were attempts
to set back that great design. Like J.S. Mill and Macaulay, Acton
feared the extension of democracy to the masses and wanted to avoid
the fctyranny of the majority' by a form of proportional representation
that would ensure that no section of society could gain an absolute
majority. As he put it in a passage examining the failure (for Acton)
of the French Revolution, "the passion for equality made vain the hope
49
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Acton to Dollinger, 22 September 1882
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Like Macaulay, Acton saw history as being much more than an account of
how men had acted in the past. History can be said to achieve three
things: it is the true demonstration of religion? it shows the progress
of liberty from antiquity to the present, such that men in the present
cam see that they have more of it than those in the past; it is of
practical relevance in political matters. In general terms Acton
makes the point in his inaugural lecture at Cambridge. He quotes with
approval the remark of his predecessor, Sir John Seeley, "Politics are
vulgar when they are not liberalised by history, and history fades into
mere literature when it loses sight of its relation to practical politics",
before continuing
Everybody perceives the sense in which this is true.
For the science of politics is the one science that
is deposited by the stream of history, like grains
of gold in the sands of a river; and the knowledge
of the past, the record of truth revealed by experience,
is eminently practical, as an instrument of action and
a power that goes into making the future.^
It is not surprising then, to find Acton arguing that "The great
question is to discover, not what governments prescribe, but what they
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ought to prescribe."
Two works that might usefully be considered here are "A History of
Freedom1 and hhe 'Lectures on the French Revolution'. The latter work,
perhaps not surprisingly given the proximity of the events to Acton's
own time, treats the revolution as a contemporary event. The whole
way of speaking, even about contemporary events, strikes us today
as foreign or at least the kind of writing that ought to be confined
to works of polemics. It is an odd mixture of nafcrative, of analysis
Lectures on Modern History, p57
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and of stern judgement in which the ideal of liberty is never far
away, and certainly always in mind when events are being assessed for
their importance or their worth. Thus,
This was the miserable end of the Girondin party.
They were easily beaten and mercilessly destroyed,
and no man stirred to save them. At their fall liberty
perished; but it had become a feeble remnant in their
hands, and a spark almost extinguished. Although they
were not only weak but bad, no nation has ever
suffered a greater misfortune than that which befell
France in their defeat and destruction.
And again concerning Robespierre
Only this is certain, that he remains the most hateful
character in the forefront of history since Machiavelli
reduced to a code the wickedness of public men.__57
What strikes one as odd here is precisely the need to offer this kind
of judgement, as if the mere telling of the story did not make things
clear in itself. An interesting comparison is with Bullock's study
of Hitler, where, though the events are scarcely less contemporary
(it was written in 1952) the evil of Hitler's Germany comes through
the story and not as an additional layer to it. In fact Bullock
explicitly refuses to see his work as having 'anaaxe to grind' or to
be either for or against Hitler: the nearest thing we get to an
Actonian judgement in 800 gages is a brief remark on the Communist and
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Nazi parties as organised conspiracies.
The hMstory of Freedom' is interesting in that the title implies a
certain unity that might, perhaps, be disputed. Freedom is something
that can be judged by one set of standards and we can assess how it
has grown or diminished in past societies, much in the same way that





thesis in 'History of Freedom' is that we have more <fcf it than previous
societies. True freedom consists in obeying God and the societies
of classical antiquity were lacking proper freedom in three respects.
Firstly they lacked a representative government, secondly they denied
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emancipation to slaves and thttdly they denied freedom of conscience.
It is important to note that Acton believes that the societies of
antiquity knew as well as the 19th century Liberal what the rights of man
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were, they merely failed to put them into effect. As he put it,
"Although the doctrine of self-reliance and self-denial, which is the
foundation of political economy, was weitten as legibly in the New
Testament as in the Wealth of Nations, it was not recognised until our
„61age."
Under Christianity progress towards freedom achieved heights that were
impossible for the states of antiquity. Again, Acton is always looking
for authors who 'anticipated' modern trends such as Marsilius of Padua,
who "had so firm a grasp of the principles that were to sway the modern
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world". The middle ages had moved towards attaining the knowledge of
political truth in that representative government was almost universal,
slavery had been virtually abolished and the principle of Habeus Corpus
6 3
had been established. ' According to Acton the great questions of
principle had been solved, what remained was the working out of these
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principles in practice. And so on.
It is clear from the above that Acton holds to standard of judgement
(Roughly co-incidental with the 'higher law' of God) by which each and
every society should be judged. To accept relativism in history can only










Given Macaulay's views on liberty and Catholicism it is interesting to
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their own time is to adopt no proper standard at all. Acton
recognised that this was a minority view.
But the weight of opinion is against me when I
exhort you never to debase the moral currency ...,
but to try others by the final maxim that governs
your own lives, and to suffer no man and no cause
to escape the undying penalty that history has the
power to inflict on wrong ... The men who plot to
baffle and resist us ... set up the principle that
only a foolish conservative judges the present time
with the ideas of the past; that only a foolish
liberal judges the past with the ideas of the present.
... There is a pojbular sjtying of Madame de Stael,
that we forgive whaterer we really understand.
The paradox has been judiciously pruned by her
descendent the Due de Broglie, in the words "Beware
too much explaining, lest we end by too much excusing"
... Opinions alter, manners change, creeds rise and
fall, but the moral law is written on the tablets of
eternity ... if we lower our standard in History, we
cannot uphold it in Church or in State.
It should be noted here that Acton is not necessarily arguing that the
present has the correct standards, merely that the same standards should
apply to both past and present.
The view of history offered by Macaulay and Acton has many points of
interest, despite the fact that tt seems, perhaps, to us a rather odd
enterprise - the product of a different cast of mind. The desire to
establish so forcefully those moral standards and judgements on which
the past can be judged is, at least, less stylistically flamboyant in
the works of contemporary historians. In this sense their approach to
hskfetoory (or rather the past) is thoroughly ideological, drawing on the
rhetorical tradition of Burke and Paine. In a way they can be compared
to E.P. Thompson, wheee a similar use of the past as a repository of
moral examples is made. This is a point that has been touched upon
earlier - in short it is an example of the vsfewv that we recall the past
64/
but endemic in Protestantism.
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as history, rather than as a species of practical wisdom. But as has
already been argued, the view that history can be of any practical use
depends upon the assumption that people in the past have recorded the
future. The historical use of the past can make no such assumption,
it can neither tell us how things will be, nor ought to be. Neither
can it tell us how to achieve our objectives, since it is precisely
those differences between 1789 and 1917 that make a study of the French
Revolution such a poor guide to overthrowing Tzarist Russia. Only
ignorance protects those who search the past to solve the problems of
the present.
Again, as we have seerv it is only our non-historical and non-technical
judgement that allows us to relate, say, the stoorming of the Winter
Palace with any plans we might have for an attack on Stormont. But by
lifting such a plan out of history and into practice we change its
character (bringing it into a different logical area). The attempt of
the French to fight the war of 1914-1B in 1939-40 is a good example of
the real use of 'history' as a guide.
Leaving this general point aside, what can be said of Action and Macaulay
here ? On one level a whole range of criticisms might be made about
the actual accuracy and reliability of their views. That would, of course,
be the province of the historian, and not of this thesis. Related to
this, however, is the question of - I suppose - emphasis. By that I
mean the way in which facts are selected and presented. In Macaulay's
case this is certainly an important rhetorical device in building up our
sympathy towards William III and our dislike of James II. One topic that
illustrates what I have in mind here is Macaulay's description of their
respective mistresses, Elizabeth Villiers and Catherine Sedley. Of
Sedley and James we find Macaulay writing:
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A dramatist would scarcely venture to bring onto the
stage a grave prince, in the decline of life, ready
to sacrifice his crown in order to serve the ends of his
religion, indefatigable in making proselytes, and yet
deserting and insulting a virtuous wife who had youth
and beauty for the sake of a profligate paramour who
had neither.rf:66
And the preceding pages give little hint of sympathy for the weak king
and his ugly, scheming mistress. But of Villiers and William we find
He was, indeed, drawn away from his wife by other women,
in particular one of her ladies (EV) who, though destitute
of personal attractions, and disfigured by a hideous
squint, possessed talents that well fitted her to
partake his cares. He was indeed ashamed of his errors,
and spared no pains to conceal them
The general impression of the pages which deal with this episode is one
of Queen Mary's virtures bringing back the basically good king to his
senses. Major defects in the character of James become minor pecadillos
when applied to William. Much more might be said about this, though
there would be relatively little to gain, since this is a criticism of
68
Macaulay that is widely accepted. (See for example, Butterfield.)
A more interesting area of discussion is to look at the various claims
that it is indeed the wivil society that has given us progress, and that
the study of the past demonstrates this. One aspect of this is raised
by Acton; for he had to admit that even within a Civil Soiiety there
were examples of injustice and oppression, resulting in consequent misery.
This did not, of course, stop him talking about 'liberty* emerging or
the influences that brought 'arbitrary' government tinder dontrol. It
did, however, enable him to sidestep an uncomfortable consqquence of his
position, namely that liberty cannot be guaranteed by constitutional change
rr
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H. Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (London; G. Bell
& Sons, 1931)
since it can always be abused by those in power. To this extent his
exemplifies an arcrument that is quite common within Liberal thought.
It is the movement from the valid conclusion that arbitrary government
is the enemy of good government, to the invalid one that arbitrary
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government is a form of government itself. In particular, it is a
form associated with monarchies. But neither Acton, nor Macaulay brings
forward an argument to show that their understanding of liberty is the
only logically coherent one. They simply assume that their readers
will believe in the same things that they do. But as long as people
who have the same rights under the law are treated in the same way, it
is difficult to see the sense in which a government can be arbitrary, as
opposed to being morally repugnant. As David Manning points out, the
difference between feudal and Civil Society is not that one is more free
or;$iSBtt than the other, but that in a Feudal society the different social
strata had different rights and in a Civil Society they have the same
rights. Whatever our preferences might be, there is nothing incoherent
or arbitrary about the Feudal use of the term rights, and the Liberal
account, as ensh±±ned in the Civil Society is not an exhaustive account
either.
It is this adoppion of a single standard of liberty that enables Acton
and Macaulay to tllk hbout liberties emerging in 12th centnny or being
rooted in Magna Carta. But it is here that Macaulay in particular is
the victim of a mirage himself. For once we go back and place Magna
Carta within its context as a feudal document in a feudal society, it
soom becomes apparent that it is not the precursor of the Victorian
House of Commons in any sense other than that it is historicially prior
to it. Macaulay seems to be a victim of the fallacy that if there
^Manning, Liberalism, ppl25-129
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are similarities between two eras, there must be connections, or if there
are connections there must be similarities. It may be true that
certain legal relationships which were defined in the l£hh or 16th
centuries are still valid today, but it does not follow from this that
'liberty* can be traced to them. Indeed, if liberty is only the
particular set of freedoms that pertain in a particular set up, then the
sense in which we can talk about liberty outside of any particular
context is limited. To repeat, different societies with legal structures
have different liberties, and Liberals do not have a monopoly of the
correct use of this term.
But can we not argue with Acton that we have progressed to being a more
open and critical society ? The arguments about progress offered by
Acton and Macaulay suffer from at least two serious defects. Firstly,
they run together the very different notions of technical and moral
progress. Macaulay lists the advances in science that have reduced
deaths from disease alongside 'advances' in the criminal code. But
in the latter case we can only mahe such a judgement by begging the
question and giving a privileged metaphysical status to the moral
opinions of Macaulay and those who agree with him. But it is surely
clear that technical and moral progress are not the same thing, and that
advances in the former need to lead to advances in the latter. The
problem is that the settled criteria which exist for deciding changes
intthe mortality rate are themselves the matter of dispute in moral
matters. Thus the Conservative can quite legitimately argue that the
technological advance in contraception has led to a moral decline and
the radical can equally argue that the invention of the atomic bomb
(through technology) has merely increased mankind's capacity for evil.
In hhort, what appears as progressive to the Liberal can be seen as
decay by others.
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The second defect is that neither Acton nor Macaulay can show through
a study of the past that what they term progress is caused by a society
adopting Liberal values. The temporal conjunction of the things they
admired and representative government cannot be sufficient to establish
their case. As David Manning puts it, we could not distinguish between
the view that democracy has civilised man or that civilised man has
democratised government. Indeed, as Macaulay noted, there were plausible
counter examples to his argument in the high level of cultural attainment
in the despotic Renaissance states or the fact that France was both
Catholic and prosperous.
In this sense they have made an error analogous to that made by certain
illiberal raciilists who argue about the relative defects of other racial
types when compared to Aryans. The argument effectively freezes
history at the present when it might be plausible to argue that western
methods and techniques are evidence of superiority over other rates^i
But once we step back from this we can see that an identical argument
would have been available to a Roman in 55BC who might have concluded
that the British would never amount to very much. The future, as we
can see, would have proved our Roman to be wrong and by the same token
the future might prove our racialist wrong since we cannot foretell how
well China or Nigeria will be doing in 1,000 years time. In much the
same way, Acton and Macaulay start from where they are and spin the
argument to justify and explain current standards. They miss the fact
that a further lOO years sees Britain in a very different position a propos
its European neighbours. Though the argument is oo logically sounder
in the 19th century, it looks more plauslbble precisely because of the
contingent relationship between success and civil society that I have
been describing. A different period such as our own makes it look
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less plausible, enen if the logic has not improved.
General conclusions about Liberalism as a whole are, perhaps, unwise.
In this chapter I have claimed that not all Liberals base their political
beliefs on the same foundations; Locke appealed to philosophy, Acton
to religion and the past, and J.S. Mill to both philosophy and history.
In as much as they have, like Acton and Macaulay, turned to the evidence
of hisditry to support their beliefs, they have supposed that history
has shown that the things valued by Liberals, tolerance, reason, balanced
government and representative democracy have all led to an improvement in
society. And, of course that these things have been brought about by
Liberals. The Liberal attitude to history is not an integral part of
a theory, in the way in which 'Historical Materialism' is for Marxism, but
can, when employed by Liberals, serve as a further illustration of the
truth of Liberalism. Not all Liberals turn to history, but doing so,
could not fail to produce a favourable analysis. In those cases where
they have turned to history - in this chapter, Acton and Macaulay - they
have not derived their Liberalism from history (in the logical, as opposed
to physchological sense) but haee allowed the wider framework of Liberalism,
in particular its emphasis on the kind of 'human nature' men, as rational
agents, really have, to impose itself on the past. Like Marxists, they
have taken out of history only what they themselves have put it. Civil
Society is bound to be superior to Feudal or Communist societies, simply
because it contains more of the things that Liberals admire. But as we
have seen, it cannot be shown that people are either happier in that kind
of society, or that they are more justly treated (since injustice is
possible in any society, justice cannot be a quality of a particular society)
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or that these societies have produced progress in the relevant sense.
In short, Acton and Macaulay 'try' the past by th standards of 19th
century Liberalism and find it wanting, save for the few sculd who
anticipated Liberal arguments, it does not seem to have occurred to them
that in doing so they were expressing what was important to them and
not revealing what was significant about those actions in the past.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Marxism is uncompromisingly theoretical in its outlook: the correct theory
of political action not only needs to inform political action, but also
needs to be wedded to it through revolutionary praxis, if bourgeois ideology
is to be overcome, and the real basis of society laid bare. Liberalism,
especially in its 'rationalist' incarnation, has the same virtues and
faults. Society, it holds, can be run along rational lines for the benefit
of all, if only men would put the call of 'reason' above the call of self-
interest and prejudice - much as the followers of Professor Hare might
decide on both the most efficient one way traffic system in Oxford and the
best set of moral values. Conservatism, on the other hand, claims to be
free of such plans and dogmas. It is, in the words of Lord Hailsham
(written when he was Lord Hailsham the first time around) "an attitude,
not a philosophy".^" The Conservative, writes Oakeshott "(is) disposed to
think and behave in certain manners; it is to prefer certain kinds of
conduct to others", it is "not a creed or a doctrine, but a disposition".
This disposition, suggests Oakeshott, shows itself in preferring the
familiar to the unknown and in preferring changes that are small and slow
to those that are large and sudden. It is a disposition that reveals itself
in many activities such as fishing or in a situation where we prefer to
work with familiar tools rather than the latest technological innovations.
It is especially appropriate in friendship, where old relationships are
valued for themselves and not for an 'end'. In terms of political activity,
government need not be based upon any general theory of society or human
Q H°ggj The Case for Conservatism ( Penguin, 1959),
16.
2
Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, 168.
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nature, but on the simple preference for the known over the unkown and in
the belief that since change entails certain loss and only possible gain,
it is up to the innovators to demonstrate that the former is outweighed
by the latter.
It may be worth making an initial distinction here between conservatism as
an attitude (as indicated above in the references to fishing, friendship
and so on) and Conservatism as in ideology. In one sense most of us are
probably conservatives in an unreflective way. We prefer favourite
records, or favourite clothes and are comfortable in an environment that
we know well. But there is another, quite different sense in which
Conservatism is a reflective, self-conscious tradition of thought intended,
in Lo»»d Haiisham's words "to protect, revive and apply all that is best
3
in the old". And it is with that which we are concerned here. From
the time of the French Revolution at least, there has been a self-conscious
tradition of Conservative thought in Britain and Europe which is committed
to political activity as a way of preserving freedoms and particular ways
of life against the ravages of rampant individualism or the totalitarianism
of the masses. It may well be the case, as Lord Hugh Cecil argues,
that up to the eighteenth century men were by inclination conservative and
that there was no need to state conservative principles since there was
nothing to oppose them to, but it is certainly not the case since then.
Widespread social change since then has brought about the need for the
explicit stating of a principle. Again, though there may be no explicit
formulation of political ideas such as one finds in the works of Marxists
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underpinned by a view of human nature, the abandonment of which has led
revolutionaries to spectacular disaster. If Conservatives are wise
enough to hold that politics is not the most important of human activities,
they are foolish enough to engage in that arena as vigorously as their
opponents.
Of course a chapter such as this could not hope to cover and do justice to
every variety of Conservative thought. The pessimism with which
Conservatives have viewed great plans for the improvement of mankind has
not led them to substantial agreement on the way society ought to be
organised, and their political programmes have sprung from a number of
separate roots. Conservatism in the USA is a rather different beast from
the Conservatism of Hegel or Oakeshott. I shall, therefore, be somewhat
selective, and confine my remarks to British Conservatism. That area of
Conservative thought that Henry Drucker labels as 'continental bureaucratic
Conservatism'^ (as opposed to 'Anglo-Saxon sceptical Conservatism}) and
intended to cover such thinkers as Hegel, Compte and de Tocqueville is,
therefore, set aside* This is not to say that it did not influence British
Conservatives, for example, Carlyle and Coleridge.
The lack of a structured theoretical comprehensiveness in British Conservative
thought, its lack of a Hegel perhaps, is more than compensated for by the
success of its pragmatism in the political arena. British Conservatism,
whether by "dishing the Whigs"^ or by accepting some of the measures
introduced by Socialists, has remained well within the mainstream of British
political life rather than ending up as political whale stranded on the bank
Drucker, op. cit, 170.
g
The phrase refers to Disraeli's opportunism in championing the 1867
Reform Act.
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by a sudden change in current. Indeed, until the general election of 1945
it was quite proper to talk of the Conservative Party as the natural party
of government. This adaptability has already been noted earlier, and it
has been claimed that modern Conservatism, in at least some of its forms
(some might say in its predominant form) owes much to its Liberal opponents.
This position may seem unusual when one considers the ferocity with which
these opinions were attacked at the time. The sight of the Conservative
party standing up for state intervention against 'laissez faire' Liberalism
is proudly recounted by Hugh Cecil.
In the 19th century, when Liberalism enforced to the
utmost the principle of personal liberty, it was among
Conservatives that the authority and control of the
State was defended, and, in some inftances, enlarged
and strengthened.y
For British Conservatives such as Cecil, Baldwin, MacMillan and Hailsham
this is a simple matter of sensibly avoiding extremes, especially an extreme
that presents itself as the current orthodoxy (though an extreme that is
orthodox may be an odd idea). Thus, khe dangers of 19th century individual-
8
ism, the "wail of intolerable sufferage" set up by unrestrained capitalism
meant that the rights of the community needed to be stressed. The current
danger from Socialist central planning means that the rights of the
individual need to be reasserted against the all-powerful State. Conserva¬
tives do, of course, disagree on the balance between the two. In modern
times we need only to look at the political, economic and social differences
between say, Sir Keith Joseph and Mr Edward Heath. Yet both Sir Keith's
commitment to the principles of the free market and Mr Heath's espousal of the
^
Cecil, op. cit., 170.
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planned economy (in a limited sense) envisaged by the Brandt Report are
both contributions to Conservatism (as opposed to Liberalism, Nationalism
or Marxism). The broad span of British Conservatism means that both are
members of that ideology, and despite the ascendance of the former at
the moeent, it may fairly be said that the Centre for Policy Studies is
not typical of the way in which British Conservatism has developed.
Having stated that this chapter is limited in its scope to British
Conservatism, it must be stated that it is not my purpose to write a
history of the British Conservative Party since 1832 or whenever. Even if
we agree with Cecil's contention that self-conscious Conservatism was
brought into being by the trauma of the French Revolution, and has under¬
gone several changes until the present day, what concerns us here is the
conceptual unity of that thought, not its chrnnllogical development.
I shall instead be starting my examination of Conservative thought with
Lord Hailsham's "The Case for Conservatism", first published in 1946.
Though this work ,is not admired and accepted by all Conservatives, it does
give a reasonably concise account of the main features of Conservatism
and I shall draw attention when necessary to any important differences
between Hailsham and other Conservative thinkers. "The Case for
Conservatism" is also an ideological work; it is a contribution to, as
much as a book about, Conservative thought. Not only does the book claim
to tell us 'what Conservatism means', it is intended to tell us what Lord
Hailsham considers to be the correct Conservative attitude to contemporary
issues, and problems. Originally intended as a contribution to "the
9
strictly contemporary politics of opposition" it is, in its second edition
Op. cit., preface.
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(1959) an attempted vindication of Conservative policies since 1951. This
mixture of the 'theoretical' and political practice is quite intentional;
the success of Conservative policy in government is the proof of Conservative
ideas, which can be seen, through these achievements, to have contemporary
relevance. In this sense it is an attempt, albeit an unintentional one, to
refute the Marxist view that 'ideologies' (in the Marxist sense) are static
views of society.
What view of political activity and man as political agents emerges from
Hailsham's book ? The first thing to note is the strees placed upon keeping
a sense of proportion about politics. It is important to Conservatives
that politics is comparatively unimportant.
For Conservatives do not believe that political strnggle
is the most important thing in life. In this they differ
from Communists, Socialists, Nazis, Fascists, Social
Creditors and most members of the British Labour Party.
The simplest among them prefer fox-hunting - the wisest
religion. To the great majority of Conservatives, religion,
art, study, family, country, friends, music, fun, duty, all
the joy and riches of existence of which the poor no less t
than the rich are indefeasible freeholders, all these are
higher in the scale than their handmaiden, the political
struggle ... The man who puts politics first is not fit
to be called a civilised being, let alone a Christian.
10
Assimilar sentiment is expressed, in a slightly more elegant manner by
Oakeshott in the essay referred to earlier. He concludes that being at
home in the commonplace world qualifies us "if we are so inclined, and
have nothing better to -fchink about, to engage in what the man of conservative
disposition understands to be political activity".** Politics is rather
like the sword Excalibur, it is taken out when politics threatens to swamp
other areas of human life, but is put away once the danger had been
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Not only is politics of limited importance, it can only be of limited effect.
In his book 'Conservatism', Noel O'Sullevan dubs this " a limited style of
12
politics, based on the idea of imperfection". Conservatives were not
attracted by the heady optimism of the enlightenment and its attendant
rhetoric. Whereas Tom Paine saw the French Revolution as 'the coming into
manhood' of the French people, Burke saw it as proof of the message of
Genesis; that Man is a fallen creature and cannot be perfected in this
life. The inherent limitations of nature, human and otherwise, mean® that
there were boundaries to what could be achieved by the State or the
individual without destroying the stability of society. Not all Conservatives
have held Man's imperfections and fallibility to be the result of, say,
Original Sin, but they have maintained that human nature cannot be changed
or improved by alterations in the environment, or more education as do
Liberals and Socialists. When confronted by Mill's argument that ignorance
is the cause of miserjr, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen was quick to retort that
getting drunk was not a matter of being unaware of the consequences, but
13
of weakness in the face of temptation. In this sense, Conservatives
stand behind Calvin's interpretation of St Augustine rather than Thomas
Aquinas.
The limits of human endeavour are then, quite low in the sphere of politics.
They are restricted, not merely because of the limitations of human nature,
but because of the complexity of the task that confronts them. Politics
is simply not susceptible to 'rational' planning; Burke for example always
stressed the limits of teason in comparison with the diversity of human
life. Given that political activity is not the most important facet of
22
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human life, Conservatives can quite easily admit this and yet hold that the
quality of life is not adversely affected by comparative political impotence.
In Oakeshott for example the important things, such as friendship, are not
capable of perfection or improvement (in a planned sense) and so no-one should
worry overmuch that politics tan only have a limited influence.
If, as Burke, Hailsham and Oakeshott all suggest in their different ways,
human life is a complicated affair that cannot be easily encapsulated and
dealthwith, even by 'reason', it is not surprising that British Conservatives
hswe rejected 'abstract' principles as guides to political action, be they
the idea of equality, of natural rights or of progress. This position
is not based solely on scpeticism concerning theppractical consequences
of the plans of thos committed to such ideals. It is based upon the idea
that tradition is more fundamental than any of these 'abstractions'.
Conservatives believe that 'reason' cannot be talked about in general, but
only in terms of its place in a concrete tradition of ideas such as
science or philosophy. In a similir way, 'natoural rights' are a fiction,
for rights can only exist under a concrete form such as the English legal
system, or, for those with a religious bent the Natural Law as Man's partici¬
pation in the Lex Divina.
Tradition and custom are the key features in any healthy political body.
It is this feature that would distinguish between two similar legislatures
where one would be the natural continuation of existing institutions and the
other based upon the idea of equality simpliciter. For example, supposing
tb$t a government, inspired by J S Mill were to set up a parliament, the
exact replica of Westminster with parties and so on in an African State that
had recently been colonised, on the grounds that these people had natural
rights to self-government. Some Conservatives would claim that even if
the procedures were identical, the Westminster parliament would be
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a genuine case of political development, the African parliament a case of
rationalist planning, totally ansuited to its traditional environment and
14
doomed to rapid failure.
This point needs to be stressed, lest the fact that much of modern Conserva¬
tism is based upon 19th century Liberalism prompt us into thinking that there
is no difference between them. As we have Already noted, Liberal* sj»ch
as Bentham (and to a lesser extent, Mill) regarded tradition as a form of
prejudice, incapable of being demonstrated to be correct and to be contrasted
with 'reason*. In short, any tradition was susceptible to external
criticism in order to determine whether it was rational or not; for the
Conservative, a tradition is a framework from within which criticism is
possible. To be sure, Liberals and Conservatives share both arguments and
political positions. Both, for example favour a balanced constitution
and the separation of executive and legislative power; both see the family
and pricate property as safeguards against all power falling into the hands
of the State; both believe in the power of capitalism^" to create wealth
and prosperity. However, whilst Liberals tend to believe in a balanced
constitution because it is necessary for the survival of liberty, Conserva¬
tives can merely hold that it is the established form of government and can
be traced back to the origins of parliamentary democracy. They also differ
14
Professor R F Torrance, for example, argues that though apartheid is
immoral, the answer is not "one man, one vote" since this does not fit
in with traditional African ways of deciding matters. Europeans
voting systems are 'atomic', African systems are based upon the
development of consensus (cf St Benedict's injunction for the solution
of disputes in a monastery). Hence the need for 'separate development'
of some sort.
The term capitalism is, of course, being used in a non-Marxist sense.
32
profoundly in the ways that this balance was to be best maintained. J S Mill
for example believed that the middle class, as the most dynamic sector of
the community, needed to be brought into government by the extension of the
franchise. Coleridge*** on the other hand held that this would be a disaster
since it would give the reins of government to a class who, although they
had wealth, had no conception of social responsibility; that is, no notion
of exercising a stewardship over land and industry on behalf of the nation
as a whole. And, if the individual is a key concept in Liberal thought,
that of the nation is of equal importance in understanding Conservatism.
But, it must be noted on the other side, that the part played by the nation
in Conservative thought is not the same as that in right wing radicalism
such as Fascism and National Socialism. Not only do right wing radicals
17
see tradition as something that can be swept away, - seeing the human will
as expressed through a mass movement being capable of regenerating society -
they also believe in the creative energy of the masses when released. This
latter point contrasts with the Conservative belief that rule by the masses
brings mediocrity rather than excellence. Furthermore, right wing radicals
have a plan for society and this will not square with the 6onservative notion
-j £
of limited politics.
Tradition is closely related, in Hailsham's book at least, to the notion of
change. Like Burke, Hailsham holds an 'organic' view of society rather than
a 'mechanistic' one. He is not typical of modern Conservative thought
here, for although Burke's emphasis on unity and consensus seems to have
survived across the ages, the analogy between the state and a harmonious
living organism (comparable perhaps with the Roman Catholic notion of the
***
See S T Coleridge Collected Works (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1971), Vols I and' X.
Kor example, the Nazi view of the family,,and the relationship of the
state to children.
18
It is not only right wing radicals that fall foul here. For example, the
change that having a plan - even against planning - is still a plan, is
levelled/
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mystical body of Christ) has been dropped as an explicit assumption in
Conservative thought (again, the best known example is Oakeshott). The
main point that Hailsham takes from Burke is that 'A state without the
19
means of some change is without the means of its conservation*. The
State does, and must, change in response to the new circumstances that
arise; but this change, in order to be of benefit must involve continuity
with what has gone before. The revolutions in France and Russia provide
a lesson that demonstrates what occurs when an intransigent authority
refuses to see, or contemplate, the need for steady and moderate reform.
Reform for Burke was quite acceptable since it was firected to remedying
a particular grievance and was in that sense still within the established
political framework. The result of this intransigence was simply to
force the public into the hands of extremists who, failing to take into
account the traditions from which they came and armed with ideas such as
liberty, equality and fraternity of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
produced a totalitarian dictatorship. The revolutions in France and
Russia epitomise what Burke, in contrast to reform, termed change.
(Change) alters the substance of the objects themselves,
and gets rid of all their essential good as well as all
of the accidentil evil anneeted to them
Thus any alteration in the political structure of a society must be 'reform'
and not 'change', though it needs to be noted here that 'reform' can include
actually pressing for alterations. An example of this would be Disraeli
pushing through the Second Reform Act of 1867 in order to pre-empt any
18/contd.
levelled by Oakeshott against Hailsham and Hayek,etc. - "The bug of
rationalist politics has finally bitten the Conservative". See
Cambridge Journal, Vol I, No 8, 1948, 488.
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Quoted in Hailsham, op. cit., 29.
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Burke, quoted in O'Sullevan, op. cit., 27.
political advantage that might otherwise have gone to the Whigs. The point
about such reforms is that they have a continuity with what has gone before,
and, on the Burkian modeL are like the changes in a healthy living organism,
they do not disrupt the working of the organism as a whole.
In a wider context, Hailsham is suggesting that if we wish to know what needs
to be done, and where, in order to preserve harmony in sofciety, it is
tradition,that provides a coherent guide rather than abstract notions such
as equality or liberty. Tradition is firmly based upon what has been shown
to be possible, not on a future ideal. The notion of tradition here is also
related to the question of identity, both personal and social. A person is
not an entity that exists for a series of (logically) unconnected fleeting
moments. What kind of person X is, is related to the past they have
experienced in such a way that to remove that past would be to destroy the
possibility of X having any identity ai all. We carry our past with us,
because without it we are nothing. In a similar way, the identity of a
society or nation is related closely to its past, its present identity
being partly the consequence of, and partly formed out of, the political,
moral and social traditions that it possesses. Traditions cannot, in this
sense, be out loose from a society as if they were the impedimenta of a
bygone and less satisfactory age. Thus changes (and I am not using the
term here in Burke's sense) must take into account the traditions of a
society, must retain some continuity with them if a sense of identity is
to be preserved. The Massai, as Oakeshott notes, took the place names of
their old homelands with them to their new reservations in Kenya.
But threats to tradition do not only come from what Conservatives see as
muddle-headed attempts to improve life. The coming of industrial society
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and the replacement of a rural, agrarian economy by an industrial one has
created a mass society in which anonymity is the norm and which has dis¬
located and in many cases destroyed old ways of living and as importantly,
a settled lifestyle. Its failure to replace them
with an equally stable form of life clearly poses a problem. The Massai
may well have taken the names of their sacred places with them, but the
destruction of that life style that made such names, places and the
traditions associated with them a viable 'way of life' has simply meant
that such names and piaces no longer play the same part that they did
before, and that such a way of life cannot be recaptured or revised. Despite
the longings of T S Eliot, we cannot go back to Mediaeval Europe, to the
21
parish community and the Universal Christian State. It is not clear
what can be done here, for to control tehhnological advance in a way that
would preserve the 'old' foom its ravages would require a degree of
political control that would offend both Burke's limited style of politics
and modern versions of laissez-faire.
Traditions are not, it is true, always undermined by external factors such
as technological change. The lure of wealth or greater material prosperity
may undermine an established way of life as surely as technological progress.
Older values may fall prey to new standards that wllow the creation of
greater wealth. In Asia and Africa, older ideals of collective ownership,
regulations against money lending and so on may be unable to withstand the
^
See T R F.Hnt- The Idea of a Christian Society (London: Faber and Faber,
1939).
It is interesting to note how this attitude to the past is shared by some
radical socialist who regret the ending of a society and its ways. An
excellent example of this, combined with a socialist analysis of the
reasons is John McGrath's play about the Highlands since 1745, 'The
Cheviot, The Stag and the Black, Black Oil'.
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introduction of western business ethics. These changes may be related to
technical progress, since it is only with certain developments that
Europeans are able to get to Africa and not vice versa, but the possibility
of a change is not sufficient to make it occur. A dramatic account of
the various eleibents involved in the destruction of a tradition is provided
in the play "The Slaying of the Dragon King". In this play, set in post-
revolutionary China, a village is suffering from a potentially disastrous
drought. The priest urges prayers to the 'Sragon King', the peasant leader
influenced by the coromunits urges irrigation. The priest is, in the end,
defeated by a combination of his own corruption (ha ihas cheated the peasants
in the past), the failure of rain to materialise after his prayers, the
desire of the peasants for greater material prosperity which is coming to
other nearby villages and the victory of the Communists in the rest of China.
Conservatives may take comfort from the fact that there is little doubt that
something important has been lost by the villagers when they replace the
'Dragon King' with "Invincible Mao-Tse Tung thought".
But, to return to Burke for a moment, it is the fact of rapid change in
areas other than politics that has helped to undermine his assumption that
the social order was basically sound. In an ara of comparatively slow
change, traditions of political stability might survive, but in a more
technological, industrial and swiftly moving society it is not surprising
that such an assumption looks less plausible and is more easily abandoned.
The industrial upheavals in 19th century Britain and changes in our own
century around the world have made society look less like an harmonious
living organism.
A third element in the Conservative notion of tradition is that it cannot
be appropriated or understood properly in an instant. This applies both to
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the realm of politics and to other matters. The understanding of a tradition,
like the learning of a akill, requires an apprenticeship during which time
the novice learns from the master craftsman not only the technical details
of the trade, but gains the experience and 'feel' for the job that allows
him to go on successfully without the masters instruction and, more
importantly, to improvise when the books on technique are silent. This,
Conservatives believe, is especially true of politics, where the judgement
and skill that are necessary for success cannot be learnt, parrot fashion,
from a book. It is this view that is at the centre of Oakeshott's claim
that the works of Locke, Jefferson and Marx are 'cribs' for those who have
no experience of political power, and that the result of relying on them
is as disastrous as that which attends the efforts of the kitcher porter
who is told to cook a cordon bleu meal with only the recipe book as his
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guide. It also underlies his view that this 'intuitive' understanding
must by its very nature be in the hands of a trained elite.
Such a political tradition cannot, of course, be written down. The
British Constitution is not, like the Declaration of the Rights of Man, or
even the Constitution of the United States, a declaration of 'self-evident'
rights and duties - periodically amended or added to - but the embodiment
of the accumulated wisdom of past ages. The past lives on, to enlighten
the present; irddition is, in Chesterton's phrase "the democracy of the
dead". By this heameans that death does not disqualify previous generations
from influencing the deliberations of the present. Tradition is this
sense resides in institutions such as Parliament, the Monarchy and the Church
The analogy chosen by Oakeshott is not entirely a fortunate one, since if
his wheel maker was to >be taken at his word, there could be no tradition
at all. See Rationalism in Politics. 9-10.
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rather than declarations of rights, and it is these institutions that
give stability to political and moral life. (Some Conservatives, Burke,
Hailsham, Stephen, for example, hold that Christianity is essential to
Conservatism as it provides, through the idea of the Natural Law, the
only basis for marality. Certainly it is true to say that in the great
political battles of the 18th and 19th centuries the Tories and Conservatives
stood up for the established Church against the attacks of non-conformist
Liberals and Socialists, but there are quite a few Conservatives who have
not been Christians, even if, like Hume they upheld the authority of the
established Church.)
The traditions of political life in Britain are, so Conservatives argue,
quite alien to ideas of extremism, either of the right or the left. They
are also quite unsuitable for the planned economy of socialism or the
rational principles of Liberals. In this sense they are peculiarly
British; as R A B Butler once put it, it is 'International in some aspects,
(but) not for export'. By this he means that Conservatives wish to uphold
those institutions that are the foundation of British society and this
brings us back to the idea that forcing universal principles onto a
tradition can only destroy it and that in the end, the search for the
ideal state or human perfection destroys what liberty does exist and leaves
a worse state of affairs than that which it was intended to remove, (cf
Burke's notion that the Ancien Regime was the appropriate development of
French history). Principles may in themselves be praiseworthy, but the
result of applying them is invariably bad. Hence Burke's argument that
the French suffered both during the Revolution and beaause of it. The
Britishness of British Conservatism might be summed up in Burke's aphosism




Quoted in Hailsham, op cit, 87.
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Before going on to discuss the Conservative notion of tradition in a more
critical manner, other aspects of Conservative thought must be developed.
As we have seen, when asked 'What lies behind the stability of political
affairs ?', British Conservatives will answer 'tradition' and go on to say
that the exercise of political authority, because it involves skill and
judgement must be in the hands of masters of that art who cannot be those
who have had no experience of government but have picked up, say, a copy
of Locke's Second Treatise. Thus, unlike Liberals, Conservatives do not
see democracy, or the extension of the franchise as being good in themselves
because they help realise the 'autonomous' nature of Man. In short,
democracy, as 19th century opponents of the extension of the franchise
argued, is not necessary for the release of some vital aspect of the human
character, but is only useful where the results of such extensions are
24
beneficial to the nation as a whole. Where Lord Acton saw the duty of
government in increasing (or preserving) individual liberty, Sir Henry
Maine saw its duty as promoting the virtues of nationhood,
Democracy ... has exactly the same conditions to
satisfy as Monarchy; it has the same functions
to discharge, though it discharges them through
different organs. These tests of success ... are
precisely the same in both cases.
25
and if liberty and the preservation of the national existence come into
conflict
It is better for a nation, according to an English
prelate, to be free than to be sober. If the choice
has to be made, and if there is any real connection
Modern conservatives would probably argue that universal suffrage in
Western democracies is of this nature (for example, it makes takeovers
by extremists less likely) but in other cases, eg industrial democracy
or giving blacks the vote in Rhodesia, it is not democracy per se
that is pursued but the effects it produces.
25
Sir Henry Maine, Popular Government, (London: John Murray, 1885)
61.
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between Democracy and liberty, it is better to
remain a nation capable of displaying the virtues
of a nation than even to be free.
26
Likewise, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen asserted that the question 'Is
Liberty good or bad ?' could not be answered in the abstract, but only in
particular cases, ie is X good or bad where X is an example of liberty.
Both Maine and Stephen vigorously argued that in fact progress often came
as the result of methods of government other than democracy and that the
premature handing of power to the uneducated masses would end progress
rather than stimulate it.
Rather than have power vested in one section or class, Conservative thinkers,
like Liberals, have stressed the value of a balanced constitution.
Bolingbroke for example, rejected both Absolutism and what he termed 'Absolute
Democracy' as simple forms of government - the former being 'tyranny', the
27
latter "tyranny and anarchy both". Both extremes need a balance which
for Bolingbroke is provided through the Patriot King at the head of the nation,
uniting it in a common interest, in the manner of the constititiinn out of
the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688. Thus the majority can be wrong, and
when they are, they need as much protection against themselves as they
28
would against the wrong acts of a tyrannical monarch.
Perhaps the closest alignment of the necessity of an elite with antidemocratic
arguments comes in such writers as Stephen and Carlyle. The former argued
that, apart from not leading to equality or freedom in the way imagined




*•41 StJ Bolingbroke, A dissertation on Parties > Works (London: Frank Cass & Co,
1971), Vol II, 173-9.
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cf Hailsham's opinion that "a popularly elected tyranny deserves no more
support than a self-appointed dietator", op cit, 51.
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I think that wise and good men ought to rule over those
who are foolish and bad. To say that the sole function
of the wise and good it to preach to their neighbours, and
that everyone indiscriminately should be left to do what
he likes, and should be provided with a rateable share of
the sovereign power in the shape of a vote, and that the
result of this will be the direction of power by wisdom,
seems to me the wildest romance that ever got possession
of any considerable number of minds.
29
Carlyle simply asserted that
supported by the whole universe, and by some two-
hundred generations of men, who have left us some
record of themselves there, that the few Wise will
have, by one method or another, taken command of the
innumerable Foolish
30
and that having got hold of power, the wise must hang onto it at all costs,
for this has been the backbone of all previous societies that have pros¬
pered. "All that Democracy ever meant lies there", he wrote, "the
31
attainment of a truer and truer ARISTOCRACY, or government by the BEST".
What was needed, argued Carlyle, was not the reform of Parliament but
'one True Reforming Statesman', whose wisdom would achieve in ten years
32




Carlyle, Latter Day Pamphlets No 1, 'The Present Time' (1850).
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Carlyle, Latter Day Pamphlets No 3, 'Downing Street', 79-103.
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Concentrating so much power thus might seem to contradict the concept
of Conservatism extolling the virtues of a politics of imperfection.
Such a statesman might make untold mistakes as well as dispense untold
wisdom. If the sole criteria were to be success then it would be
possible for China or the USSR to claim conservative support thanks to
the efforts of a Mao-Tse Tung or Lenin. The difference with the
Liberal 'falliblist' such as Popper is shown here.
2.4?
For Conservatives then, fie for some Liberals, there is an implied difficulty
in combining democracy with rule by 'the best'. As has been suggested,
the locus of this problem has moved away during our own times in the West
from the question of the franchise to that of industrial democracy, where
the 'threat' of worker-directors is seen as a handicap to efficient
business management. Here the arguesant often revolves around the supposition
that without an equal stake in the enterprise of firm, workers (as opposed
to shareholders) would not pulj their weight, or that as they have less of
a stake in the firm, they ought to have less say. This view is echoed,
in relation to the franchise, by the Marquis of Salisbury in the Quarterly
Review of 1864 where he argued that no 'natural rights' could justify equal
suffrage as long as people did not have equal amounts of property to protect.
(This argument is in direct line from the argument that claims that the
country should be run by those who have the largest stake in its continued
prosperity.)
Because democracy can lead to the tyranny of the masses over the individual,
it is important that the law, as guarantor of individual freedoms should
remain outside of political control, so that the individual has some redress
against the state or powerful monopolies such as Trade Unions. Thought the
state should not allow freedom of the individual to extend to sedition or
other such acts, it is proper to defend civil liberties (as opposed to
democracy) as the best way of giving citizens a stake in the nation. The
question of tyranny, civil liberty and the law is linked here with the
distinction between the public and private spheres of life. A distinction
which conservatives have held to be vital to the health of the political
community. Thus there are a great many issues on which the state should not
wish to interfere, even if those issues may have political consequences.
An individual cricketer should, for example, be allowed to go to Sough Africa,
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a car driver should not be compelled to wear a seat belt and a worker should
not be forced to join a Trade Union against his or her will. The collect-
ivist ethics of the unions would be seen as anathema to the Conservative
here. As has been noted elsewhere, the logical relationship between public
and private is such that neither can be abolished without destroying the
other, but the Conservative is in this sense talking about the encroachment
of laws upon matters that were onee a question of individual choice. Here
the influence of Liberalism, is very strong, for in an earlier age it was
certainly true that the church and aristocracy allowed for little to be
a matter of choice and interfered a great deal in religion, the arts, science
and so on.
How is the past related to all of this ? Certainly, Conservatives do not
have a vision of what Man can become, as Marxists do? nor do they have an
idea of 'progress' from ignorance and superstition to reason, as do Liberals.
In this sense, there is no teleological or escatalogical dimension to
Conservative thought (except where Conservatives are of a Christian dispos¬
ition). Two major elements in the Conservative view of the past will be
considered here. Firstly, it is the repository of tradition - in this
sense Conservatives look back to the past as a guide for present actions,
rather than to the dictates of abstract concepts such as 'reason'. Secondly,
the past shows the follp of political enterprises that have abandoned
tradition and provides a catalogue of the misery that has resulted foom
well meaning but misguided enterprises to reform or improve mankind. Where
the Liberal finds reason releasing the creative powers of men, where
previously they have been bridled by superstition and authority, the
Conservative finds only a ruinous pursuit of ideals that is inimical to
settled behaviour. Where the Marxist sees the casting off of the chains
of exploitation, the Conservative sees a new kind of serfdom arising.
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The first element is exemplified by David Clarke when he writes
The only text book of conservatism is the history of
the British people, their institutions, their
traditions, their accumulated wisdom and their
character.
33
Later on he tells us
The first care of the Conservative is, therefore,
to approach the change historically, to ascertain
the purpose and principle of the institution and
to safeguard its continuity whatever change of form
may be necessary.
34
The second element is found in Burke's 'Reflections', and in the works
by Maine and Stephen that have already been cited. Lord Hailsham puts
the matter as follows x<rben discussing Prance. "The unhappy history
of that glorious and gifted people since 1789 onwards, is as good an
35illustration of what Conservatives mean".
As we have already noted, Burke held that what was wrong with the French
Revolution was that it was innovative rather than restorative, as the
English revolution of 1688 had been. The cardinal error of the Jacobins
had been to try and apply the principles of science to something that was,
in principle, unquantifiable viz social life. ^Politics" he wrote,
"ought to he adjusted, not to human reasonings, but to hnman nature: of
36
which reason is a part, and by no means the greatest part."
It is important to note here that the 'Reflections' were not simply a
commentary on recent French history for those who were interested; they
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Quoted in F O'Gorman, Edmund Burke (London: Allen & Unwin,
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were not only a defence of the ancien regime as the most appropriate form
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of government for the French but a warning to the English. Burke saw
the French Revolution as only the beginning of a series of revolutions
that could even occur in England, given the existence of a pro-Jacobin
faction there. These worst fears were confirmed when Paine chose to
confide in Burke his wish that 'The Revolution in France is certainly a
38
Forerunner to other Revolutions in Europe'." Burke's 'Reflections' were
therefore, as much a political act as an account of a series of political
acts. They also made his reputation, in a similar way to the manner in
which the Russian revolution drew attention to the theories of Marx and
Lenin. The seeming truth of Burke's Warnings and predictions appeared
to underwrite his social philosophy.
Burke's solution to the French Revolution was in interventionist was
against the new government in order to save Europe from universal havoc
and atheism. The 'natural aristocracy' must be put back in its proper
place before anarchy brought a new Dark Age, and if the French would not
co-operate in this, then Britain must take the 'directing part'. A problem
here with Burke's position would seem to be his desire to prevent that
which is impossible. If the Jacobins and their successors are, in fact,
chasing an illusion then this may be foolish, but how can it be harmful ?
Burke may have thought the France of the Directory an unpleasant place,
as his predecessors found the England of the Protectorate and as his
successors have found the Soviet Union to be a gigantic prison camp; but
the fact that he did not approve of its policies does not make it incoherent
or, at any rate, any more incoherent than the constitution of the United
States of America. Like any state, France does have laws which are
37 ' v£- • - " * ~ \
. "It grew oat ei the U&hitu&l conditions, relations and reciprocal
claims of men. It grew out of the circumstances of the country,- and *" \
out of the state of property", 0'Gorman, op cit, 129.
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administered according to rules and as such can legitimately be said to
bind its citizens by virtue of the allegiance they owe it by birth. If
the laws of our country are repellant (such as those of Nazi Germany)
we may well feel that it is our moral duty to oppose them, or to refuse
to obey them, but that does not mean that we are not bound by them as
citizens. Indeed it is the tension between moral duty and legal obligation
that may be said to present us with a moral dilemma in the first place.
As we shall see in the final chapter, it is illustrative of the nature of
ideological disputes and arguments to compare the attitudes to the French
Revolution found in Burke and his great rival, Tom Paine. Much of the
dispute, as with Mill and his Conservative critics in the next century,
is simply to do with the fact that when Burke (or whoever) says that
democracy has led to the decline of good government and Paine (or whoever)
says that democracy has brought about good government, they mean different
things by the term 'good'. Thus Bolingbroke's aphorism that "The good of
the people is the ultimate and true end of all govd government" is
vacuous unless we can specify some concrete sense of "the good of the
people". Sir Henry Maine held that the virtues of nationhood were more
important than those of freedom, Mill held the reverse. Does 'good' here
mean material well being, or something more ? Are those defenders of
South Africa aorrect to select evidence which shows blacks to have higher
wages than those in some other African countries, or are their opponents
correct to claim that without the right to vote they are slaves, and a well
fed slave is still a slave ? In this sense, any historical evidence
brought forward will usually turn out to be question begging, for one man's
decline is another man's progress. The former is what we do not approve
of or regret, the latter is not. This, it cannot be stated too strongly,
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There is no emotivist or subjectivist (or even existentialist) theory at
work here. A certain degree of consistency in application is required,
and is usually to be found. But it does mean that the enterprise is
arbitrary in another sense.
I mean here that there is no rule for determining the descriptive use of a
term such as 'progress'.in, say, Liberalism outside of their use in an
evaluative way. That is to say, the descriptive use of decline or progress
is not separate from their employment as evaluative terms, and evaluation is
arbitrary here, for there is no possibility of specifying in advance the
criteria for judging between an illegitimate revolution (such as that in
France) or a justified revolution or counter coup (eg the English Revolution
of 1688 or the wars against France in the 19th century) other than the
decision of Conservatives to support one and condemn the other. The same
being true of Liberals and Marxists.
When, for example, Sir James Fitzjaines Stephen attempts to refute J S Mill's
arguments in 'On Liberty' by the reductio ad absurdum of claiming that if
they were granted then both Christianity and nonventional morality would
collapse, he only appeals to those who think that the contemplation of such
an eventuality is absurd or at least undesirable. An existentialist or
Muslim might well say that if Christianity or morality cannot stand up to
these arguments, then so much the worse for them.
Turning to the past does not, then, show that disaster inevitably occurs
when Conservative principles are ignored. At most it shows that many
events have occurred in the past which Conservatives do not like, or
consider to be dangerous, and that many of these events have been caused
by people who have been acting in accordance with principles other than
Conservative ones. The economy of Russia may have collapsed after 1917,
but it is extremely difficult to show that this is the result of abandoning
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Tzarist rule, as opposed, for example, to being the result of the civil
war waged by the White Russians or previous defects in the economic system.
The fact that China has /*ood shortages and is communist may be countered
by the examples of India and the Phillipines which have food shortages
and are capitalist.
The second aspect of the Conservative view of history under consideration
here is that of the past as the repository of tradition. The two
points are, as we have seen, related to the extent that the abandonment of
tradition for reason can lead to political disaster. Though the charge
of rationalism is often well founded, both in intellectual terms, and in
the (for Conservatives) satisfying sense that they have been utter failures,
this is not true of all changes attributable to the exercise of principles.
The case of the 18th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
which introduced prohibition might be considered a rationalist failure.
Good intentions only served to make the matter they were attempting to
solve a great deal worse, due to unintended and (possibly) unforseen
consequences. But against this we might urge consideration of the
extension of the franchise to women and the establishment of the framework
of the welfare state and National Health Service. Certainly some of those
who argued for these steps based tihem upon 'abstract' principles, but it
is not entirely clear that they have ushered in a decline in British
political life equivalent to that brought about by prohibition. Indeed,
the acceptance of both measures by all political parties may be seen as
proof of their success. The point is not just that they have confounded
the pessimists, but that they have shown 'abstract' principles can and do
play a part in political life. The dichotomy posed between traditional
modes of thought and ideals may not be as complete as it appears since the
latter may be part of the former and can be the appropriate reason for
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doing X, where X is a piece of legislation. An example of this might be
a Roman Catholic's belief in the equality of all men before God, or
sanctity of human life, playing a part in their decision to vote for
legislation on immigration or abortion. Oakeshott claims that the
decision to give women the vote was the result of changes that had taken
place in the position of women due to changes in circumstances during and
39
after the Great War, such that the old strictures were no longer appropriate.
40
But, as Professor Barry points out, some of these changes were themselves
the result of 'progressive' or 'rational' legislation pioneered by
Liberal ideologists such as Hill in the Victorian House of Commons.
Not only can reasons in this sense be the cause of political change, the
understanding of such 'rational principles' may be indispensable to
the understanding of certain kinds of political action. Though such
principles may, strictly speaking, be mere 'idle wheels' at a theoretical
level they are engaged in political practice. Could we understand the
policies of Mill cr Bentham without understanding the part played by reason,
or could we understand the story of the Bolshevik seizure of power without
understanding the part played by Marxist theory in their deliberations
about what to do ? In short, such ideals and principles do succeed at a
certain level - that of communicating to supporters which objectives are
to be aimed for.
It is, of course, also the case that the planning rejected by Oakeshott
and others has had both success and failure. Spectacular disasters such
as Brazilia might be contrasted to Edinburgh's New Town or Paris. At a
common sense level, Conservatives have to explain how France, Japan and
39
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other countries they admire as successes, at least economically, also have
high levels of intervention and planning.
A second point is the question of how we can tell whether a development is
a genuine development of a taadition or an abberation from it. The
tradition itself cannot do this, outside of recognised authorities wtio
interpret it. An example of this would be the authority of the Synod of
Bishops in the Catholic Church or the MCC at cricket. What is important
here is that the authority in question be agreed upon by any parties v/ho
dispute a matter of doctrine or cricketing law. Part of the trouble with
a political tradition, in the sense used by Hailsham and others, is that
there is no single way of interpreting it. What the Labour Party sees
as a legitimate extension of the parliamentary system, or of democracy to
other areas of life, may be seen by Conservatives as a radical departure
from that tradition. There is in fact a distinction to be made betrteen
doing things traditionally and doing things according to a tradition. An
example of this is the controversy in the Roman Catholic Church over
liturgical reform (in particular the abandoning of the 'Tridentine' Mass
for the Missa Normativa) or the debate amongst Anglicans about the ordination
of women. One side argues that the old rite, or the old ban on women priests
must be maintained, the other claims that in the light of the tradition,
such innovations should be made. The difference is, of course, that in
the examples used, there is a common authority bo be invokes, and the only
way that Conservatives in these churches can protest once the decision is made
is by leaving. In the Reformation both Luther and Calvin refused to be
bound by the teaching authority of the Roman Catholic Church, although it
claimed to be based upon a tradition stretching back 1500 years and appealed
to the Bible as a more fundamental authority, claiming that the true Christian
tradition stemming from the Apostles had been submerged by the deviations
of the Papacy.
This distinction is also important when we consider the objection made
to the Benthamite account of 'reason', namely that 'reason' cannot exist
outside of a concrete tradition of thought. We cannot reason in the
abstract, but only in accordance with cannons of thought that are
enshrined in, or at least related to, existing modes of thinking (other¬
wise we would be at a loss to know what anyone meant). In this sense,
the Liberal is not doing what he sets out to do, ie to subject all traditions
to t&e test rationality, since rationality needs a tradition in the
logical sense. But even if this is granted and even if we can also rule
out other efforts to replace tradition in this limited sense as incoherent,
this does not get us very far towards accepting a Conservative's political
preseriptions. As we have just seen, reasoning according to a tradition
cannot dictate, a priori, what decisions we should take over the Latin Mass
or whether women should become priests. The demands of a tradition are
quite different from the Ipgic of argument that a tradition imposes. Or,
to put matters antPher way, tradition in the senseoof things have always
been done in this way' is different from tradition in the sense of a
concrete and distinct manner of thinking which provides a framework for
the use of the term 'rational' in that context: and belief in the latter
does not imply acceptance of the former.
In short, we can accept the importance of tradition, but argue that X
or any particular political act is a genuine development within a tradition,
and thus avoid the practical consequences the Conservative wishes to
force upon us.
There is, perhaps, the tendency here to lump together too much when ve talk
of tradition and to speak as if the term referred to an homogenous entity.
The fact that there are traditions in British political life and traditions
in fishing or cricket does not mean that they are all of the same sort.
Not all political traditions may be the sort that Conservatives approve
of. Each year at the Durham Miners Gala (and, no doubt, at other
similar occasions) leading members of the Labour Party extol the virtues
of working class traditions such as loyalty, solidarity and political
radicalism. The defence of a worthwhile way of life, centred around the
ability of a man to work for a living, depends upon the maintenance of
such traditions against those of cost-efficiency and the 'philosophy' of
individualism that Unions were formed to combat. It is not a question
of deciding which tradition is the correct one (how would one do so ?)
but of noting that the examination of the past can strengthen and nurture
other political traditions and other ways of doing things. And, it
can also reveal traditions that are quite inimical to Conservatives.
Along with the Liberals who ran the British Empire, Conservatives were none
too careful to preserve the traditions of native life in Indian villages.
In the case of some (Fiszjames Stephen, for example) this was justified on
the grounds tnat they smacked of the mediocrity imposed by socialsfctttypes
of thought!
The existence of what I have termed 'working class' traditions highlights
a tension in Conservative thought here. Such traditions are concerned,
not only to resist the power of the state, but of the rapacious individual.
That is to say, unlike Conservatives they wish to resist the encroachments
of private capital rather than state intervention (and in some cases see
the latter as protection against the former). We have seen how in the
18th and 19th centuries Conservatives were prepared to defend the village
community against the encroachment of the mass producing factory and how
some Conservatives have seen the return to smaller units of government and
community as the solution to many of our present problems. One paradox
of this is that such views are now radical, in the sense that they would
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demand changes that are 'large and sudden* rather than 'small and steady',
and that 'real' conservatives may turn out to be radicals in disguise.
But the mainstream of Conservative thought in our present century has seen
the main enemy, not as Liberal individualism, but as Socialist collectivism.
Thus the emphasis has been on protecting the rights cf the individual
against those of the state and encouraging the puraait of individual
excellence against the trend to conformity.
The result of this move has been an attachment to the economics of
capitalism (in some cases in the Adam Smith version) with its emphasis on
the pursuit of profit and its tendency to merge into fewer, but more
powerful conglomerates. The existence of private monopolies and cartels
(which in some cases can easily rivkl the state run monopolies, which are
usoally confined to public utilities and economic infrastructure) aan
not only be destructive towards a settled way of life in other parts of
the world, but can also only survive by constant innovation and
expansion. Economic freedom and social stability are not always
reconcilable; ntr can they be arrested by the forces of government without
creating a further tension.
At both the practical and theoretical level, British Conservatism is an
alliance of several groups in which a particular element may, at any
specific time, be dominant. In our own time, the dominant section is that
which draws its economic ideas primarily from Liberals and has extolled the
virtues of the individual, perhaps at the expense of the wider community.
This, as has been suggested, can lead to a conflict between the demands of
economics and those of culture (in a broad sense); for the pursuit of
excellence in one undermines the basis of the other. This may be apparent
where capitalism 'engages in African and Asian countries but is also true
of, say, an economy such as Western Germany where economic progress may
be said to be coupled with social and cultural decline and the erosion of
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a stable way of life. The fact that modern Conservatism occupies this
area has had the effect of pushing Liberalism much more towards the
interventionist stand that we noted earlier: in going along this road
they have encountered disillusioned socialists retreating from the Labour
Party. This movement should come as no surprise to us since, though it
may be justly asserted that ideologies try and formulate absolute
principles (eg all men are equal, all history is the history of class
struggle, human nature is imperfectable), these principles are only
expressed in concrete political situations which are relative. In other
words a particular political programme that was neither distinctive nore
related to contemporary issues and problems would be of little political
use.
II
It is now time to turn, as with Marxism and Liberalism, to the writings
of those Conservatives who will show the ideological view of the past
in their writings. In the case of Conservatism I have chosen Paul
Johnson. Some may feel this to be a strange choice, on the grounds that
Johnson is a journalist rather than an historian. But this would be
to misunderstand my case; for the point I am trying to establish is
the relationship between the understanding of the past and the categories
of an ideology, not the relationship with a certain class of people -
historians. What is important is that Johnson sees the study of the
past illuminating his preseriptions for the present.and the manner in
which he articulates this view, not what he does for a living.
Johnston is an interesting case in several ways. Firstly, he is an
example of someone who has changed sides, having been at one time a
radical (rather than Marxist) Socialist and now a Thateherite Con-
41
servative. As we shall see, this change of allegiance has affected
41
One is reminded of the story of a Catholic prelate interviewed about
the Catholic position on contraception, who replied that the Church's
position was one of absolute certainty. When asked trhat would be the
position if the Papal Commission changed that view he replied "Then/
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the content, but not the form of his writings. Secondly, his view of
Conservatism shows how deeply some of the ideas we associate with 19th
century Liberalism have penetrated the modern Conservative party and
exemplifies, therefore, the process of change within an ideology itself.
Thirdly, he belongs broadly to the British school of polemics and can,
to that extent, be understood in conjunction with writers such as
Burke, Paine and for that matter, E.P. Thompson.
What I intend to do here is to look at three of Hohnson's more recent
42 43
works, The Offshore Islanders, The Enemies of Society and The History
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of the Modern World 1917-83. Though distinct works, written at
different stages in Johnson's political odgssey, there are certain
common themes that are worthy of our attention. I will also be looking
briefly at some of Johnson's writings in the 'New Statesman' to set
the scene.
The fact that Johnson has undergone a radical change of opinion from the
heady days in which he abandoned the editor's chair in the New Statesman
offices and went to Paris to witness les evenements at first hand, is
not, of itself, important. The ease with which he was able to come to
some of his judgements at the time, is, as we shall see, of somewhat
greater importance; for as I shall suggest, the author who finds Cohn-
45
Bendit Aa jovial Robespierre', who describes Paris in 1968 as having
46
Sspring air loaded with intellectual incense", and who judges that
"the French have given birth to a new revolutionary spirit which will
47
eventually enhance the lives of all of us" is one of a kind with the
author who finds the French spring a schoolboy imitation of 1848 and
41/
the Church will have moved from one state of certainty to another."
The same can be said of Johnson who has moved from leftist convictions
to right wing onew without much doubting in between.
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who fulminates against Marxism-Freudianism some fifteen years later.
Certainly, the rhetorical and polemical style of argument, with its
emphasis on 'knocking down' an opponent's position is present from the
start, and to this extent we can say that Johnson has always been a
thcooughly ideological writer, concerned to carry his readers towards
action of some sort, rather than a disinterested observer of events.
But how exactly does Johnson see the past as important to his enterprise ?
The Offshore Islanders, written in 1972 at the height of the debate
about Britain's entry into the EEC (though this may be a coincidence) is,
for example, an attempt to locate the present state of Britain within
an identifiable context and to reflect on its causes, before pondering
the question 'What will become of the British ?'. As Johnson puts it
I was conscious all the time that the failures (of the
Labour Government 1964-70) lay not merely in the
limitations of the men and women who composed the
government, but in the nation as a whole, in its
institutions and the attitudes which shaped them ...
The failure of a government merely Epitomised and
reffticted the diminution of a people.
Was this process natural, indeed inevitable ? Was
it even desirable ? What precisely did we mean by
failure ? ... These questions naturally provoked
others. Whfct sort of people did the English wish
to be, and what bind of country did they prefer to
inhabit ?.n48
Now in order to make something of this, we need, according to Johnson,
to look back to the past for "the more he (the journalist) tries to
understand the present, the more he is driven to probe into the past,
49
in search for explanations". An example of this would be the
commentator attempting to understand the strife in Northern Ireland.
Not only would he have to look back to 1920 and the roots of partition,
48




but to 1688 and the Protestant ascendency and to the middle ages and
the origins of English interference. This vtovhfaas two consequences.
Firstly, the historian must influence the contemporary debate, for those
seeking to understand the present through looking at the historical
roots will inevitably be subject to the judgement of historians.
Secondly, it is clear that Johnson sees history as a seamless continuum
of chronology, rather than a distinctive logical gramework for the
understanding of events. As he puts it, "the frontier of history
ends only with yesterday's newspaper".^0 One particular problem worth
mentioning here is that of when to stop going back into the past.
After all, why stop with the Roman invasion, since we would need to know
why the Romans invaded and so on. Johnson is simply wrong to assume
that we are propelled by some logical necessity to go back in this way.
Even so, it is not surprising, to find Johnson settanting the Offshore
Islanders with the story with the withdrawal of the Romans in 406.
Without wishing to summarise the book in any great detail, a number of
themes might be mentioned. Firstly there is the idea that the book
itself is the product of a period of despondency and that what is now
needed is a fresh maturity of approach stemming from this comprehension
of the nation's past.^ Secondly there is the argument that the decline
of Britain in the Twentieth Century stems from a combination of hubris
(overwheening pride) and nemesis (fcetributive justice). It is interest¬
ing to note here that Johnson locates the seeds of this in the thoughts
of John Ruskin and his articulation of the late 19th century Imperial ideal,




spitit in which the Empire was gained. These views led to the
prolongation of the Empire, an institution which had brought nothing
52
but evil to the English tbnmselves, by allowing them to overestimate
their strengths and underestimate their weaknesses. It also had the
effect of featherbedding British industry by 'spreading the area in
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which British inefficiency mattered less'. Thirdly, there is the theme
that involvement in the Continent, via two world wars has hasteded
Britain's decline. Fourthly, there is the argument that the British
have always regarded stability above adventure and creativeness, with a
consequent pasiivity in the present century. Fifthly, there is the
view that the powerlessness of the Labour Party to effect radical change
has been due to - amongst other things - its failure to accord sufficient
priority to education; for educational failure is at the root of
Britain's decline as a dynamic society and has held back economic
growth. Finally, there is a discussion of Britain's decline and its
relationship to liberalism (as exemplified by the Labour Party of 1972)
in which Johnson concludes that the failures are not those of liberalism
but of insufficient liberalism, and that we must now resume the quest
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for improvements in liberalism and the appropriate institutional reforms.
The upshot of this is that the English now find themselves in a
dangerous position, bitter at the loss of Empire and without a compensatory
role; what they need to do is to renew themselves and to embrace the
fresh experienee that their position leads them to. As we shall see,
Johnson does not hold on to all of these positions. The important
point to note is the tone of his argument and its intermingling of the






by renewal; understanding the past will show us the false steps
we have taken and give us encouragement by showing that we have been
down before and recovered.
Compared with 'A History of the Modern World', 'The Offshore Islanders'
is, in one sense, parochial. Though it goes back further into the
past it tells the story of <i nation and its struggles. The later book
points a broader, if shallower, canvas taking us from the Russian
Revolution to the 1980's. Like Perry Anderson, it covers an enormous
amount of ground in every continent through a wide number of secondary
souraes. The book has two main currents running through it. Firstly,
if offers a trip through the present century, noting the key events
from the Russian Revolution, through the rise of Hitler to the Cold
War, Vietnam and super-power dipldbmacv. This chronicle is enlivened
by a number of 'controversial' re-assessments of some of the leading
actors on the sta§e. Thus we find that the American presidents to
admire in this century are not Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy,
but Calvin Cooledge, Warren Harding and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Gandhi,
for example, is seen as "a political exotic", obsessed with bowel
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movements and quite unfit to lead India to independence. The leaders
of independent Africa and Asia get similar short shrift, as does Keynes
(the Economic Consequences of the Peace is described as "One of the most
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destructive books of the century").
Secondly, hhere is the theme of the causes of our present miseries,
real enough to Johnson. Rather strangftfcy, this story starts with
Einstein, for giving us the theory of relativity. This, according to
Johnson, has undermined belief in abeolutes - if space and time are no
550p cit, pp470-471
^Op cit, p 30
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longer absolutes, then how can moral standards possibly have any claim
57
to ultimate objectivity ? The step from relativity to relativism,
though recognised by Johnson as being, perhaps, erroneous, is one which
he alleges the present century has made. This fits in with certain
themes in 'The Inemies of Society', but for our present purposes it is
enough to note that Marx and Freud are condemned as prime underminers
of values and Trotsky and other 'revolutionaries' of both left and
right have seized on these justifications to attack civilisation.
Moral relativism has made possible the political terrorism of the 1970's.
This is linked with the decline of religion and its absolute injunctions.
A passage that sums up the fiavour of the book is the following.
Among the advanced races, the decline and ultimately
the collapse of the religious impulse would lead a
huge vacuum. The hstory of modern times is in
great part the history of how that vacuum has been
filled. Nietzsche rightly perceived the the most
likely candidate would be what he called 'the Will to
Power' ... In piace of religious belief there would
be secular ideology. Those who had once filled the
ranks of the totalitarian clergy would now become
totalitarian politicians. And, above all, the Will
to Power would produce a new kind of messiah, uninhibited
by any religious sanctions whatever, and with an
unappeasable appetite for controlling mankind. The
end of the old order, with an unguided world adrift
in a relativistic universe, was a summons to such
gangster- statesmen to emerge. They were not slow
to make their appearance.co
Do
The theme of cultural and moral decline is unmistahible. The causes
of this decline ere the army of academice (through the law of
'unintended consquences'), the dictators of the war and of the new
nations in Africa and Asia, the pseudo-intellectuals influenced by
Marx and Freud and hhose who have failed to uphold the traditional
values of Western civilisation - the betrayers of moral absolutism.
57
Assubsidiary culprit here is G.E. Moore's 'Principia Ethica'
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Related to moral decline is economic freedom. For Johnson, economic
freedom and political freedom are inseparable, thus the free market
economy (dismissed in the late 1960's) is the only guarantee of individual
liberty and moral worth. The free market is the dynamic element in
growth and anything that undermines it (such as inflation) is itself
a moral evil. In short, the good men of our present century are those
who have defended absolute standards and the free market, the bad men
those who have espoused the philosophy of collectivism and moral
relativism.
The 'Enemies of Society' proceeds along much the same lines, Indeed,
it is possible to argue that 'A History of the Modern World' makes
concrete some of the claims in the earlier book. In particular, the
role of intellectuals is vigorously examined to see if, and how, they
have defended or attached society and civilisation. But that is to
move too far ahead. As the introductory paragraphs of 'Enemies of
Sodriety' make clear, the relationship between past and present is
still at the front of Johnson's mind. He writes
The exhilaration of the long, post-war book is over
and we now harbour a growing number of doubts about
the future of our societies and the civilisation which
embraces them ... The Cassandras of our time are
divided between those who struggle to save the
civilisation of the West from itself and its enemies,
add those who deny it is worth saving. Where does
the truth lie ?
This book is an attempt to answer such questions, and
many others that are relevant to the well-being of
humanity. We shall start the quest at the beginning,
not by analysing the ills, real or imaginary, of our
present civilisation, but by inspecting its roots,
the factors and forces that brought it into being
over many centuries ... We shall, in the first instance,
try to isolate the matrices, whether political, economie
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or cultural, of a progressive civilisation, and then
to examine whether, and if so how, such e civilisation
can decline and disappear. Then, having established
our historical model we shall be ready to investigate
the origins and development of western society and to
weigh ... its prospects of survival.
In line with this, Johnson starts his exploration with the growth of the
Greek city states and, more importantly, the decline of the Graeco-
Roman world, for it is in this decline - caused by the decline of
political and economic freedoms personified in the urban middle ciass -
that we see the model of civilisation working? first its rise and
then its fall.
We then approach our own time, with the constant and now familiar
reminder of the positive relationship between political and economic
freedom ("it is furely no coincidence that the Industrial revolution
and the creation of westefeenn capitalism were followed by the development
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of democracy in the West" ) and the importance of the urban middle
class in the development of culture and freedom ("there is ... a close
connection between cultural progress ... and technical and economic
achievement. All (painters, scientists, craftsmen) were seeking
freedom ... all were drawn from the middle section of s&ciety and in
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an urban atmosphere" ). At the end of this trail is the unparalleled
growth that took place in Western economies between 1945 and 1973, a
period in which capitalism really seemed to produce the goods and place
them within the grasp of the working class. The hero of this part of
the story is Keynes, for it was he who successfully balanced the equation
of private gain and public service. As Johnson puts it "If Keynes
cannot claim posthumous credit for assistant the post-war book, no thinker
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in history can claim credit for introducing anything".
But it is at this very moment of triumph, when capitalism appears to
have solved the problems of prosperity with humanity, that doubt sets
in. The problem Johnson now addresses himself to is that of why there
should have been this loss of confidence in capitalism and a rejection
of its values. There are, three related sets of reasons that he
enumerates. Firstly, there is the purely contingent fact of the world
depression, started by the Yom Kippur war of 1973 and the subsequent
rise in oil prices; a process which in effect added an automatic
inflationary twist to the western economies. Interestingly enough,
Keynes is ntot blamed for this, the failures of economic policy in the
1970's are not those of Keynesian theory. This has undermined
confidence simply by demonstrating that growth is not automatic and
that the economic system can still be thrown into reverse by unforeseen
circumstances.
But clearly this is not enough to account for the deeper malaise that
Johnson detects. The two key reasons here are the deliberate attack
on society by the enemies of western liberal democracies and the failure
of those who should be its defenders to come to its aid. Each civil¬
isation inevitably has within it the seeds of its own destruction, its
best hope of survival is to locate hbose seeds at an early eneugh
stage. The attack on truth, as Johnson calls it, takes a number of
forms.
As we have seen, he argues that the economic problems of the 1970's,
caused a trauma in western confidence. Into thd>s vacuum has poured a
vociferous anti-growth lobby of conservationists and environmentalists
who have tried to undermine the bfe&ief in growth per se. Secondly,
62Ibid, p83
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there has been annattack on language itself and the undermining of
linguistic truth - or at least language as the framework of reason -
by the growth of jargon and a number of dubious academic and pseudo-
academic subjects such as sociology and psychology. Thiddly, we
return to the decline of Christianity and the belief in an external
arbiter and, therefore, of absolute standards. In this instance, the
defenders of Christian truth have helped the invaders over the wall
of the citadel they are supposed to be defending, by indulging in
woolly minded oecumenism and 'pop' theology w&lch has fehades of
Alasdair Maclntyre) drained it of all empirical content and, therefore,
of any claim to truth.
Fourthly, philosophy, which ought to be at the forefront of the battle
against 'the forces of unreason' has lost itself in irrelevant linguistic
puzzles which do not set standards. The result of this is that a
whole generation of philosophers has done no useful philosophical work
at all. Fifthly, science has declined in standing intthe west and
there has been a shift away from physics (properly the queen of the
sciences) towards more dubious, immature sciences especially by govern¬
ments interested in planning 'social engineering'. The importance of
the decline of science is that, for Jo-nson, the method of science is
the method of civilisation. By this he means that the formulation of
hypotheses which can be empiricially falsified by tests. Civilisation
and science are inextricably linked and the decline of one will cause
the decline of the other. Thus one of the key areas in which the
enemies of society attack western civilisation is through the attach on
science and its replacement by psaedo-science of the Marxist-Sreudian
variety.
If science is a crucial subject to be undermined, then the universities
are the crucial instititutions for our enemies to assault. Unfortunately,
265
the defenders of academic standards appear to have given up, and the
Fascist Left' seems to have taken over. Though Britain has trebled
the number of places in higher education since the war, this had had
no appreciable (beneficial) effect upon our economic performance or
the GNP, but has merely brought ruin through the destruction of the
real purpose of academic pursuits and their replacement by the rabble
of the polyochracy.
What, as Lenin might have asked, is to be done ? Johnson opts for
two answers. The first is "to identify the malign forces quickly,
as and when they appear. That has been the chief purpose of this
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book" . The second is to reassert certain salient principles which
are essential to uphold. Hence the final chapter is devoted to
outlining 'a new Deuteronomy', "a new and secular Ten Commandments,
designed not, indeed, to replace the old, but rather to update and
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reinforce their social message". These new commandments can be
summarised in the following way. Firstly, there must be moral
absolutes. Secondly, we must reject violence as a political tool.
Thirdly, democracy is the least evil form of government. Fourthly,
the rule of law is essential. Fifthly, we must always stress the
importance of the individual. Sixthly, we must support the values
of the middle classes. In the seventh place we must acknowledge the
importance of freedom. Eitjhthly we must beware of the destruction
of language. NAnthly, we must trust science, and finally we must
always pursue trut$r.
Such a series of summaries cannot do justice to all of Johnson's ideas
and arguments. Nor can the nature of this thesis allow us to go into




The purpose of this section is, after all, to pdsint out where and how
Johnson fits into our conception of an ideologist using the past to
illuminate the political causes he is currently supporting. All three
books are fairly clear examples of that art, explicitly so. And one
can imagine the scorn with which Johnson would greet any attempt to
suggest that this should not be the case. Part of his conviction is
that everyone should be defending liberal democracy and the free market
with whatever tools and weapons are available, whether they be the
intellectual equivalent of a cannon or a pitchfork.
The logic of Johnson's thought might become store apparent if we examine
some small part of it in a bit more detail. In 'A History of the
Modern World* for example, we are greeted in the first sentence with
the claim hhat "The modern world began on 29th May 1919 ..." with the
confirmation of Einstein's theory of relativity (though Johason later
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admits that the final proof of the theory came some years later ).
This is in itself instructive of how a non-historian m^dfVh wish to
see epochs and eras starting and ending, rather than the more mundane
concern of history simply to link together what happened with what
preceded and with what followed it. This view is confirmed if we
consider that what i£ unhistorical about this approach is not the idea
of eras having a start per se, but rather the key event which is said
to start them. In Johnson's case it is the idea of a scientific
experiment (or hypothesis) undermining part of a culture and that
culture's faith in itself. In this sense, it is not the start of a
new ereein the way that someone might start a book on European history
with an essentially arbitrary event such as the discovery of America




as he admits himself, the relationship between Einstein's theory of
relativity and the relativism he seeks to attribute to itaas an
unconscious bye-product, is not one of historical cause and effect,
but essentially historical.
In general, one would want to make tww distinct types of ctiticisms
of Johnson. The first is to do with the level of accuracy and, for
want of a better worB, truthfulness of his account. For example, the
account of Gandhi and the road to independence in 'A History of the
Modern World' will scarcely satisfy the rigorous academic. Gandhi's
interest in bowel movements, his rejection of sex and his pacifism
are, perhaps, parts of the the story. But it is difficult to believe
that merely drawing attention to them in this way is enough to
account for, and lead to, a balanced judgement of, the man and his
role. For example, we find this assessment of Gandhi^
Gandhi was not a liberator but a political exotic,
who could only have flourished in the protective
environment provided by British liberalism. He
was a year older than Lenin with whom he shared
a quasi-religious approach to politics, though in
sheer crankiness he had much more in common with
Hitler, his junion by twenty years.-,.bb
We also discover that he ate heartily and that his avowed poverty was
hypocritical because it was expensive forofchhers to maintain him in
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that lifestyle. Finally, Whs policies were all inappropriate to
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India, and if followed would have Laed to 'mass starvation'. Now,
. one does not need to be Sir Richard Attenborough to find this a
rather bizarre and one-sided account.
The clear implication in linking Gandhi with Hitler and Lenin is that







Germany and the USSR can be laid at the door of the two great dictators.
If the account of Gandhi and his role in Indian politics is superficial
and misleading (and one might add here, makes little attempt to
understand the role of passive resistance, hunger strikes and so on
within Indian culture - as opposed to seeing them as cranky or
hypocritical) it is because Johnson has lost sight of the advantage that
hindsight will always give in judging the success of actions. But
explaining why something came about needs to keep this inc check,
otherwise the past becomes oneffoolish mistake after another that the
all-wise historian can pontificate about.
A second example of Johnson's rather cavalier treatment of the past is
his account of the Chilean coup inil973. Allende and his government
come over as incompetent, indecisive and as the main precipitators of
the coup. When the coup came, we are told that "most of the resistance
came from non-Chilean refugees .and that "The opposition to Pinochet,
though noisf, came chiefly from abroad. It was cleverly orchestrated
from Moscow ..."7°. Again, one does not need to know a great deal
about the subject matter to feel that the two pages Johnson allocates
to the episode certainly leaves out a great deal of material. One
might reasonably ask for the destabilisation policy of Henry Kissinger,
the United States pressure on internationalcredit and so on to explain
some of the events. Furthermore, there is plenty of evidence to
throw doubt on the assertion that opposition to Pinochet was mainly
external. But what is of equal interest here is the way in which





ship between freedom and the market economy. He tells us that
"Though foreign criticism concentrated on the repressive aspect of
Pinochet's regime, the more important one was the decision to reverse
the growth of the public sector ... and open the encnomy to market
forces ... Market economics by definition involved a withdrawal by
the state from a huge area of decision making, which was left to the
individual. Economic and political liberty were inseparably linked.
Freedom of the market inevitably led to erosion of political restraints:
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that was the lesson of Taiwan, Thailand and South Korea". One
cannot avoid the impression that Chile is an example of a general thesis
rather than an account of a series of events for the sake of their own
intelligibility. And the general thes&s is one which both begs the
question of whether this is an acceptable way to achieve even the most
laudatory of aims and whether Chile will in the future follow the same
path as Taiwan or Korea.
A third example of the failure tob live up to academic standards can be
taken from 'Enemies of Society' where in Chapter 10 he is discussing the
role of philosophers. In all honesty one can only say that the account
offered is a travesty of academic reasoning. A large number of
philosophers who should not be grouped together are thrown into vast
bran tubs with titles such as 'Cambridge plilosophers' or 'analytic
philosophers' without much attempt being made to understand their
arguments at all. The picture of faintly eccentric old buffers
wandering aimlessly around quadrangles, wondering if time is real
may make a funny novel, but is not really the kind of work one would
expect from a defender of reason. Indeed, when Johnson discusses
71Ibid, pp725-726
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(if that is the right word) the work of Wittgenstein, one wonders if he
has understood anything at all; the fact that he uses the well known
72
quotation from Russell on the 'Philosophical Investigations' suggests
not. The claim that for two generations "no useful work has been done
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in large traditional areas of philosophy" is simply false, unless
one has a peculiar idea of what it is that philosophers should be doing
in the first place. The fact that many have abandoned large scale
metaphysical theories may distress Joimson, but if they offer philo¬
sophical reasons for doing so, it is hard to see what grounds for
complaint he has. One of the ironies of Johnson's attack is that he
does not realise that some of his enemies agree with him on far more
occasions than he thinks. Wittgestein was, for example, often
depressed by the state of the world in which he lived and a conservative
rather than a radical.
The second type of criticism is over the type of claim that Johnson sees
himself as making between, for example, moral relativism, moral absolutes
and civilization. One problem here is the uncertainty one feels over
the concept of 'relativism' in Johnson's writings. There are at least
two types of 'relativism' that can be distinguished in this context.
Firstly, one might consider the 'relativism' of the Protagorus, where
Man is seen as the measure of all things. This is the kind of
'relativism' that Johnson probably has in minde Secondly, there is a
different kind d5f 'relativism' where it can be held that certain kidds
of moral judgement clash in a way that precludes jus judging them by an
agreed standard, or where there are no Objective, agreed, grounds to




second type Is not that we cannot make judgements at all, but that our
judgements are of a certain kind, in which we do not give a privileged
metaphysical status to our own set of criteria. It is this type of
'relativism' that is held by the philosophers that Johnson attacks and
so many of his arguments simply miss the point altogether. For example,
in his 'Lecture on Ethics', Wittgenstein discusses the nature of a
moral judgement and is quite clear that it has an absolute character
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rather than a relative one. However, he then goes on to argue that
moral absolutes from different religious or ethical traditions may
clash in such a way thfct there is not clear right answer as to what X
should do in case Y. Nothing Johnson says undermines this. We can
perfectly well imagine a Johnsonian absolutist faced with a moral
dilemma about, say, abeotion and having no better guidance from an
absolute set of principles than our 'relativist' (in sense two of the
term). In short, to be a 'relativist' in our second sense does not
imp&J that 'anything goes' (as Johnson seems to think), nor does his
kind of absolutism lead to any greater certainty in moral dilemmas that
there is a right answer to be chosen.
Furthermore, Johnson 1s thesis seems implausible in a number of ways. In
the first place, it is difficult to see either concept of relativism as
the product of our own century, for both have long traditions behind
them. Secondly, it is hard to ppoduce a convincing account of the past
in which decline and destruction can be said to have been caused by the
adoption of 'relativist' opinions, without begging the question of
decline versus tolerance. Equally importantly, there are a number of
counter examples where absolutism appears to have caused a number of
events that Johnson might describe as undesirable. Absolutism does
not, of itself, bring enlightenment, as a modern Iranian might agree and
74
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one could produce a huge list of atrocities brought about by, or at
least carried out in the name of. Christian values, the Koran or several
other systems of absolute valued. Whatever Johnson's examination of
the past does dhow, it does not provide any proof that civilization
depends on what he terms 'absolute' beliefs.
A final comment here is that it is perfectly possible to be sympathetic
towadds Johnson in terms of sharing his view that our society is decadent,
riddled with serious problems and so on, without wishing to endorse
either his explanation of why this is so, or his plan of action for the
future. Oddly, one finds an intimation (that cannot really be gone
into here) of what seems wrong in Johnson in the strictures of Oakeshott
against Hayek, Hogg and others. It is simply an unease with the position
that there are quite general solutions that are applicable here, as if
we can ask the question "Why is civilization in decline and what can we
do about it ?" and expect an answer in the form of any sort of doctrine
or principles. There may be ao such answer, as opposed to what we can
do about a particular problem.
This chapter has tried to examine some of the major themse in British
Conservative thought and to emphasise both the abhorrence that Conservatives
feel for 'abstraction' and 'dogma' and the importance they attach to
tradition. Two caveats to avoid possible misunderstandings should be
added here. Firstly, it would be too quick a move to turn the dislike
of dogma into a dogma itself (cf the argument "Your doctrine is that there
are no doctrines%"). A systematic expression need not be dogmatic.
Secondly, it is necessary to distinguish between theoretical and practical
objections. For example, a Conservative might agree that without the
consent of the governnd, stable government is a practical impossibility
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(hence Trade Unions must be accommodated within the political system
irrespective of rhetoric surrounding 'individual freedom') but still
disagree with a Liberal that consent by the governed is necessary to give
legitimacy to a particular governa«nt.
Further, I have suggested, ass with Liberalism and Marxism, the past is
integrated into this view of Man as a political agent such that it is
part of a Conservative view of the world, rather than part of the world
seen in a Conservative way. Conservatives, more so than other ideol¬
ogists, have tended to distinguish between the proper study of history
and the practical use of the past. This does not mean that they have
escehewed this latter oourse themselves. From Burke onwards, through
to Hailsham's pajber reflections, Conservatives have looked to the past
for inspiration and enlightenment. But what they have drawn from it
has been neither a vision of the future, nor a series of instructions;
rather they have seen it as providing a warning to those who are too
optimistic about human nature. If, as Concesvatives believe, man is
a fallen and imperfect creature, who cannot be systematically improved
by education, greater wealth, or any of the solutions of ideological
rivals, then the past may be said to confirm those gloomy thoughts.
The past shows it is Man, not his environment, that is to blame. But,
of course, this fact does not lead to support for any particular
programme that Conservatives, as opposed to Liberals or Marxists may
advance. The past is, in this sense, politically redundant unless we
already see it through Conservative eyes, in which case, though it may




The leat three chapters have attempted to look at the role of the past in
particular ideologies and to locate that role within the overall context
of Liberal, Marxist and Conservative thought. The past is not something
added to Liberalism but something that runs through it. The past is
seen as distinct from history here and its importance is conceived in
strengthening ideological commitment and certainty. But if the ideological
understanding of the past is distinct from an acadaaic understanding (and
not necessarily a failed academic understanding either) then how is it
related to other examples of practical discourse and other practical uses
of the past ?
One such use that I now propose to examine is the relationship between
ideology and Christianity. I do so, partly because many people have
suggested that they are identical in form (if not content) and there are,
therefore, philosophical issues at stake here; but also because it helps
provide (from the non-academic discipline side) another light which will
help throw ideology into sharper relief as an object of study. Some
critics may suggest that the discussion of ideology and religion together
is highly appropriate since they are both dubious if not vacuaus enterprises.
God is dead and ideology has replaced religion as the secular illusion of the
secular society. As Hobbes saw the ghost of the Roman Empire in the Roman
Catholic Church, there are those who see in Marxism, nationalism and fascism
the ghost of Christian religion in secular guise. For them, religion and
ideology are lumped together, in the sense that both are seen as false
doctrines or inadequate guides to action to be contrasted with 'a voice
that, with impartial logic flays them all'.^" They agree with Professor
*
P Corbett, Ideologies (Hutchinson, London, 1965), p 58.
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Raphael that an ideology may be taken to be 'a prescriptive doctrine that is
2
not supported by rational argument'.
In contrast most of those called ideologists and those who claim to be
religious have been concerned to keep their beliefs apart; not least
because they see their convictions as rivals for allegiance. Christians
have wanted to emphasise the gulf between the sacred and the secular - the
City of God is not seen to he the earthly city with better sewage disposal.
Marxists and liberals have wanted to contrast what they see as religion
with trhat they take to be philosophy and how much common ground there is
between religion and Marxism or liberalism (the best known case being the
Cfcfristian-Marxist dialogue), but the majority of adherents on either side
remain unconvinced as to the suitability of a merger. Of the saall group
of Christian-Marxists who see themselves as a bridge between both sides, it
has been unkindly remarked that there is a limited use for a bridge that
touches neither side of the river. For the most part, Marxists, as Francis
Barker put it in a recent issue of New Biackfriars, believe that because
Christianity is an ideology it will be incompatible at: a theoretical level
with Marxist 'science'. Compared with Marxist 'knowledge', Christianity
offers groundless confidence for action in the world. Liberals often
conclude that religion, with its emphasis on authority, be it that of the
Bible or the Pope, is repellent to reason and to the 'autonomous man'.^
In this chapter I shall critically examine what, broadly speaking, are the
claims of those who recognise no formal distinctions between ideology and
Christianity and those who categorically reject their conflation.
2
D Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy (Macmillan, London, 1970), p 17.
It is not entirely clear whether he means that ideologies are non-rational
or irrational. I suspect the latter.
3
Francis Barker, 'The morality of knowledge and the disappearance of God',
New Blackfriars, September 1976, pp 403-15. Marxists believe that all
religions are ideological, I shall only be concerned with Christianity in
this chapter.
4
Not all liberals are anti-theological, T H Green and Locke for example.
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The first claim, that ideology and religion are distinct, is sometimes
expressed as follows: whilst ideology is about man, and the here and now,
religion is about God and the hereafter. It is, however, clear that in
religious thought God is not absent from his creation. The study of Old
Testament prophets such as Amos, Micah and Isaiah,"' and the Last Judgement
as related by St Matthew,^ should be enough to show that human actions and
relationships are not to be understood as being independent of religious
faith, but rather as the occasion or context for an expression of that faith.
To say that the Christian attitude to life is 'otherworldly', or 'spiritual',
is not to conjure up a mysterious parallel world in which the Christian
may claim to partake, but to talk about the standards used in judging this
world. The 'spiritual' is not, pace A N Whitehead, what is left over when
material things are removed. Such a view would run the risk for the
Christian of making God's commandments remote from his creation. Fortunately
for them the prophets and evangelists make clear the kind of relationship
that exists within the Juddec-Christian tradition between the love of God
and the love of the neighbour. The latter, as St John points out, is not
an optional extra which is chosen apart from the former, but the principal
way in which the former is shown. Furthermore, as Kierkegaard tells us,
love of the neighbour is not like love for another person that could
legitimately fade away or even cease. The neighbour is always present and
the necessity of Chiistian love of his or her is permanent by virtue of
the existence of the Creation. Although for the Christian the religious
^




and the practical are distinct in experience, they are both ever-ptesent in
it. They are also both aspects of the public world on which it is possible
to make objective judgements.
The Covenants of both the Old and New Testament are made, not with an
individual, but with a people. The events that befall an individual, such
as the conversion of St Paul,oor the misfortunes of Job, are only intelligible
within the context of the religious community and tradition of which they
form a part. The concept of religious community is not something incidental
to religion, but the context in which religious notions of truth and
falsity are understood. What I am trying to combat here is tha tendency,
inherent in the dichotomy between God and the world, to make the latter
public, and the former private. To speak of prayer, or our relationship
with God, as private is not to place it outside discussion, but to suggest
that it does not invite secular government. Prayer is discussable in the
context of the religious tradition to which it belongs. To claim otherwise
is to skate close to the troubles encountered by Schleirrmacher in making
religious claims self-authenticating.^
Now the failure of the first claim does not establish that religion and
ideology are identical. My point, however, is that they can both be said
to play a similar role in a personis life. That is to say, for some, as
7
SSchleiermacher held that there was a specific, identifiable, religious
experience, correctly apprehended by the believer and misconceived by the
atheist. This buys exemption from the atheists' criticisms (as I, and
only I can know the quality of this experience); but if the experience
is private in this Cartesian sense, it is difficult to see how the atheist
can be accused of unfairly rejecting claims made for it. If it is not
pfiwate, Schleiermacher ought to admit the possibility of something other
than this inner feeling being used to test whether or not it is a sign of
the divine, and this mist apply to his own inner feelings.
278
the Christian sees the Resureecticm as saving humanity from the power of
sin, if only man will accept the gift of God's grace, revealed in the life
ancj person of Jesus, so the Marxist may see the proletarian revolution as
freeing tiankind from capitalist exploitation, when the proletariat of the
world unites. And, to extend the parallel one stage further, as the
kingdom of God inaugurates 'authentic' human relationships (in the sense
that they are no longer necessarily corrupted by sin and death), so the
proletarian revolution ends 'pre-history' and becomes the starting point
(not the culmination) of 'atthentic' human history (in the sense of making
it possible that human relationships be for the first time, uncorrupted
by exploitation).
Of course an ideologist may well agree with what has just been stated and
still claim that ideology and relgiion are distinct. As I said earlier,
the Marxist conceived that religion are distinct. As I said earlier, the
Marxist conceives that religion is 'ideological' in the sense of being both
a false and a biased view of the world, but that Marxism is not ideological,
because the form of its claims is comparable to those of science. Marxism,
it is claimed, can not only be shown to be capable of distinguishing true
from false propositions about the world, it can explain why people such as
Christians hold to false ones. For Marxists Christianity is not simply a
false doctrine, it is an example of 'false consciousness' or wishful thinking.
It is interesting in this context to note the similarity in the arguments
offered against religion by Marx, Feuerbach and Freud. Indeed, Marx's own
atheism seems to have been derived largely from Feuerbaoh, who saw religion
as the 'dream of the human mind' telling us (in a pejorative sense) about
the believer and not about God. This was the result of applying Feuerbach's
transformative method to, for example, St John's claim that 'God is love',
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revealing that this really means 'Love is God', and so on. Marx extended
this to cover material relationships, making Hegel's 'Man is the master of
his property' reveal 'Property is the master of man'. However, whether
religion is seen as neurosis on a grand scale, or the symptom of mankind's
alienated essence, it still needs to be shown that it is false and irrational.
This the argument does not try to do; for it assumes that religion is false,
and therefore to be in need of explanation as a phenomenon, in the same way
that we look for an explanation of X's paranoia when we have established
that his claim 'everyone is against me' is false. In short, it attempts
8
to explain mistaken beliefs without showing us why they are mistaken.
Without such a previously established sceptical conclusion it is easy to see
that this devaluation of religious belief loses its force in the argument.
That is to say, if we wish to say that religious beliefs are nothing but
neurotic hankerings after the security of a father figure, or the product of
certain material conditions, then we are open to the rejoinder that our own
anti-religious beliefs are nothing but childish rebellion against our human
father, or the product of material conditions. Reductionism of this sort
neatly undercuts itself, since religion and atheism do not come out as the
irrational and the rational, but equally as products of the psyche or society.
This is not to deny that some religious people are neurotic, or that people
may turn to religion out of a sense of personal inadequacy. I am merely
cliaining that it is illegitimate to move from this fact to the claim that
religion itself is a neurosis or a crutch for emotional cripples. This simply
g
Marx may not have been bothered about 'proving' the falsity of religion
as he thought that this would have been as irrelevant as giving a drug
addict lectures on the harm of drug-taking. Religion would not
disappear through argument, but only when certain eocial conditions had
been removed.
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does not follow. To reach such a conclusion requires that neurosis be
contrasted successfully with normal behaviour. On the face of it, many
religious believers are completely normal, and more important, the most
direct way by which we can identify a religious neurotic is by contrasting
his or her behaviour with that of a normal religious believer. This being
so, the criteria we must use to designate X as a religious neurotic must
be those of authentic religious behaviour, and it follows from this that
such a judgement must presuppose religious criteria and cannot stand in
judgement on them. Another difficulty is that for both Freud and Marx
nothing whatsoever can count as a falsifying example. In their description,
whatever religious believers do they still offer mere rationalisations
for doing it. Now, as we have noted, it is usual for correctly calling a
given reason a rationalisation to rely upon the existence of appropriate
criteria, but there is an impottant feature of the notion of deception,
namely, the possibility of the person who is decieved being able to recognise
it, that casts doubt on the rationalisation,thesis altogether in the work
of Marx and Freud. Lear, for example, as we saw in Chapter 3, eventually
sees Goneril and Regan in their true light. But this is not open to those
who suffer from 'false consciousness' or a neurosis; for Lear's recognition
of what has gone before, though it changes his perspective on matters is
still intelligible within the one framework. What Lear believed could have
been true, and it is only the tension that exists between what Lear believes
Goneril and Regan to be, and their actions (which indicate the opposite),
that brings us to say that he is decieved. These features are, however,
absent from the situation in which the Marxist or Freudian wishes to call
religion an illusion. Here the beliefs cannot be the right ones. Their
class or childhood experience prevents their recognising this.
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Another way of bringing out the error involved in thinking that we can explain
religionsaway by giving an account of the genesis of religious belief is to
consider a distinction we can make between reasons as grounds and reasons
as motives. I may, for example, assert that the Battle of Hastings was
fought in 1066. My grounds for asserting this consist of the relevant
historical evidence that we have at our disposal. These are independent
of my will and that of anyone else. One the ether hand, I may refrain
from correcting someone who claims otherwise, my motives being that of fear
stemming from my knowledge of his violent temper. This response is
independent of the standard of truth involved in the first case, and leaves
the truth-value of the statement untouched. The two cases are such that
they cannot be reduced to each tither. There is a logical gap between
them. We can have reasons of either sort, but a ground cannot be a motive
and vice versa. We hwve grounds for claims and motives for actions.
Jealousy may be my motive for killing X, but it cannot be evidence for it;
the detective's photographs may be his grounds for suspecting my guilt, but
a knowledge of my motives is not. Thus the location of the motives of a
religious believer could not affect the truth or falsity of his or her
grounds for faith. It should also be added at this point that such arguments
will be valid against any such accounts of ideology as well. That is,
those theories that attempt to see them as forms of wish-fulfillment or the
9
externaiisation of internal disorders.
The ideologist may still not be convinced by this. In particular the claim
may be made that we are indeed looking for grounds, rather than attempting
9
For example, Robert Tucker's account of Marxism in R Tucker, The Marxian
Revolutionary Idea (Allen & Unwin, London, 1970).
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to locate motive, and that the truth of the ideologist's prescriptions
im demonstrable by an appeal to history, science, or philosophy. Thus the
certainty of academic disciplines (if there is indeed such a thing) is
contrasted with the lack (and in some cases, Karl Berth for example, the
positive disavowal) of any foundation for religion in this sense.
However, it is not clear that religious faith is compatible with the kind
of certainty we expect of science or philosophy. Given certainty, what,
as Kierkegaard asked, bocomes of the possibility of faith ? We can admit
that there is a distinction to be made between the natures of knowledge
and of fatth, but the distinction is not one between that which is rational
and that which is irrational. It is a formal difference, not a difference
that depends upon an evaluation.
Another claim made, amongst others, by Patrick Corbett** and Alasdair
12
Maclntyre, is that Christianity is itself an ideology. Corbett, for
example, takes 'the Marxist', 'the Catholic' and 'the (American) Democrat'
as his main examples of ideological belief (although he claims that there
are hundreds, if not thousands of other examples, including Ghandism,
nazism, the divine right of kings and myths about the English public school!).
There are two points that can be made about this characterisation. The
first is the systematic unfairness of it all. His account of Catholicism
ranges at points between a parody and a travesty. He writes:
His the Catholic's contempt for fact is so glaring
as to need no comment. His fundamental contention
is that the ills of the world ... can only be cured
by the acceptance of certain truths ... under the
guidance of the Church. Now if this were true
*^
When asked to sum up the four volumes of 'Chtroch Dogmatics', Barth
replied 'Jesus loves me, this I know, for the Bible tells me so'.
**
Patrick Corbett, Ideologies > °P cit.
*^
Alasdair Maclntyre, °P cit, ASIA.
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there should plainly be some correlation between the
power of the Church and the peacefulness of life ...
but as everyone knows, the truth is exactly the reverse.
13
This 'must be seen by anyone who looks without prejudice at the world
around him', though 'looking at the world without prejudice is not the
Catholic's aim ... he is prepared to spin the facts around in any way
14
that suits his purpose'. I cannot actually think of any Catholic
theologian who believes that the ills of the world can be cured in the
way that Corbett describes, not anyone who thinks that the truth of
Catholicism is shown or measured by the correlation Corbett suggests.
It is, of course, the duty of the church to bring people to God, and
to uphold certain Christian values, but even so the ills of humanity could
not be cured by the church, since these ills are a condition of sin which
must always be present by virtue of the nature and existence of the
Creation.
The second point is that Corbett sees ideological statements as being
'designed' to condition men socially. It is not the 'ordinary man' who
gains by them, but the crafty ideologist and his masters. Thus the
ideologist's motives are as suspect as his logic. But Corbett has
misunderstood the kind of relationship that exists between the ideologist's
aims and his beliefs. Corbett sees the Catholic or Marxist as believing
certain things in order to gain power. He accuses them of believing
because they want something. It does not occur to him that they want
certain things because they believe. The point is that the Catholic may




have a therapeutic abortion, but still be unable to sanction such an
operation because the outcome (the loss of the unborn child) cannot be seen
as a good thing whatever else happens. 'The facts' do not refute what
the Catholic believes since it is what the Catholic believes that determines
the moral significance of the facts. Corbett is right to suggest that
there ire no ultimate grounds on which the Catholic or Marxist may demon¬
strate the objective nature of his beliefs (the same, incidentally, being
true of his own heliefs), but it does not follow from this that they are
strictly comparable.
The similar claim to that made by Corbett advanced by Maclntyre is that
Christianity is an ideology, but one that has drained itself of any
empirical content.The replacements offered by an increasingly secular,
and it seems, neurotic society - on the one hand Marxism, on the other
psycho-analysis - have failed to fill the gap left by belief in God and
we are left to search for a more satisfactory ideological replacement.
Maclntyre writes:
Against those who still believe that some particular
ideology is still able to provide the light that our
social and individual lives need, I shall assert that
- in the case of Christianity, of Psychoanalysis and
above all, of Marxism - either intellectual failure,
or failure to express the forms of thought and action
which constitute our contemporary social life, or both,
have led to their necessary and in the long run not
to be regretcied decay.
16
Now, as Henry Drucker has pointed out,*^ it is difficult to see the way
in which psychoanalysis is an ideology in the way that Marxism, nationalism
and liberalism are. Certainly in terms of uocal manifestations in the
^




Henrp Drucker, The Political Uses of Ideology, 97-8.
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political arena there is no parallel to be drawn. If we wish to call
psychoanalysis ideological, it would certainly have to be distinguished
from those ideologies named above.
However, more needs to be said about Maclntyre's claim than this. It is
ciear from Maclntyre's comment that he thinks that Marxism and Christianity
are similar (in the logic of the discourse that they employ) and that
Christianity has now been replaced by Marxism as a more recent if not more
advanced form of ideological commitment. In order to establish this
claim, he has to show that they are related by something more than
historical contingency.
It might be claimed that mankind has progressed from primitive myths and
magic to religion, replacing notions of gods that are in trees or animals
with that of a God who does not inhabit in person the world he created,
and that the next stage in this development is the abondonment of religion
18
for a yet more sophisticated view, namely, ideology." But the theological
writings of Aquinas or Augustine, whatever failings they do have, are as
accomplished as Mill's or Marx's contribution to their respective traditions.
Indeed, when compared to Aquinas, the writings of national socialism and
fascism in particular (two ideologies peculiar to the twentieth century)
seem unsophisticated in Maclntyre's terms. His view only makes sense if
we have a one-dimensional picture of human understanding: the sort of
perspective that sees the parting of the Red Sea as the precursor of the
Hoover Dam, or a magical rite as an attempt to perform a scientific
experiment. It is this kind of assumption that permeates the anthropological
18
cf. Compte's idea of progression from theology to science via
metaphysics.
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writings of Sir Janes Frazer, and is powerfully exposed by Wittgenstein in
19
some remarks on Frazer's The Golden Bough. In particular, Wittgenstein
notes that the people Frazer describes aiready understood causal connections;
magical rites were an expression of something important, not the deployment
20
of a causal hypothesis. Why, for example, should they pray for rain
at the start of the reiny season ? Surely, if prayers were thought to
have a mysterious causal efficacy, it would be sensible to pray at the
start of the dry season! In this context it is worth recalling G K
Chesterton's remark when told that the presence of food and wine in an
Egyptian tomb 'proved' that the Egyptians must have believed that the
dead were capable of eating and drinking; he said that this conclusion
no more followed from the evidence than the fact that Christians put
floners on a grave 'proved' that they must believe that the dead can
both see and smell!
Before going on to look at the parallels that might be drawn between
religion and ideology it is as well to draw a distinction between
theology and the philosophy of religion. This is not easy; ad ® £ ~
Phillips points out, it is rather like working on the Tower of Babel
with the added disadvantage of there being no convenient agreement as
21
to the object of the project. Nevertheless, some general remarks
can be made. Theology is the systematic attempt by which the believer
shows, as Aquinas put it, 'God in His Godhead'. The theologian does
this in a variety of ways, by examining the scriptural conception of
19
L Wittgenstein, 'Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough, The Human World,
May 1971, 95. ""
20
This is not to say that they can never be mistaken in this way, but
that they need not be so.
21
D Z Phillips, The Concept of Prayer (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1965), 1.
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God, by examining what the Councils of the Church have said, or by asking
questions such as 'can the number six be the Creator ?'. The important
thing to note is the relationship between theology and faith. St
Anselm, for example, described his work as that of 'faith seeking under¬
standing', and of himself as 'believing that I might understand'. Faith
here is an inner demand of theology. That is, theology may be separate
from the other facets of religion, but not from religion itself. It
is not, in this sense, separate from the beliefs that it expresses; for
it is not a ground for belief, it is a systematic, doctrinal, expression
of that belief, in the way that public worship is the liturgical expression
of that belief. The theologian must always be within a religious
tradition. Contrary then, to the assertion made at the start of Chapter 2
22
of Honest to God by John Robinson, traditional theology is not based on
the five proofs of God's existence offered by Aquinas, but on faith in
God's word as revealed in scripture. It is worth noting in this context
that the Summa Theologia does not start with or from (in the sense of
23
being based upon) the Five Ways at all. Secondly, though we may examine
(and find wanting) the arguments put forward by Aquinas for their philo¬
sophical coherence as proofs, it is not clear that they were intended
as such. Who were the thirteenth-century a't&eists to whom Aquinas could
have been addressing himself ?
Having *aid all this, it ought to be clear, on the one hand, that the
theologian is not an impartial judge between the claims advanced by two
churches or within different religious traditions, but a man committed to
22
J A T Robinson, Honest to God (Westminster, London 1963), 29.
23
Question 1 is entitled 'On what sort of teaching Christian theology
is and what it covers'.
a religious stance. The philosopher of religion is, on the other hand,
concerned with the logic of religious statements, not, qua philosopher,
choosing between them. The philosophy of religion is not faith seeking
understanding; it is concerned with what is involved in belief, rather
than expressing it. In this sense the philosppher sees the philosophical
relevance of certain concepts, but not their religious significance (which
is not the same as their significance for religion): for in one sense, to
understand the religious point of a doctrine is to believe in it. Or, to
put it the other way around, to believe in a doctrine is to 8«» the
2A
religious point of it.* If the above characterisation is correct it is
clear that the difference between Christianity and Marxism (to keep to
Kaclntyre's example) cannot be expressed merely by enumerating a series
of propositions that one assents to and the other does not. To do so
would be to place faith on top, rather than at the heart, of the theologian'
task. It would reduce faith to an intellectual extra that could be
added on to the end of the liberal or Marxist account of religious
experience.
If the foregoing discussion has established the relationship between
theology and religion, we are now in a position to draw the correct
distinction between ideology and religion that was hinted at earlier in
noting the attempt of ideologists to ground their beliefs in what is
claimed to be social science or social philosophy. The Christian does
not attempt to ground his belief in the theology iet alone in a secular
discipline like philosophy or science. On the contrary, it is those very
24 This should not be confused with the claim that belief is necessary for
understanding tout court. A person may understand what is involved in
the doctrine of the Trinity and reject it. My claim is that seeing
the point of an activity is not the same as knowing what constitutes a
valid move within it or defending it against objections.
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beliefs that make theology possible. To labour the point, theology
does not stand below or outside of belief (whatever your metaphorical
preference) as a foundation based on 'the facts'; it is itself another
way of expressing those beliefs. If the relationship, for example,
between Marxism and history were of the same type as that between tbeology
and religion, it would produce for the Marxist the extremely unsatisfactory
spectacle of Marxism appealing for verification to a version of itself:
the claims of the ideologist and theologian are, I suggest, different.
Now we can, of course, argue with Maclntyre that both claims are mistaken
and in the end vacuous. But it is important to see that, even if this
were so, the mistakes of the ideologist and of the religious believer are
of a different order. The desire to organise the state in accordance
with the laws of God may produce disastrous results, as the Anabaptists
found out, but though such a society might be strange and unpleasant, it
could only be unstable, not an impossibility. Again appealing to the
Bible might not demonstrate that only theocratic government is legitimate,
but it is not the same kind of mistake as trying to base the political
structure of a society on the discoveries of natural science. The appeal
to a religious authority may prove contingently unacceptable, but it will
not be incoherent as an appeal to science must invariably prove to be.
Even if it is accepted that the forms of an ideological and of a religious
work ar rent it might still be claimed that the content or practical
achievement is the same, or amounts to the same thing. By content or
practical achievement I do not mean a series of propositions that are
affirmed by either or both, or even their respective ontologies, but
something more akin to the fact that religion and ideology both offer a
'world view'. One similarity that can be noted is the radical discontinuity
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that exists between oj- previous standards and those we noo adopt when
we become religious believers or adherents of an ideology. The world then
becomes, in an important sense, a different place and we characterise
such a metanoia in terms such as 'dying to the world', 'being reborn', or
recognising 'alieaation' and escaping 'false consciousness'. In saying
this the believer and adherent are not claiming to have more information
about the world than they did before, but that they see it as it 'really
is'. That is, they claim to see the real significance of events: to
have gone beyond mere appearances. This is connected with the fact
that, in adopting a religious or ideological standpoint, the individual
is rescued from insignificance and placed at the eentre of the stage.
No one is insignificant in the sight of God, and each 'proletarian' has
a part to play in securing the success of the 'revolution'. And, as in
a Shakespearian tragedy, nothing, when seen from the total scheme of
things, is irrelevant or insignificant. A person may hold to moral
standards and yet still say that 'life has no meaning' or 'life is a
mystery', but the believer and adherent are committed to saying that
life is meaningful, and that through salvation, class struggle, or
national self-determination, the value and intelligibility of their life
is revealed. For the man of conviction bhere is a point to life the
significance of which is not i.ramediately given in experience. This
significance will, of course, be different, depending on the faith or
ideology embraced. What the Marxist sees as a symptom of the class
structure of society may appear to the liberal or conservative as
evidence that the rule of law is being upheld against the claims of
sectional interests. The point is that both bhe believer and the
adherent see all events as peculiarly significant withinttheir respective
frameworks. Nothing is excluded.
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But to say that Christians, Marxists, liberals and nationalists all find
events significant within a certain framework will not get us very far,
unless we can look at the kind of singificance involved. One way of
trying to bring out the parallel it is claimed exists between them is to
look at the way that holding a 'world-view' helps a person to work
towards a goal. In the case of the Christian this can be put roughly as
follows. The kingdom of God is not (only) the final stage of history,
but the trajectory of history. The fact that the kingdom will come, or
rather the fact that the kingdom has been established, though not fulfilled,
enables us to work towards salvation. This is to say that the kingdom of
God is not just the top note of the ascending musical scale of history,
but the trajectory of history. In a similar way, it is the belief in
the certainty of the 'proletarian revolution' that provides, for the
Marxist, the significance of history, and enables him to see himself as
advancing a cause. It was the 'correct' attitude taken by the Bolshevik
faction to the''bourgeois revolution' in Russia (that is, of seeing it as
the prelude to, and midwife of, the 'proletarian revolution').which could
be seen to justify their tolerance of liberals, whilst perceiving in this
convenience the deeper dimension necessary for their eventual 'success'.
But we should not, like Corbett, get carried away with similarities that
exist only on the surface. For the Christian, the post-Resurrection
worldso thn "^histological perspective is one in which the certainty of
the kingdom is assured. Even if the world were to end tomorrow, then
this would not negate what the Christian sees as the victory of Christ
over sin and death, since the event that assures this victory has been
revealed to him through his faith and is guaranteed by it. It cannot be
reversed by a future event. There is, it must be admitted, a serious
disagreement over the kind of event the Resurrection was, and whether or
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not claims about its occurrence are potentially falsifiable by historical
evidence. On one side of the dispute is the unlikely, if not unholy,
alliance between Catholic natural theologians and sceptics, such as
Antony Flew, who insist that it is on a factural level, on a logical par
with other historical events. On the other side are modern Protestant
theolagians, led by Barth and Bultmann, who put it safely outside the bounds
»
25
of historical investigation. The kind of invulnerability they claim
26
has led to charges of vacuity, reductionism and inconsistency. " But
such a controvery cannot, I think, alter the contention that to be a
Christian is to believe in the occurrence of the Resureection, and in the
Christian faith its occurrence cannot be challenged. However, it is
clearly not the case that believing in Marxism similarly guarantees the
occurrence of the 'revolution'. As a temporal event the 'revolution' is
a possibility, but not a certainty. Marxism cannot preclude the possibility
cf nuclear energy destroying the world.
I do not wish to deny here that the place of the past in Christianity is
a complex issue with many writers taking different sides. Ever since ike
process of 'demythologizing' the bible was started in the 18th century by
Protestant scholars, there has been less emphasis on the bible as history
and more emphasis on the symbolism involved. Thus the prevalent view
that the New Testament is an attempt to make sense of Jesus' life and
claims to Messiaship within various intellectual traditions (Greek,
25
Bultmann puts the point as follows: 'It is precisely its immunity from
proof which secures the Christian proclamation against the charge of
being mythological.' Kerygma and Mtyh, A Theological Debate, rev. and
trans. R H Fuller (Harper & Row, New York, 1961), 44.
26
See A Maclntyre 'The religious significance of atheism' and 'God and
the theologians' (reprinted in ASIA).f For some interesting and pertinent
criticisms of Bultmann, See R W Hepburn 'Demythologizing'and the problems
of validity', in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed A G N Flew and
A Maclntyre (Macmillan, London, 1964).
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Jewish, Gnostic, etc.) rather than a record of actual events. But for
every follower of Bultmann who wishes to deny the literal occurrence of
miracles and to suggest that even the Resurrection does not involve any
27commitment to the physical revival of Jesus' body there is a Hugo Meynell
who holds that not only are miracles signs or symbols of Jesus' power but
evidence for it.
Whatever one thinks of these rival claims I could suggest that they do
not involve history in any sense that we would normally use. It is clear
that the significance of the events goes beyond the actual events themselves
because they are set in a theleological context (and the parallel with
the teleological element in Marxism is strorghere) in a way that for
assessment of the history of Spain or England does not. Furthermore,
though we may see miralie X as an event, it is difficult to know where
the concept of evidence could apply here. What evidence would we require
to show that a miracle occurred, as opposed to evidence for the battle of
Hastings having taken place ?
Earlier, it was noted that 'authentic' human relationships were inaugurated
by the advent of the kingdom of God for the Christian and will be by the
coming of the 'revolution' for the Marxist. Again, it is worth examining
what is involved in these concepts of authenticity, and seeing if there
are any significant disparities. One which comes to mind is that for the
Marvia; *->a#;ed, any ideologist) authentic human history is still
history. It is still within the bounds of time in which it is possible
that men perform actions, catch colds and die. For the Christian, this
27
H Meinell, God and the World (London, SPCK, 1971).
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is not sot for whatever we are to make of the notion of eternal life, it
cannot be a temporal duration. Our salvation is not an event. It is
outside time, and without all that occurs in time. To say that there will
be no colds or deaths in heaven is to make a grammatical remark, and not
to comment on the superiority of preventive mddicine there.
This brings us to the notion of the eteunal, and its importance in religious
life. It is a difficult notion, especially when connected to questions
about survival after death, and I do not want to comment on the complex
issues involved. I shall only consider the relationship bef-wen the
eternal and temporal and try to make clear their incompatibility. There
is a danger of looking on the after-life asbbeing like the last reel of
a Western movie - that is, the time following the time of reckoning when
the divine sheriff gives to everyone their just deserts. If we thus look
on eternity as a period to be added on to the end of hisbbry this must
preclude our making the essential distinction we have to make in order to
grasp the point made by D Z Phillips in advancing the following txro
28
quotations."' The first is from Antony Flew, the second from Wittgenstein.
Flew says:
And if this future life is supposed to last forever, then
the qeestion of whether or not it is fictitious ... is of
overwhelming importance. For what are three score years
and ten compared with all eternity ?
29
Here eternity is seen as more time. What Phillips wants to stress is
the qualitative difference the use of the term eternal makes, hence the
following passage from the Tractatus;
28
D Z Phillips, Death and Immortality (Macmillan, London, 1970), 48-9.
29
A G N Flew, op cit.
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Not only is there no guarantee of the temporal immortality
of the human soul, that is to day, of its eternal survival
after death: but in any case the assumption fails to
accomplish the purpose for which it has always been intended.
Or is some riddle solved by my surviving for ever ? Is not
this eternal life as much of a riddle as our present life ?
The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies
outside space and time.
30
The point Phillips is making is that to ask 'how long does eternity last ?'
is as pointless as asking 'where do parallel lines meet ?' or 'what is the
largest number in an infinite series
Seeing the grammatical distinction between eternity and temporality helps
us to draw one final distinction in this era. It is related to the
earlier discussion of the past and future. The Marxist may see the
General Strike of 1926 as a defeat for the working class movement in
Britain, a defeat that will be reversed by future events. The working
class may receive setbacks but in the end it will be victorious. For
the Christian, on the other hand, the Crucifixion cannot be understood
in this way. It was not a defeat that will be overcome at a later date,
or even a defeat that will come to be seen as essential to the final
victory. Seen from the standpoint of the eternal, it always is a
victory. As Kierkegaard puts it:
nothing in the world has even been so completely lost
as was Christianity at the time that Christ was crucified
... never in the world had anyone accomplished so
little by the sacrifice of a consecrated life as did
Jesus Christ. And yet in this same instant, eternally
understood, He had accramplished all ... Was it not said
by many intelligent men and women, 'The result shows
that He has been hunting after phantasies; He should
have married. In this way He would now be a
distinguished teacher in Israel.'
30
L Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicaa (Poutledge & Kegan Paul,
London, 1961), 6.4312.
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And yet, eternally understood, the crucified one had in
the same moment accomplished all.' But the view of the
moment and the view of eternity ... have never stood in
such atrocious opposition. It can never be repeated.
This could only happen to Him. Yet eternally under¬
stood, He had in the same moment accomplished all and
on that account, said, with eternity's wisdom 'It is
finished'.
31
So far I have tried to show that there are important differences between
both the form and content of religious and ideological claims. In
particular, that theology is not a ground for Christianity, as history
of science are claimed to be a ground for Marxism, and that the eternal
(as understood by Chris teams) is a category that has no equivalent, in
ideological writings. I want to conclude by making some remarks about
religious practices and ideologically inspired activities.
When we consider religious practices, there are important differences
even within Christianity. The mass, with its attendant notions of
sacrament and priesthood, is a central feature of Roman Catholicism and
yet it is regarded by extreme Protestant sects as 'a blasphemous fable
and dangerous deceit'. The notions of sacrament and priesthood are not
to be found in the religious talk of the Pentecostal sects and the Quakers.
Are, then, the differences between Christian sects greater than, or of
a different order from the differences between religious and 'ideological'
practices ? It might be argued, for example, that the 'Internationale'
and 'Deutschland uber alles' are the equivalent of 'Onward Christian
Soldiers' or 'Full in the Painting Heart of Rome'; that 'A letter
Concerning Toleration' is similar to a Papal Encyclical, and that the
devotion shown by Catholics to St Francis is echoed by that shown by the
31
S Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart, trans D V Steere (Harper, New York,
1956), 120-1.
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Russians to Lenin and the Chinese to Mao. The monument to Mao is certainly
as grand as that accorded to any Christian saint.
There are, of course, similarities, just as there are between revivalist
meetings and football matches or rock concerts. Even so, it is important
to see that calling Russian devotion to Lenin 'religious' is not to be
taken literally, and that such usage is parasitic on authentic religious
notions. In seeing the part a notion plays in a way of life, it is
essential to put it into the appropriate context. The religion itself,
where the notion of what is sacred and holy and the conception of God all
determine the sense that prayer has for the believer, and the very possib¬
ility of praying. The context in which ideological activities and
pronouncements take place is a different one, with different conceptions
providing different possibilities. It is illegitimate to 'abstract'
notions from the two contexts and say that they really amount to the same
thing. It would be as absurd as equating a Saturday night dance in
Pitscottie with an African ritual for choosing a wife on the grounds that
there is music, dancing, possibly the uae ;of hallucinatory substances,
and that the end result is the same - people pair off into couples. Seen
within their appropriate contexts, we can see that the concepts which give
life to one are absent from the other. Thus it would be mistaken to
equate prayers that are tied to the notion of an Eternal God with whatever
regard the Chinese have for Mao when the notion of eternity has no place
in Maoism. To this extent, there are no ideological equivalents ahd
prayers and worship at all. In a similar way religious rifruals and their
expression are distinct from ideological rituals. Again, it would be no
use arguing that the notions of the sacred and holy only make a difference
of degree, for they are what make religious notions religious. In this
sense they are internal to the religious notion of a ritual, and once this
2 CR
is seen we should not make the mistake of equating religious and ideo¬
logical practices on the grounds of external similarities.
Given the variety of religion and ideology, discussing them in this way
may seem an ambitious project. It is not surprising that religion is
construed as referring to Christianity, and mainstream Christianity at
that. There may,be, of course, Christian sects that do not appear to be
covered in the exposition given here. What can be intelligently said
about them would then depend on the concepts they employ and the relation¬
ship these concepts would have to other Christian churches on one hand,
and ideologies on the other. The matter could not be settled by an
a priori definition of religious belief. Such matters are left alone,
first because of ignorance of the minutiae of peripheral Christian groups
and secondly because they are peripheral. It should be stressed here
that the religious and theological attitudes outlines are examples of
Christian thought, not archetypes.
None of the above should be taken to imply that religious people should
not get involved in politics. The Reverend Dr Paisley is quite consistent
to be an MP if somewhat repellant to his ecumenically minded colleagues,
for other reasons.
Nor should the force of the parallels between Christianity and ideology
be overlooked. Ify point has been to show both that they rest on different
foundations and that there is no satisfactory ideological category that
can do justice to both the concept of the eternal and the activity of
worship. This emphasises the point I have been making all along about
context. The fact that taken in abstraction the Marxist and Chriatian
attitudes to the past seem similar in form dissolves when we place them
against their respective backgrounds - or at the very least, loses its
plausibility as a genuine comparison.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
In the opening chapter of this thesis it was suggested that the author
might be accused of allowing the question of truth, surely the central
concern of anything worth calling philosophy, to slip by. I have
tried, in one sense, to deflect this question, rather than meet it head
on by suggesting that ideological thought is not like history, or
philosophy - in as much as either of those disciplines attempt to give
genuine theoretical knowledge about the world. In saying this I
would want to distinguish my thesis from that of a Popper, a Corbett
or a Raphael, who would want to suggest that ideological beliefs and
doctrines are nothing but nests of intellectual confusion with potentially
dangerous practical results if those who are mislead by them seize
power. And they are dangerous precisely because they fail to live up
to the standards of science, history or philosophy. My argument is
that even if this were so, within the arena of politics, ideological
thought may be said to be a factor which may motivate or encourage
people to act in a certain way and that we should not dismiss ideology
but investigate precisely what is involved in it. The fact that
ideology is not a discipline (in an Oakeshottian sense) need not imply
that it is vacuous or irrelevant.
I have tried to carry this investigation out by approaching the subject
from two opposite directions. Firstly, I have tried to look at the
contrast between 'academic' disciplines and ideological thought and
secondly, to iook at the relationship between ideology and practical
activities such as religion, where it might be thought that there are
worthwhile parallels. But I want now to look in more detail at the
question of disputes between ideologists - both those which take place
-30O
between members of the same ideological tradition and those which take
place between rival ideological groups. The purpose in doing so is to
look at how, if at all, such disputes might be settled and to see whether
they are similar to disputes between scientists or historians on the
one hand, and other practical activities auch as religion (an morality)
on the other. In this way the question of truth is raised for
consideration, though, I hope, in a clearer context.
It cannot have escaped the attention of any student of politics that the
disputes between, for example, Conservatives and Socialists are as
interminable as they are ill tempered. Though there may be particular
instances where one side or the other will admit defeat on a point of
detail or over a matter of fact, there is no concession in the wider
arena of principles and values. Moreover, disputes between various
Marxist or Nationalist groupings are often characterised (to the outside
observer at least) by many of the same features. Why, we may ask,
should this be so ? Is it because the stubbornness or plain irrationality
of one side in the dispute, or is it because the very nature of the
debates themselves precludes a satisfactory solution ? I shall call
those disputes between Liberals and Marxist or Conservatives and
Nationalists 'external' disputes and those between members of the same
ideological persuasion 'internal' disputes.
I
The most fertile source of 'internal' disputes is undDubtadly amongst
those groups professing to be Marxists. The followers of Trotsky, Mao
Tse Tung, Althusser, not to mention the 'orthodox' Communist Parties of
both Eastern and Western Europe, all claim to be "true" Marxists, as
opposed to their opponents who are 'revisionists', 'ultra-leftists' or
'adventurists'. Consider the following examples of such disputes.
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At the beginning of the present century some Socialists, such as
Bernstein, argued that certain of Marx's predictions had failed to come
about because of changes within the structure of western capitalism
that Marx had not foreseen. Socialists should, therefore, abandon such
redundant ideas and replace them with an analysis that took the new
situation into account. More recently, the late Anthony Crosland*
argued that increasing economic prosperity had effectively defused the
class struggle and that Marx's predictions of catastrophe were false.
Against this it was argued (by Kautsky and Luxemburg among others) that
the 'scientific' nature of Marxism means that in the end it would be
vindicated by events and Shown to be correct. Any setbacks would only
be temporary, because capitalism cannot survive the internal contradictions
it generates, no matter how many times it finds a way to overcome a
particular crisis, whether by war or by economic imperialism.
Thus the modern Socialist critics of Crosland^ argue that his thesis
was only tenable at a time of economic growth and increasing prosperity
because it would hide the fundamental question of how the capitalist
cake was distributed behind the fact that the cake was increasing in
size and everyone got more. But, so the critic argues, that was only a
temporary respite from the economic crisis that is inevitable, and that
class struggle will surface again sooner or later.
A second example is that of the Russian Revolution and the subsequent history
of the Souiet state. Some Marxists have argued that whatever imperfections
there are in the USSR, it is a socialist state? Marxist in economic
*
C A R Crosland, The Future of Socialism (London: Cape, 1956).
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policy and the first example of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'
in action. Others have argued that it is nothing of the sort,
complaining that the Soviet rulers have departed from Marxism and set
up a 'degenerated workers' state' or 'State Capitalism' instead.
There are features of such debates that are worth mentioning here.
Firstly, a great deal of attention is paid to specific texts, pre-eminent
amongst which are the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin. This does
not mean that such texts are unambiguous, consistent and have settled
interpretations that all the disputing parties are agreed upon. Rather
it means that in some circumstances it is enough to refer to a
statement of Marx (or Lenin) in order to end an argument and to decide
upon one course of action rather than another. In other words, not
only must an argument be convincing, it must be shown to be in accordance
with 'Marxist principles'; that is to say, shonr foundation for it must
be sought in the writings of accepted Marxist writers such as Marx,
Engels and Lenin.
As we have already noted (see page 55 ) an example of this point is
provided by the debate between Gunn and Hoffman over the question of
Engels' position in the 'Dialectics of Nature'. It is not enough to
assess the coherence of what Engels says, the authors feel impelled to
show that those views are, or are not, 'Marxist'. But, though there
may well be a wide range of interpretation over a particular Marxist
text, there is a fairly broad agreement that only certain texts can
count in this way. Thus, whilst it would be of importance to show that
Marx or Lenin held opinion X, it would be absurd to cite the writings
of Adolf Hitler or J S Mill.
Not anything, then, can count as a contribution to such a debate. The
procedure is not an arbitrary one. This leads to the second feature of
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such debates, the part played by the notion of authority, or an authority.
As we noted above, to show that Marx or Lenin opposed a certain action
can be enoughtto stop further argument. To go on would be as absurd
as a Christian saying "I know that X is against the will of God, but I
still don't see why I shouldn't do it". This is not to give Marx
divine status, merely to point out that his works have the status of
authorities for adherents of Marxism.
Theological debates provide a striking comparison. One thinks of St.
Augustine's famous remark at the end of the Pelagian controversy "Roma
2
locuta est, causa finita est". Lest anyone think that such deference
to authority is dead, a modern example shows the same point. In G Egner's
3
book Birth Regulation and Catholic Belief the author examines (and
finds wanting) the traditional arguments put forward by fellow Roman
Catholics against contraception. However, he also accepts that there
is a tradition in the Catholic Church against contraception, and the fact
that such practices have been condemned by Popes, Saints and Councils of
the Church, counts as an objection against his position. It need not
be the end of the matter, for a tradition isn't everything. He might
for example show that the tradition has been mis-interpreted by his
opponents, or that it conflicts with a more fundamental area of Christian
belief, and that it should therefore be abandoned. The point is that
it is recognised as an objection that must be faced, in a way that the
objection "But that's unscientific" would not. Now in much the same
way a Marxist might feel able to say "Well, so much the worse for Marx
2
"Rome has spoken, the debate is ended."
3
G Egner, Birth Regulation and Catholic Belief (London: Sheed and Ward,
1966).
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if he believed Y", but he would have to admit that it was an objection
that Marx disagreed. And if he found himself disagreeing with Marx a
great deal then the end of his allegiance to Marxism would be near at
hand.
Such a parallel should not be pressed too far. It might be suggested
that the Bible is not a document that is self interpreting and that there
was at one time a body recognised as the true interpreter of scripture
- the Catholic Church. What happened at the Reformation was that the
appeal to the Pope as a source of aothority lost its force for some
Christians; the authority of the Papacy being rejected in favour of
the Bible alone. In such circumstances a prescription such as Augustine's
loses its force to compel all those who are not Roman Catholics. A
unity was thereby lost for Christendom. On the other hand, so the
argument might run, the writings of Marx have been matters of dispute
from the very start and there has never been a widely accepted authority
in a position analogous to that of the Catholic Church.
This point becomes of some importance when we consider a possible
objection to this characterisation of debates between Marxists. The
objection is simply that it ij> pejorative to pretend that all debates
between Marxists are over who are the real heirs to the true gospel of
Marxist thought and never about empirical matters. Rosa Luxemburg, for
example, was right about the facts and Berastein was wrong; these
disputes were, therefore, factual matters thatccould be settled in favour
of one side or the other.
Now I have no wish to argue that matters of truth and falsity never arise
in debates between Marxists. Someone might argue that event Y took pllce
in 1066, another that it took place on 1067 or whatever and, of course,
such a dispute could be settled upon production of the appropriate evidence.
But this is not quite what I have in mind here.
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What evidence would one produce to show that the Russian Revolution
installed the dictatorship of the proletariat in that country ? The
terms used here^ 'devolution', 'proletarian dictatorship' and so on are
not descriptive terms that are capable of verification (did it or didn't
it happen ?) but evaluative terms that already provoke controversy. It
is not as if all the disputing parties are agreed as to what would count
as an example of X and are looking for one, they are disagreeing over
the very examples themselves. Thus the Marxist who claims that the
Soviet Union is 'State Capitalist' is not likely to be convinced of his
error by a description of the events in the USSR since 1917, since the
terms used by himself or his opponent already decide the question in
advance of any evidence offered. There are no appropriate criteria for
deciding between rival Marxist claims to the authenticity or otherwise
of certain political actions. History cannot provide them because
the description of the events offered by the historian has no place for
either proletarian dictatorship or state capitalism - they are not
explanatory hypotheses about the past since our description of the events
in the Soviet Union would not be less complete or comprehensible if they
were left out. In the same way that the hittorian's description of
events since the birth of Jesus is not enhanced by referring to the advent
of the Kingdom of God at that time. It makes no difference to how
things were.
Nor can a closer study of Marxism illuminate what is the correct view to
hold about the past, or the correct action to take in the future. There
are two reasons for this. Firstly, there is no 'correct' version of
Marxism that would command allegiance from all who look without the blinkers
of prejudice. Any assessment of Marxism from within is bound to beg the
question and any assessment from outside Marxism will only be able to note
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that there are many differing Marxist groups who disagree, but who quote
the same works in the support of their respective positions. There are,
for example, no 'core' doctrines that all Marxists must hold (and in the
same way) in order to be called Marxists - where would we find them
without begging precisely those points at issue. To reject Engels
or Stalin or even Lenin as 'un-Marxist' might tell a listener the kind
of Marxist we are, but it will not illuminate the logic of Marxism.
The absurdity of saying that Engels wasn't 'really' a Marxist could be
paralleled by saying that the Pope isn't 'really' a Christian. If
there is no ^essence' to Marxism, neither is there some kind of original
set of beliefs that Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin or Althusser can be shown to
have diverged fundamentally from. The difficulty here can be brought
out by asking the question "When did Marx become a Marxist"?^ Do we
need to take all of Marx's works into account, should we abandon the
earlier ones as Althusser suggests, or are the contributions of Engels and
Lenin vital to Marxism ? Clearly the various Marxist parties have their
own answers to these questions, the point is that they cannot be settled
by an appeal to something called *t;he facts'.
Secondly, Marxism cannot specify in any detail those actions which count
as moves towards 'a Marxist society' or are genuinely 'revolutionary' as
opposed to 'counter-revolutionary'. Marxism is not a party manifesto
with political objectives, though Marxist groups might have both. All a
doctrine like Marxism can do is talk of creating a Socialist society, of
ending 'exploitation' and 'alienation', it cannot tell us whether or not
programme X will bring about that end, or whether Soviet citizens are
'unalienated'.
4
And to continue the parallel with Christianity, a similar difficulty
can be raised by asking "When did Jesus become a Christian ?"
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Thus debates between Marxists as to whether the revolution of 1917 or
1948 in China were 'socialist' are not settled by appealing to the facts
at all. They are in fact, not settled.
In debates between Marxists, then, we have seen that there are not
conclusive criteria that can be brought to bear by either side, but that
nevertheless there is a broad agreement as to the language used in such
disputes, the range of concepts and judgements invoked. As we shall see
later on, though Marxists might disagree over the conditions under which
socialism can be said to flourish, they do agree that socialism is
something to be fought for and that terms such as 'ciass', 'alienation'
and 'exploitation' are the vocabulary of such a struggle. To use a
phrase of Wittgenstein's, they bear a family resemblance to each other
and their disputes, if we read fthem attentively, remind us just how much
they have in common.
Of course, not all arguments between members of the same ideology or party
are like this. Conservatives do not invoke Disraeli or Burke in quite
the same way that Marxists invoke Lenin or Trotsky. The case of Liberalism
shows more clearly just how far members of the same ideology can differ
in terms of both intellectual grounds and practical recommendations. Locke,
JSS Mill, T H Green and Herbert Spencer are all recognised as Liberals,
yet they not only disagreed on how best to promote Liberal values, they
disagreed as to what Liberal values were. As we saw in Chapter 4,
Locke saw 'human rights' as the key, Mill appealed to 'utility', Green
appealed to 'moral self-realisation' and Spencer seems to have believed
in a biological (and therefore non-moral) view of politics. Now none
of these is the 'real' Liberal, nor is Liberalism an amalgam of all these
positions. Rather they are positions that have, at one time or another,
seemed more or less compelling to those who called themselves Liberals.
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Modern Liberals, for example, seem to favour the arguments that promote
'positive' liberty, rather than seeing liberty as the mere absence of
restraint. Yet it is difficult to see what common grounds could be
offered for deciding between the two views any more than Mill's appeal
to utility could be said to refute Green's talk of self-realisation.
I hope that none of this has given the impression of being too cut and
dried. Plainly there are figures who have changed from one ideology
to another and those who are on the borderline b«t»een competing ideo¬
logies. Different ideologies are not sealed compartments, incapable
of change or adaptation.
Also, it should be noted again that the relationship between ideological
adherence and a philosophical stance is often a complex one. There
is no obvious relationship between philosophy and ideology. T H Green
and Mill were both Liberals, yet nothing could have been further from
Mill's conception of moral duty than that of Green. On the other hand,
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen admitted that he found utilitarianism a
sympathetic creed, though he remained a staunch Conservative.
II
Before turning to consider those disputes between members of opposing
ideologies, it is necessary to say something about what is involved in
the notion of settling an argument. Part of the difficulty I wish to
raise is precisely what counts as a solution to a disagreement of this
kind. At first glance it appears that different things will count as
solutions, or, as K R Minogue puts it, Apartheid is a problem for blacks,
5
but a solution for Afrikaaners.
5
K R Minogue, The Liberal Mind .(London: Methuen, 1963).
309
Clearly, part of calling an exchange of words an argument is the pre¬
supposition that there are common standards or criteria available to
provide a framework as to what counts for or against an assertion. If
the Professor is uncertain as to whether or not there are snakes in
Iceland then he can go there, hire guides, peer at the ground through a
strong magnifying glass and so on. Of course, there may be matters of
fact that are at present unresolveble because we lack sufficiently soph¬
isticated techniques or instruments. The point is that it is agreed
what would count as a test of that assertion. In science, for example,
two disputing scientists would be bound by the results of a properly
conducted experiment.
The technique of 'looking and seeing' is not the paradigm for all
arguments however. Questions of logic, whatever Lenin might have
thought, are not empirical matters but are settled in advance of any
evidence.** As Wittgenstein argued there are a great many different
kinds of argument with more, or less, developed criteria for deciding
between competing positions. To realist this one only has to look at
the differences between arguments in philosophy, history, aesthetics,
mathematics, or theology; for finding a solution will depend upon using
appropriate procedures and they may differ from case to case.
The question is then, "Are there appropriate criteria for settling
ideological disputes" ? As we have already seen, arguments between
members of the same ideology have appropriate arguments and authorities
that can be advanced and recognised as contributing to the debate at
hand. Equally, they are not always decisive; it is usually the case
**
Cf. L Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 5.552.
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that defeat for one side in practical political terms is followed by
the abandonment of their theoretical stance rather than vice irersa. The
victory of Stalin's view of Marxism over that of Trotsky in the Soviety
Union is a good example of this.
If we look, not at the debate between the fellow Marxists, Stalin and
Trotsky, but between Burke and Paine, it soon becomes apparent that noH
only do the two sides disagree as to the appropriate criteria for settling
their quarrel, but that there are no such criteria. This is because
their dispute is not so much about the course of the French Revolution
but about the significance of such an event. Now this does not mean
that there are no factual errors in either account, nor that such issues
are not of legitimate interest to us. It is not, for example, easy to
sympathise with Burke when he lambasts the character of the leading
revolutionaries, only to contrast them with the noneetoo obvious virtues
of the French Queen.^ It can be readily agreed that bias and error
creep in; given that Paine admits that he has not even read Burke's
work the whole way through, it is clear that we can at least cast doubt
on his sense of academic detachment. The crucial point, however, comes
when they both agree as to what happened, but offer completely different
interpretations of it. Whereas Paine saw the significance of the
revolution in bringing France from childhood to adulthood (by adopting
'reason'), Burke saw nothing regression into barbarism through the
abandoning of tradition. In short, events become transformed when
placed in their respective frameworks. Burke thought it a scandal
7
E Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, (Penguin, 1969) 169-70.
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that the revolutionaries admitted Louis XVI was by no means a bad king
and yet still rebel against him. Paine thought that this demonstrated
a commendable desire to act, not out of personal hatred or passion,
but out of principle. Again, Burke held that the executions, the
reign of terror, the September massacres, all showed hhe kind of
undesirable anarchists that were now at the helm of the state. Such
men were unable even to uphold a minimum of law and order. Paine's reply
was that these actions, terrible as they were could not be seen as
the true spirit of the revolution, but of the pre-revolutionary sickness
g
that had fostered under the repressive Bourbon state.
To take a more modern example, a Marxist and a Nationalist might perfectly
well agree that the First World War broke out in 1914, that British
losses at the Somme were N thousand (or rather, they would agree over
what kind of evidence could substantiate or refufie such claims). What
they would disagree about is the significance that those facts have.
They see the war in different ways, one as a conflict between classes,
the other as a conflict between nations. In this case there is no
appropriate procedure for deciding between the two, for each ideology
provides the grounds for assessment. I have already noted that the
famous statement 'All history is the history of class stouggle' is not
an empirical generalisation, but lays down a condition for understanding
any historical event within Marxism. It provides a framework for
understanding all historical events. There could he aore be an event
that did not illustrate class struggle than there could be an unalienated
O
T Paine, The Rights of Man (Penguin, 1969), 71 & 81.
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man within capitalism, or a married bachelor. 'All history is ...'
stands in relation to past events in the same way that 'All events have
g
a cause' stands in relation to those events investigated by science.
By this I mean that since it provides the framework for the proper (in
Marxist terms) understanding of that evidence. The situation is not,
for example, analogous to two scientists discussing what would count as
evidence for a particular hypothesis, where there must be things that
would not count as evidence. For the Marxist anything and everything
is evidence, nothing is irrelevant or excluded.
Again, this has nothing to do with the case where the Marxist or his
opponent may be proved to be correct over a particular matter of fact.
An example of the relationship between a matter of fact and ideological
commitment would be of the Scottish Nationalist who says "I am a Scottish
Nationalist because I believe that if Scotland becomes independent it
will be more prosperous in economic terms that would otheewise be the case".
Such a person may well come to feel that this is not the case, having
been given evidence that UK subsidies are at higher levels in Scotland
and so on, and convinced that Scotland will not be more prosperous if
it bbcomes independent (I am assuming here, for the sake of argument
that there are no disputes over whether the facts are correct here.).
He or she may cease to be a Nationalist and feel that its claims are
false or dishonest. But, hy point is that this is a very different
matter from refuting Nationalism, for Nationalism is not just about
that. There are other strands, such as the importance of Scottish
culture, the advantages o§ greater democracy and so on which mean that
g ■' ' ••'*■*» '• • ' '
This would sot be true. Oof m|j£bt ke that learning'
'mere"abc>ut help elucidate what w^S Tpeant by 'class
struggle'* whereas leaxsiiag ®ore about acif^ not involve the
same concept of cabsaUfjfiT-*f^rhie is debatable,
thought ean^t be gone into here. ......
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Nationalism itself cannot be killed off by a single thrust. Some
people may, for example, argue that it is better to be poor but free,
or that economic advancement is meaningless if it is not tied to a
love of Scottish institutions, culture and the way of life that goes
with it. Within an ideology there may be many factual claims at any
given time, but they are couched in such a form that their refutation
can be accounted for within the particular ideological framework.
Thus nationalisation does not appear to be successful because of the
failure to go far enough and current 'monetarist' policies fail
because of 'the world recession' or because they have not been properly
implemented or whatever.
The kind of dispute that we have here might be illuminated by looking at
moral disagreements. Now much ink has been spilt over the question of
the relationship between matters of fact and judgements of value.
Some philosophers, such as R M HareL° have argued that facts and values
are logically independent, such that an evaluative conclusion cannot
be drawn from a factual premise. Others, such as Phillipa Foot,1^ have
argued that some factual statements entail a moral conclusion, a
conclusion, moreover, that must be the same for all moral agents.
Hare's account suggests that there is a 'world' of facts and in the
case of moral judgements an evaluative element is added. This is done
by the agent concerned deciding to make a principle universal. Particular
judgements of value follow from the application of these universal
10
R M Hare, The Language of Morals, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972)
Freedom and Reason, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1963)
P Foot, Moral Beliefs, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1958
Moral Arguments, Mind, 1958.
314
principles to particular cases. Thus, in Hare's account it is possible
to decide to be against lying in the same way that it is possible to
decide to be against capital punishment. What this account misses, as
12
Julius Kovesi points out in his book Moral Notions is that moral terms
do not evaluate a world of descriptions, they describe a world of
evaluations. There is, for example, no purely factual account of lying,
such that we would decide to be for or against it. This is not because
it has no descriptive content, but because we learn how to use the term
'lying' in the course of learning the term 'wrong'. From the start,
lying has a moral importance for us and we learn to pick it out as
something that should be avoided and condemn people because they tell
13
lies and so on. As H 0 Mounce puts it, to ask "Ought lying to be
avoided ?" would be like asking "Ought I to avoid what I ought to avoid ?"
(This should not be confused with the question of whether a particular
lie would be justified in exceptional circumstances or not. Such a
matter would only be as ar»ral dilemma if lies were already seen as things
to be avoided.)
It does not follow from this, however, that the same moral conclusion
must be reached by all moral agents who have the facts before them. The
same facts can entail different moral conclusions, especially when
different moral practices are involved. Thus the statement that X
committed suicide will carry a different weight for O'X the Roman Catholic
and McX the atheist. For the former, suicide is just one of the ways in
which a person can do wrong, for the latter it might have no moral
significance at all.
12
J Kovesi, Moral Notions (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967).
13
D Z Phillips and H 0 Mounce, Moral Practices (London, Routlege & Kegan
Paul, 196S). I am indebted to this book for much of the argument in
the next throa paragraphs. I do not:, of course, claim the approval
of either author for the use to which I have put their arguments.
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If we look at an area of deep disagreement such as abortion, we can see
that both sides might agree that the mother's life is in danger or that
an extra child might place a great burden on the family resources.
For one side, this is enough to justify termination, but for the other
killing what is seen as a human life cannot be justified, whatever the
circumstances. There is no possibility here of settling the matter
by an appeal to some concept such as human good or harm; for it is
precisely over what is to count as good or harm that the two sides
disagree. What is understood to count as good will be different for
various moral practices or traditions, and it is the tradition that
orders the way in which the facts are to be understood. Thus the
Samurai who commits suicide rather than suffer dishonour and the Catholic
who feels suicide to be a grave sin are worlds apart.
It should be emphasised bare that there is, of course, room for either
side to change their mind, or be convinced by their opponent. My point
is that to recognise this, to change one's moral standards or way of
life is nothing like recognising that one has made an error in a mathy
ematical calculation or recongising a mistake in a crucial experiment.^
This may seem to have taken the discussion a long way from disputes
between different ideologies. However, having seen the incommensurable
nature of different moral positions and the way in which really funda¬
mental moral disagreements may fail to find a solution, we can see that
disputes between different ideologies display many similar characteristics.
The Liberal and the Marxist may both agree that the days lost through
strikes in Britain have increased since the way, but to the Marxist this
£4
The person who tries to excuse a moral failing or an evil action on the
grounds "It was a "-istake" is surely not meeting the criticism being
made. For example, Richard Nixon's defence of his handling of
Watergate.
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indicates something about the class nature of society, the deepening
capitalist recession and the class consciousness of British workers.
To the Liberal it might indicate that the balance between the various
sections of the community that is essential for harmony in society has
been disturbed and must be restored.
As we have altseady seen, the arguments and conclusions are based upon
different premises. Mill for example starts from the notion that the
highest value must be placed upon the greatest good of the greatest
number and asserts that democracy is the pre-requisite of progress. On
the other hand, Sir Henry Maine denied that democracy had brought about
15
what he understood to be progress and rejected the idea that democracy
and freedom, so beloved by Mill, were the highest ends of government at
all. ^ How can Mill's appeal to freedom and utility refute Maine's
appeal to the virtuee of nationhood ?
To risk being prolix, such disagreements are not like disagreements
between two scientists, where one explanation would be replaced by another
of the same sort. With ideologist, the correct analogy would be where
one of the disputing scientists ceased to see the point of science any
more. If, for example, Lenin had become a Nationalist, or Lord Hailsham
joined the Socialist Workers' Party, it would not mean that they now had
a superior explanation of political activity: rather it would be that in
the one case Marxism and in the other, Conservatism, no longer played
any part in their lives, or way of thinking about politics.
It is important here to see that the Marxist and Nationalist who argue
about the First World War and Burke and Paine are not, strictly speaking,
Any such argument- will be circular here since for Mill a progressive
society simply i_s one that is democratic (and vice versa for Maine).
See the earlier quotation from his Popular Government on page 63.
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contradicting each other in their respective accounts of events. A
series of remarks by Wittgenstein an the La;: Judgement helps to bring
this out. He compares two people disagreeing over rhe statements
(i) there is a German plane overhead, (ii) there will be a Last
Judgement. In the former case, although there is disagreement, the
judgements are still fairly close together, in the . ..It er case, diaagree-
ment indicates a vast gulf between them. He continues:
Suppose someone is ill and he says: "This is a
punsihment," and I say, "If I'm ill, I don't
think of punishment at all". If you say: "Do
you believe the opposite ?" - you can call it
believing the opposite, but it is entirely different
from what we would normally call believing the
opposite.
I think differently, in a different way. I say
different things to myself. I have different
pictures.
It is this way: if someone said "Wittgenstein,
you don't take illness as a punishment, so what
do you believe "? - I'd say, "I don't have any
thoughts of punishment ..."
17
In a similar way the Marxist and the Liberal or Nationalist have
pictures before them when they consider the General Strike or World
War I. In the way that the believer sees illness as a punishment and
the sceptic does not, so the Marxist sees the Great War as an example
of 'ciass struggle' and the Liberal does not. They do not, strictly
speaking, contradict each other because they are not describing, or
misrepresenting the same event or entity. By this I mean that
'capitalism' and 'the state' are not like cats and sheep that can be
more (or less) accurately described by either side. "Capitalism' is
L WittgeneSein, Lectures on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious
Belief, Ed C Barratt SJ (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1966), 55.
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a different thing in Liberalism than in Marxism. The Marxist account
of 'capitalism' cannot be divorced from such notions as 'alienation',
'exploitation', 'class' and so on, and since Liberalism has no place
for these concepts, it cannot be said to be mis-describing 'capitalism'
in the sense understood by Marxists. It has a different understanding
of capitalism. When a Marxist says "The Great War was an example of
class struggle ..." the Liberal does not want to say "No it wasn't"
(cf "There is an elephant in the room" - "No there isn't"), but to talk
in a completely different way about balance, reason, the guilt of
individuals and so on. To adapt the passage above, when the Marxist
says "If you don't see the war as a struggle between classes, what do
you believe ?" the Liberal says "I don't have any thoughts of classes."
In this sense the world of the Marxist and the world of the Liberal are
complete, and admit nf no intrusion; for everything must demonstrate
the class nature of society in Marxism, nothing man do so in Liberalism.
Of course, people do change, become converts or cease ideological
adherence. But then, as the Tractatus puts it:
It becomes an altogether different world. It must
so to speak, wax and wane as a whole. As if by
accession br loss of meaning.
18
There are two objections that might be brought against my arguments
here. Firstly, someone might suggest that although matters of social
or historical fact are difficult to settle or resolve, due to ambiguity
in the evidence or lack of reliable sources, there is no difficulty in
principle. The situation is analogous to two scientists who need more
sophisticated ?nstrutnents or to carry out further experiments before
18
L Wittgenstein, op cit, 6.43.
deciding in favour of one hypothesis or another. Thus we can decide
between the Marxist and the Liberal interpretation of the Great War by
reference to objective (if not perfect) standards. It may well be
that both are wrong, in which case, so much the worse for them. This
call may well be echoed by those who want to argue that falsifiability
is an important feature of anything that should be able to command our
support. Indeed, the best ideology is the one which is moxt open to
falsifiability, in the same way that the best scientific theories
are those which are open to such decisive refutation.
My answer here is that ideologies are not like that. The Marxist
interpretation of the Great War does not, in the end, rely on historical
facts (though it may contain information that could, in another context
be termed historical) such that it can be decisively refuted in the way
that, for example, Trevor Roper's view of the origins of the English
Ciiil War has been completely discredited by his rivals. This is
equally true of the Liberal version of events, for the failure of
'unalienated man' and 'rational man' to appear under Socialism or Civil
Society are not like substances in a test tube or documents that we may
appraise for authenticity. I am arguing that not only does the
Marxist understanding of, say, 'capitalism' differ from the Liberal
understanding of that term, it also differs from the historian's use of
that term. The historian is using that term to dascribe a set of
economic relationships that play a part in the attempt to write a plausible
account of what took place in the past. In contrast the Marxist use of
the term cannot be divorced from its evaluative sense where such notions
as alienation, ."Iss and exploitation cluster around it. Capitalism
cannot be a neutral term in Marxism, since understanding what the term
means also involves understanding that it is alienating, exploitative
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and 30 on. History does not confirm or refute either the Marxist or
Liberal version of the past, since they belong to different logical
areas. It would, of course, be no use in objecting here that
historians also 'evaluate' the evidence (when they select which
documents to believe and so on), for that kind of evaluation is nothing
like the evaluation of capitalism that we find in Marx.
The second objection is that my understanding of what is involved in
arguments between scientists, philosophers and historians is naive.
19
For example, T S Kuhn argues that science is not just a matter of
two or more parties disputing within a universally accepted framework.
He suggests that at any given time there is a paradigm, within which
scientists argue, but that £hve& paradigms themselves shift over time.
Thus the phlogisten theory is unable to accommodate certain other
experimental findings. The initial reaction is to try and accommodate
both theories within the existing framework but when this cannot be
done a new paradigm arises which holds sway until it too changes.because
it cannot accommodate conflicting results. Problems do not take place
within a universal and unchanging context, but within a frame that
constantly changes. This, it might be suggested is similar to my
pitture of ideological disputes where the criteria are themselves the
matter of dispute. Ideological disputes are like scientific disputes
at what Kuhn would cill a time of 'paradigm shift'. Thus ideology and
science are comparable, not because ideologies are scientific or
objective, but because science is ideological or subjective. I have,
however, in my illustrations of ideological arguments shown that this
19
T S Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific PevoluSions (London, 1970).
is not the case. Though scientists may argue about the framework
within which their activity takes place, it has so to speak, a linear
progression, such that we may legitimately call the changes in
paradigms, changes in science,
They are all still attempting to do the same thing and to develop it in
such a way that problems which confront the scientific communtyy are
resolved. But this is not the case in disputes between ideologists
because Liberalism and Marxism are competitors, not collaborators.
They always run in parallel to one another. Put another way, Liberals
and Marxists are not trying to solve the same problems. A change in
Marxism would not be the same as a change in another ideology or indeed
a change in ideology. After a period of shifting paradigms, the
scientific community returns to the business of conducting experiments
and postulating hypothesis within the new paradigm, but wilhin the
category of ideological thought there are never periods of agreement
over the fundamentals of what is at issue. The Marxist and the Liberal
always disagree over what counts as the correct understanding of
political activity. What may (if we agree with Kuhn) is a temporary
state within science is a permanent fixture within ideology.
I have tried to show here that ideologies are not concerned about whether
or not certain facts pertain, but with a wider enterprise that might
be termed the search for the meaning of the world. This may draw us
back once more to parallels with religious or moral codes of conduct.
But the meaning they seek cannot be another fact within the world, for
then it would be a fact amongst facts, and could, quite simply, have
been different. If this is so then it is unlikely that history (where
any fact may have been other than it was) will be able to provide the
appropriate inspiration, or foundation.
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If we accept that disputes can only (intellectually) end where there
are appropriate criteria, and that in disputes between ideologists heuld
out no hope of providing such criteria, then it is not surprising to
find them continuing down the ages. They do end, of course, for they
run out of steam or lose their point, or are rendered redundant by the
political victory of one side or the other. Even Burke gave up
attacking the revolution after a while. It is this, rather than
intellectual agreement that brings them to a halt. As Paine put the
matter in The Rights of Man
When the tongue or pen is let loose in a frenzy
of passion, it is the man, not the subject, that
becomes exhausted.
20
Paane, op cil, 61.
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CONCLUSION
In his 'Lecture on Etihics'* Wittgenstein notes two reactions that we
may have when confronted by a work of philosophy. We may say words
to the effect 'Well, I can see what he wants to say, but how is he
going to get there ?" or we may conclude "I can see the individual
arguments, but what does it all add up to ?". Having reread this
thesis in order to provide a conclusion, these words have a particular
pertinence. Indeed, it may be felt that if 280 or so pages have not
made the argument reasonably clear, then there is little that is likely
to be achieved in another few hundred words. Worse still, conclusions
that make attempts to sum up a work often raise as many unresolved
questions as the rest of the book does, with no clear link between
them and the text they are supposed to be explicating.
I shall, therefore, be brief, and say that this thesis starts with a
problem or series of problems about how we, as philosophers, are to
understand ideological thought. In this case the subject is how
ideologists understand and use the past. In writing about the past,
are ideologists merely producing a poor version of history, such that
it ought to be condemned for its inadequacy ? or are they engaged
in a more complex enterprise in which the past is integrated (or at
least related) within a wider context such that it can be more profitably
understood as a distinct type of activity ?
The path of this thesis has been to try and clear a space for the
philosophical discussion of ideological thought, to show how that
thought is to be understood, and then to try and see how the ideological
understanding of the past is related to a discipline such as history
on one hand, and more practically orientated activities such as religion
*
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and morality on the other. The conclusion (and given the tentative
nature of philosophical conclusions outlined in Chapter 1, this may
not be saying much) is that the past in ideological thought is part
of an elaboration of what is involved in a particular ideology, rather
than a foundation for it. Looking at an ideology and deciding whether
we accept it or not is trying to appreciate a pictury of the world and
the discussion of that ideology involves a further elaboration of what
is involved, rather than digging deeper towards a bedrock of certainty.
In this ideology is more akin to a moral perspective than to an
academic enterprise.
Perhaps the world and politics would be better places without ideologies,
but as philosophers, it is surely our task to make what sense we can
of them and to locate the part of logical space that they occupy. We
can leave the task of combatting them to people.
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